

Mīmāṃsā in Controversy

By

Shripad Bhat



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Preface

The object of the present work is to study the controversy between Mīmāṃsakas and the exponents of heterodox systems. While studying original Sanskrit texts in traditional manner, we come across many references like, 'atra kecit', 'iti Bauddāḥ', 'iti Naiyāyikāḥ' etc. but they do not have recognitions, in the sense, we do not know whose views are cited. Just out of curiosity, while thinking the same took the task for M. Phil dissertation. Prof. S. S. Bahulkar gave me manuscripts of Bhavya's *Madhyamaka-hrdayakārikā* in which Bhavya refuted the doctrines of Mīmāṃsakas along with the doctrines of Hinduism. In the same way, the extension of the same topic was decided for Ph.D. thesis.

The controversy, it seems, originated in the Bhāṣyas and developed in the Vārttikas. As far as the present study is concerned, we cannot find any kind of controvertial notion in Jaimini sūtras. Śābara refers to Buddhism. During his time, mostly, Buddhism was rising up. Afterwards, Buddhism developed with rational thinking and attacked orthodox systems of philosophy. Exponents from Buddhism like Dinnāga, Bhāvaviveka, Dharmakīrti seriously criticized the doctrines of various orthodox schools. On the other hand, Kumārila refuted doctrines of Buddhism in his *Ślokavārttika* which served the purpose of attack particularly on Buddhism. Śāntarakṣita dealt with the name and large quotations from the works of Śābara and Kumārila and refuted their doctrines. Thus, the controversy has been found developed with the Mīmāṃsakas. As far as the limitation of the present study is concerned heterodox refutation of Mīmāṃsā has been taken into consideration but not of other orthodox systems of Indian philosophy.

I express my deep sense of gratitude towards my guide Prof. S. S. Bahulkar who suggested the topic and guided in completing

the thesis. I must thank Dr. P. P. Gokhale who kindly went through some portion of the thesis and offered valuable suggestions. I must make a special mention of my obligation to Prof. D. V. Garge, Prof. P. G. Lalye, Prof. Ujjwala Jha and Dr. R. N. Aralikatti who made valuable suggestions for the publication of thesis in the form of book. I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks towards the authorities of the Vidyapeeth for granting me permission to publish the thesis. I cannot sufficiently grateful to my parents and family members for their constant encouragement in completing the thesis and publishing the same.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Ait. Br.	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.
Buddhist.....	Buddhist Logic.
Buddhism.....	Buddhism as presented by Brāhmanical systems.
Buddhist philosophy.....	The Buddhist philosophy as presented in Mīmāṃsā Śloka-vārttika.
Ch.Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
Diñnāga.....	Diñnāga on Perception.
Epistemology.....	Epistemology of Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā.
Early Buddhist.....	Early Buddhist Theory of knowledge.
Hist..... of Dharma.....	History of Dharmaśāstra.
Hist..... Ind..... Log.....	History of Indian Logic.
Hist..... Ind..... Phil....	History of Indian philosophy.
JS	Jaimini Sūtra.
JSMN	Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī.
KSV	Kāśikā on Śloka-vārttika.
MD	Mīmāṃsā Darśana.
MHK	Madhyamakahrdayakārikā.
MM	Mānameyodaya.
MTN	Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra.
NB	Nyāyabindu.
NKC	Nyāyakumudacandra.
NR	Nyāyaratnākara.
NRM	Nyāyaratnamālā
Perception.....	Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief
PKM	Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa.
PMS	Parīkṣāmukhasūtra.
Pūrvamīmāṃsā.....	Pūrvamīmāṃsā in its sources.

PPB Praśastapādabhāṣya.
PS Pramāṇasamuccaya.
PV Pramāṇavārttika.
PVB Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya.
RKT Ratnākarāvatārikā.
Refutation..... Refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas by the Buddhists.
RV Rgveda
SB Śābarabhāṣya.
Śat. Br. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.
SD Śāstradīpikā.
Structural..... Structural Depth of Indian thought.
SDS Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha.
SV Ślokavārttika.
Tai. Br. Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa.
TPS Tattvopaplavasīmha.
TR Tantrarahasya.
TS Tattvasāṅgraha.
Tai. Sam. Taittirīyasamhitā.
TT Tātparyāṭikā.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

The Phūrvamīmāṃsā school plays an important role in the development of Indian philosophy, through the ages. The object of that school seems to have been *vedārthavicāra* or the investigation into the interpretation of the Vedas. In order to understand the Vedas in the traditional manner, the Mīmāṃsā sūtras of Jaimini serve as an important tool of interpretation. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact date of Jaimini, it is generally assumed that the sūtras belong to the period of 400 B.C.¹

As a matter of fact, we do not find any direct references either to the Cārvākas or the Buddhist or the Jaina doctrine in the sūtras themselves. The commentators like Śābara, Kumārila, Pārthasārathi clearly refer to Buddhist as the major opponents attacking the orthodox systems of philosophy and trying to establish their own doctrines. The authority of the Vedas was frequently challenged and criticised by the anti-Vedic philosophers. Criticising the Vedic religion, they made an attack on the faith of the society in the Vedas and Vedic sacrifices. Under these circumstances, the exponents of Vedic religions had to review and re-establish their own systems by refuting the opponents.

The sūtras of Pūrvamīmāṃsā of Jaimini were interpreted by some ancient commentators, such as, Bodhāyana and others. However the interpretation made by them was not capable of refuting the arguments of Buddhists, and they did not consider Dharma as the object of investigation. According to these commentators, every one is expected to obey the Vedic injunctions without questioning their validity and without expecting any

benefit whatsoever from the performance of the Vedic rites. The system of Mīmāṃsā as interpreted by the early authors became unpopular, since none was likely to obey the Vedic injunctions, if there was no possibility of achieving any desired object from the performance of sacrifices.²

Śābarasvāmin (Circa. ... 200 - 400 A.D.), had a two-fold purpose for writing a commentry on the sūtras of Jaimini. First, he wanted to re-establish the proper meaning of the sūtras of Jaimini by discarding the innovations made by ancient authors and secondly, he had to save the Dharmamīmāṃsā from the attacks of the non-Vedic tenets. He introduced, for the first-time, the epistemology in this system which proved the Vedic doctrine as valid and rejected the theories of Buddhism i.e. *nirālambanavāda* and *śūnyavāda*. Śābara explicitly mentions the Buddhists as Māhāyānikas.³ He established the theory that the duty is performed for producing individual merit and established the existence of soul as a separate entity enjoying the results of merit.

After the period of Śābarasvāmin, the Buddhist philosophers, such as, Vasubandhu, Diṇnāga, Bhāvaviveka, and Dharmakīrti made great efforts to disprove the doctrines of the orthodox systems, mainly those of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. During the period, ranging from 3rd to 6th century A.D., the Buddhist philosophy and logic enjoyed greater popularity due to the writings of these authors. Until then, there were no works worthy of mention written by any author to support the doctrines of the these systems.

The *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu (400-80 A.D.) attempted to present the Sautrāntika position, refuting other Buddhistic and non-Buddhistic thought⁴. Vasubandhu was a well-known teacher of logic. He himself composed a large number of valuable works. Some of them are; *Abhidharmakośa*, *Karmasiddhi*, *Viṃśatikā*, *Triṃśatikā*, *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* and so on⁵.

The *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the masterpiece of Diṇnāga (circa 480-540 A.D.) marks an epoch in the history of Indian logic. The PS as its title states, is "a collection (of remarks) on the means

of (valid) cognition". Diṇnāga's original Sanskrit works are not extant, save a few fragments collected and published by Prof. Randle and only Tibetan versions of them are at present available. The Tibetan text and Sanskrit restoration of the PS with critical notes are now offered to the public through the labours of H.R. Ramaswamy Iyengar. This helps us to lay the foundation for an accurate and scientific study of the history of Indian Logic.

Indian philosophical works written after Diṇnāga contain numerous references to him and about hundred quotations from his works are found scattered in several subsequent works. Randle has collected and edited some of the fragments found in the *Nyāyavārttika* and its *Ṭikā* by Vācaspatimiśra. Ramaswamy Iyengar edited the passages found in the *Ślokavārttikaṭīkā* of Pārthasārathimiśra and identified them with the passages in the Tibetan text of PS. Diṇnāga first expounds his position and then goes on to criticise the views of other schools, like the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsā. Diṇnāga, with his profound insight into logic and the problems of epistemology, offered a challenge to rival Brāhmanical systems. Udyotakara of Nyāya school, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of the Mīmāṃsā school, Mallavādin of the Jaina school made vehement attacks on his doctrines as presented in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*⁶.

Bhāvaviveka (5th cent. A.D.) an exponent of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism did a valuable service to Indian philosophy. His famous work *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* with its auto-commentary *Tarkajvālā* supplies much information regarding the theories and the practices of Brāhmanical and non-Brāhmanical schools. The *Tarkajvālā* gives full exposition of the views of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā often quoting from the original texts. In the ninth chapter titled a *Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra*, he elaborates some Brāhmanical concepts mainly related to the Mīmāṃsā system, such as, *mokṣa*, *vedāpauruṣeyatva*, *śabdanityatva*, *śabdaprāmāṇya* and *sōmapāna*. He rejects *yajñīyahimsā*, *surāpāna* and *svarga* along with the concepts of Mīmāṃsā mentioned in the *pūrvapakṣa*⁷.

Dharmakīrti (circa..... 650 A.D.) is the author of numerous works on logic. After Diṇnāga, Dharmakīrti accepted the challenge

of the opponents. He composed a detailed commentary i.e. *Pramāṇavārttika* on *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dīnāga in which he replied to the objections raised by the non-Buddhist philosophers. His other works on logic are; *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, *Hetubindu*, *Nyāyabindu*, *Sambandhāntaraparīkṣā*, *Vādanyāya* and *Santānāntarasiddhi*. *Pramāṇavārttika* is the main work among his all treatises⁸.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (7th Cent. A.D.) appears to have composed five Vārttikas on the Bhāṣya of Śabarasvāmin. They are known as the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, *Madhyamaṭikā*, *Ślokavārttika*, *Tantravārttika*, and *Ṭupṭikā*. Among these, the last three works only are existent now and they form a complete commentary on the twelve chapters of the Bhāṣya. Ramaswamy Shastri opines that the SV is an abridged form of the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, a longer extent of the same subject. Nothing, however is known about the *Madhyamaṭikā* of Kumārila. SV of Kumārila occupies a unique place, not only in the history of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, but in the whole Indian philosophy. SV is the most important part of the Mīmāṃsā and it has been raised to the status of an independent system of philosophy. There would be hardly any work on Buddhism or Jainism where in a large number of verses of Kumārila are not quoted for refutation. The Buddhists and the Jainas have made great efforts to refute the well-established doctrines of Kumārila in their works⁹.

Both Śabarasvāmin and Kumārila introduced several reforms in the Mīmāṃsā system, condemning the method of Bādari school, with a view to making the system more useful to the people. Kumārila opens his SV with a great contempt towards certain early Mīmāṃsāka who made the system akin to heterodox. He states in a verse that his attempt to write his Vārttika was meant to bring the system back to the orthodox lines¹⁰.

Prabhākara (7th cent. A.D.) who follows the path of Bādari, had written commentaries on the Bhāṣya of Śabara. He really belonged to the opposite camp and deliberately attempted to establish his own contrary doctrines through the writings of Śabarasvāmin¹¹. However, people, in general, rejected the

Prabhākara school and adopted the Bhāṭṭa school in their daily actions, Vedic or nonVedic and always preferred a determination in the beginning of every action where the result of action undertaken was openly declared by them¹².

The controversy in Mīmāṃsā philosophy introduced by Śabara, has given ample scope to Kumārila for establishing the Mīmāṃsā system of philosophy on a sound basis and for refuting the arguments of Buddhists. Kumārila rejects the Buddhist doctrines in his works, especially in the *Ślokavārttika*. Hence, it seems that he was considered to be a real opponent of Buddhism because he alone opposed the Buddhist's views, mainly those of Dīnāga and Dharmakīrti, with sound arguments.

Stcherbatsky called Prabhākara as a real bastard son of Buddhism¹³. Although a disciple of Kumārila, Prabhākara stood against his teacher in the direction of more natural views. He denies the views of Kumārila on time, space, the cosmic ether, motion and non-existence and so on. The perception of non-existence, according to him, was simply the perception of an empty place. In this respect, he fell in the line with the Buddhists. He also agrees with the Buddhists on the most important problem of illusion. According to him, illusion is due to the non-perception of difference. He admits introspection (*sva-samvedana*) as an essential character of all consciousness. Again, he admits the fundamental unity of subject, object and act of cognition and many other details. In this view, he stood against Kumārila and supported the Buddhists¹⁴. It may be the reason as to why Buddhists do not refute the views of Prabhākara. Śāntarakṣita, the author of *Tattvasaṅgraha* dealt with the name and large quotations from the works of Śabara and Kumārila and not those of Prabhākara. The reason may be that Prabhākara does not materially deviate from Śabara where as Kumārila does deviate from him in his attempt to revive the orthodox system.

Prajñākaragupta (700 A.D.) the author of the *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, was a disciple of Dharmakīrti. He was a versatile scholar intimately acquainted with the work of his predecessors, belonging to different schools. It seems that his

style has been adopted by the Mīmāṃsā exponent Pārthasārathi for his *Śāstradīpikā*¹⁵.

Vārttikālaṅkāra or *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* professes to be a mere commentary upon Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*. It is, however, much more than an ordinary commentary. Prajñākaragupta naturally defends the Buddhist position on all controvertial issues. He maintains that the existence of God, Soul, Space, and the authority of the Vedas cannot be proved. The theory that the Vedas are *apauruṣēya* is undoubtedly, logically untenable and Prajñākara finds no difficulty in dashing it to pieces¹⁶.

The school of Cārvāka, otherwise known as Lokāyata darśana plays a vital role in Indian philosophy as a pūrvapakṣa in almost all the systems and in the *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya (circa.. 14th cent. A.D.) No work, however, belonging to Lokāyata school is known so far. An exception to this *Tattvopaplavasīṃha* of Jayarāśi evinces to its sceptical tendency of the Cārvāka school.

It is clear that TPS is familiar with the philosophical doctrines of almost all important schools, Vedic and non-Vedic as well. A few quotations from the works by the Cārvāka have been traced in the Mīmāṃsā sūtras of Jaimini, the Vaiśeṣika sūtras of Kaṇāda, the Nyāya sūtras of Gautama, the Bhāṣya of Śabara, *Śloka-vārttika* of Kumārila, the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti. He criticises the *pramāṇa theory*, *pratyakṣa*, *ātmānumāna*, *śabdānityatva*, *śabdapramāṇa upamāna*, *arthāpatti*, *abhāva* and *vedāpauruṣeyatva* and so on.

After a careful study of the texts, it can be understood that Jayarāśi is a serious thinker as any other and it is true that the TPS of Jayarāśi adds a new chapter to the history of Indian philosophy.

Śāntarakṣita (705-762 A.D.), the author of *Tattvasaṅgraha* was one of the great Buddhist philosophers. It can be seen that in almost all stanzas he arranges the words in a way that the *pakṣa*, *sādhyā*, *hetu* and *drṣṭānta* invariably follow one after another in logical sequence. While stating the theories of his

opponents, he finds out very essential grounds on which his theories are based and state them one after another till their firm establishment with logical reasons and arguments. It is a noteworthy fact about the writing of Śāntarakṣita that he rarely named the authors, whose views he either quoted or explained in stating the position of his opponents before criticising them. He has quoted Kumārila extensively without naming him in all instances¹⁷.

It is an important feature of the TS that it mentions a good number of authors and philosophers whose views it records and refutes them at length. Later, Kamalaśīla follows the same way Kamalaśīla while stating the views of the different authors named only those who were pioneers in profounding of those views¹⁸. In the development of thought, hence, Śāntarakṣita's contribution is an unparalleled one. Besides, Buddha and the authors of philosophical sūtras he has mentioned a number of important authors both from orthodox and heterodox systems¹⁹.

In the course of twenty seven different examinations, he examines almost all systems of Indian philosophy, mainly those of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. Very frequently he criticises Kumārila. It seems that the TS was composed mainly to refute the arguments and theories of Kumārila and Udyotakara as the two were deadliest antagonists of Buddhism in those days. He refutes the Mīmāṃsā doctrines viz. *soul*, *sense-perception*, *inference*, *verbal congition*, *analogy*, *presumption*, *non-apprehension*, *validity of the Veda*, *eternality of word and sentences*, *self-validity of all means of cognitions* and so on.

Kamalaśīla (circa.. 740-797 A.D.) the author of the *Madhyamakālaṅkārapañjikā* was follower of Śāntarakṣita. He criticizes the Buddhist doctrines of Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools as well as non-Buddhist doctrines and proclaimed the Mādhyamika as the highest doctrine of all²⁰.

Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī of Jñānaśrīmitra (11th cent. A.D.) shows that his knowledge of different Śāstras was much above the common level. Apart from the works of his own system and those of the Naiyāyika who were his philosophical opponents,

he had utilised the works of other systems too. Mīmāṃsakas have been given more prominence by him. *Brhātṭikā* of Kumārila (now lost) along with his *Ślokavārttika* has been quoted by him in his *Nibandhāvalī*. He has made general mentions of Bhaṭṭa (i.e. Kumārila) along with his followers. Sucaritamīśra the author of *Ślokavārttikakāśikā*, has also been quoted. Among the works of Mīmāṃsā, however, *Nyāyakaṇikā* of Vācaspatimiśra has been given more prominence here. Long passages from it have been quoted at length and criticised²¹.

Bodhibhadra (circa... 11th cent. A.D.), the author of *Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana* introduced the specific doctrines of four schools of Buddhism as well as included non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools²².

Jainism, one of the major systems of Indian philosophy differs from the Mīmāṃsā system in rejecting the authority of the Vedas, eternal relation between the words and their denotations, the ethics of ritualism and in advocating the ethics of ahiṃsā and strict observance of morality.

Tattvārthādhigamasūtra of Umāsvāti (1-85 A.D.) fluctuates between the meanings of valid knowledge and the means of valid knowledge. In its former sense means of cognition is of two kinds, viz. 1) *parokṣa* and *pratyakṣa*. Umāsvāti contends that inference, verbal testimony, analogy, presumption, probability and non-apprehension are not separate sources of knowledge. He includes them under *parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). According to him the majority of them are the result of the contact of the senses with the objects which they apprehend and some of them are not sources of valid knowledge at all. All perceptions are indirect apprehensions in as much as the soul acquires them not of itself but through the medium of senses. The words *parokṣa* and *pratyakṣa* are thus used in senses quite different from those which they bear in Brāhmanic logic²³.

S. C. Vidyabhushana opines that with the commencement of historic period 453 A.D. systematic logic of the Jainism developed scholars from the both Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects who devoted themselves to the study of logic with great

interest and enthusiasm. They wrote treatises on logic which along with similar works of the Buddhists, contributed to the formation of medieval school of Indian logic²⁴. However, it is an interesting point to note that it seems, during the whole period of Indian philosophy Jainism was not considered as a major opponent by other systems. Systems like Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā hardly mention Jainism in their literature. However, since the time of Akalaṅka, the Buddhists have paid more attention to Jainism. Śāntarākṣita quotes and rejects the views of Jainism. However, some of the Jaina scholars criticise the doctrines of orthodox systems along with Mīmāṃsā.

The contribution of Samantabhadra (600 A.D.) is very important in the philosophical literature of the Jainas. He is the author of the *Āptamīmāṃsā*, *Yuktyanuśāsa* and *Svayambhustotra*. Among these, the *Āptamīmāṃsā* discusses logical problems and explains the philosophy of non-absolution. He was a Digambara preceptor²⁵.

Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (7th cent. A.D.) was a great Digambara author and commentator. He was a contemporary of Kumārila. He composed philosophical treatises in Sanskrit, such as, *Laghīyastraya*, *Nyāyaviniścaya*, *Pramāṇasaṅgraha* and *Siddhiviniścaya*²⁶. He rejects the doctrines of non-Jaina schools by quoting the original texts, like, *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti, *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila etc. Vādirājasūri (11th cent. A.D.) wrote '*Vivaraṇa*' a commentary on this work. He has traced the views of Śaṅkara, Kumārila, Praśastapāda, Īśvarakṛṣṇa and so on for the refutation of orthodox schools.

Haribhadra (circa... 11th cent. A.D.) a famous Śvetāmbara writer composed a large number of works both in Sanskrit and Prakrit. He was an eminent author in verse and prose. His *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, is an important treatise on Indian philosophy. It gives a summary of the six philosophical systems of India.

Aṣṭasāhaśrī of Vidyānanda (circa... 800 A.D.) is an exhaustive sub-commentary on the *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. It contains an elaborate exposition of various logical principles. He criticises the doctrines of the Sāṃkhya,

Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Advaita, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist philosophy. He mentions Diṇṇāga, Udyotakara, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākara, Bhartṛhari, Śabara, Prabhākara and Kumārila in various contexts²⁷. He examines the views of non-Jaina schools as pūrvapakṣa and profounds his views as siddhānta in each section. He criticises *śabdanityatva*, *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* mainly along with *bhāvanā* and *niyōga*, the doctrines of Mīmāṃsakas. He frequently adopts the views of Kumārila and Prabhākara. Vidyānanda is a distinguished Jaina philosopher belonging to the Digambara sect. His *Aṣṭasāhaśrī* a commentary on *Aṣṭaśatī* (Akalaṅka's commentary on the *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra) is perhaps, the most difficult of all the Jaina philosophical treatises²⁸.

Pramāṇamīmāṃsā of Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.) occupies an important position in the philosophical literature in India in general and in Jaina philosophical literature in particular. It is a standard text book on Jaina logic and epistemology. He criticises all means of cognitions of Mīmāṃsakas, especially those mentioned in the *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila. He cites some quotations from *Śābarabhāṣya*, *Ślokavārttika* etc. Hemacandra was the most versatile and prolific Jaina writer of Sanskrit. He belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect. His *Ayogavyācchedadvātriṃśikā* forms the first part of his hymn called *Dvātriṃśikā* and the second part refutes the doctrines of the non-Jaina systems. It is as an excellent treatise on Jaina philosophy²⁹.

Prabhācandra (circa. 9th cent. A.D.) a famous Digambara writer composed a number of commentaries on philosophical and other works. His *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* is an exhaustive commentary on the *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra* (a work on Jaina logic by Māṇikyanandin) and *Nyāyakumudacandra* another comprehensive commentary on the *Laghīyastraya* (a work on Jaina logic by Akalaṅka). Both treatises deal with all important philosophical problems. In his *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* he has mentioned Upavarṣa, Śabara, Bhartṛhari, Bāṇa, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Diṇṇāga, Udyotakara, Dharmakīrti, Vidyānanda and so on³⁰. He refutes the doctrines of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Bauddha etc. with logical reasoning. He

refutes the views of Kumārila mainly on *vedāpauruṣeyatva*, *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*, *śabdanityatva* and all means of cognitions. He cites opponents views first as Pūrvapakṣa and refutes them as siddhānta.

Vādi Devasūri (1086-1169 A.D.) composed *Pramāṇanayatattvokālāṅkāra* which is an important treatise on Jaina categories and Naya. The author was an eminent logician well versed in different systems and fully steeped in Jainanyāya treatises. He wrote an exhaustive commentary namely, *Syādvādaratnākara* on his *Pramāṇanayatattvokālāṅkāra* a standard work on the Jaina mediaval logic and epistemology. This treatise and its commentary present and develop at first the views of opponent schools set them aside and finally establish the theories on the Śvetāmbara school of Jainism³¹.

Ratnākarāvatārikā of Ratnaprabhasūri (1181 A.D.) is a commentary on *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* can safely be judged as a source book of Indian logic that was fully developed in the twelfth century. It discusses all important topics of Indian logic of that period. Vādi Devasūri enhanced the utility of the work by *Syādvādaratnākara* by writing a commentary on that work³². As its name suggests, it is an ocean in depth and extent. Hence, the author's pupil Ratnaprabhasūri composed a brief and elucidatory commentary *Ratnākarāvatārikā* on it. He rejects the main doctrines of Mīmāṃsā like *vedāpauruṣeyatva*, *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*, *śabdanityatva* and all means of cognitions.

Research work done so far - Regarding the controversy between the orthodox and heterodox systems we can find only a few modern works. However, some scholars like, Th. stcherbatsky, H.N. Randle, R. Samkriyayana, H. Nakamura, Eli Franco, P. T. Raju, and so on give as many as hints regarding the controvertial notions between the orthodox and the heterodox systems in their works. However, as against to the controvertial notions, there are two more works which expose Buddhism in orthodox systems. They are; Buddhism as presented by the Brāhmanical systems by Chitrarekha V. Kher and the Buddhist philosophy as presented in Mīmāṃsā *Ślokavārttika* by Vijaya Rani. But there are few

works which show the controversy between both orthodox and heterodox systems. They are as follows.

i) *Fragments from Diṇnāga* by H.N. Randle deals with a study of logic in the early schools, contains seventeen fragments attributed to Diṇnāga by Vācaspatimiśra and also confirmed by the Tibetan version of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. The fragments constitute the Sanskrit text transliterated in the Roman script, translated and annotated into English. The text deals with the various topics of logic, such as perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy and *apoha* etc.

The book is divided into twenty two sections. Section 1 is an introductory one which discusses the date of Diṇnāga and section 2 deals with probable arrangement of topics in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Sections three to twenty two contain seventeen fragments which deal with the different topics of Indian logic. Their range is wide. From the description of the valid means of knowledge they extend to the definition of *Vāda* and cover the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine of soul.

ii) *Diṇnāga on Perception* by Massaki Hattori consists the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* of Diṇnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions translated and annotated by Massaki Hattori. This volume is the first attempt in a Western language to furnish both source and interpretation for a major body of Diṇnāga's thought. The English translation of M. Hattori shows that the minimum addition is necessary for the modern reader to get at the Diṇnāga's intention. The translation furnishes clear English syntax when read in its complete form. To furnish the background of philosophical opinion and dispute against other schools, Hattori has used the technique of annotation. This annotation helps us trace the original sources of a large number of quoted fragments. It shows the tracking down of the arguments of other schools both Buddhists and Hindu, referred to by Diṇnāga.

iii) *Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief* by Eli Franco consists of an introduction, detailed analysis, edition and translation with extensive notes of the first half of the TPS of Jayarāṣi.

In the introduction, Jayarāṣi's affiliation to the Lokāyata school is reassessed and his place in historical development of philosophy evaluated. New-evidence for the dating of Jayarāṣi is examined and a new dating is suggested. Methodological problems concerning the interpretation of Jayarāṣi's arguments are discussed.

The sections of the text are devoted to the various definitions of means of knowledge in general and perception in particular. The schools criticised are : Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā (Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara) schools as well as older commentators (Bhavadāsa), (Vṛttikāra), the epistemological schools of Buddhism (Diṇnāga and Dharmakīrti) and Sāṃkhya (Vārṣaganya and Vindhyavāsin). In the section of notes, the opponent behind the different arguments are identified, their positions are reconstructed, and put into historical perspective. In addition, parallel passages both from the TPS and from later works are assembled and translated.

iv) *A history of early Vedānta philosophy* by H. Nakamura consists the history of Vedānta philosophy before the period of Śaṅkara, although the period of Śaṅkara is called early Vedānta philosophy. This work proposes to examine that neglected history of early Vedānta philosophy as comprehensively and thoroughly as possible. It deals with the topics the chronological divisions of early Vedānta philosophy as seen by the Indian schools, like the Buddhists, the scriptures of early Jainism and it appears in orthodox Brāhmanical literature. It discusses the internal controversy and internal relation of the various schools of Indian thought. It may be said that it gives an idea for studying the controversial notion during the early period of Vedānta philosophy.

v) *Epistemology of Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā* by Govardhan P. Bhāṭṭa on Bhāṭṭa school is authoritative, scholarly and comprehensive. It is well-documented and based on the intensive and critical study of Sanskrit texts. Author's treatment of topics is logical and critical. Author examines philosophical problems by presenting the views, of exponents from various schools i.e. Nyāya, Buddhism, Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa comparatively and tries to expose the development of thought in these schools. He highlights some controversial concepts of other

schools in contrast with these Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

vi) *Mīmāṃsā chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* is edited by Shinjo Kawasaki. A number of scholars have critically edited and translated some of the chapters of *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* recently. Seventeen verses of the Sanskrit text of the ninth chapter, *Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra* have been investigated and edited by S. Kawasaki. In these seventeen verses Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka presents the views of Mīmāṃsā as pūrvapakṣa.

vii) '*Refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas by the Buddhists*' with special reference to *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* of Bhāvaviveka has been studied by the present author. In this M.Phil. dissertation, an humble attempt is made to study the ninth chapter, *Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra* of *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* of Bhāvaviveka which throws some light on the views of author on Brāhmanical religion based on what he calls the doctrines of Mīmāṃsā. The first chapter of the dissertation gives an outline of the chapter *Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra* and the origin of the controversy between Mīmāṃsakas and Buddhists is discussed here. A comparative study of Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of MTN is also attempted to a certain extent.

The second chapter of dissertation deals with the sources of MTN, traces to the original works of Brāhmanical schools and that of Buddhism. The third chapter studies the position of Mīmāṃsā as reflected in MTN and its refutation made by Bhāvaviveka. The contents of MTN are classified as -

- (i) Position of Mīmāṃsā and its refutation by Bhāvaviveka.
- (ii) Position of so-called Mīmāṃsā and its refutation by Bhāvaviveka.

Certain observations have been made while studying the MTN. Bhāvaviveka has tried to refute the whole Brāhmanical religion under the title of *Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra*. In the pūrvapakṣa (position of Mīmāṃsā) he elaborates a few Brāhmanical concepts mainly related to Mīmāṃsā system. Such as, *mokṣa*, *vedāpauruṣeyatva*, *śabdanityatva*, *śabdaprāmāṇya* and *somapāna*. Besides, there occurs criticism of logicians and the

omniscience of Buddhism. In the *siddhāntapakṣa* (refutation of Mīmāṃsā) he rejects *yajñīyahimsā*, *surāpāna* and *svarga* along with the concepts of Mīmāṃsā mentioned in the pūrvapakṣa. His refutation on Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara and so on are not directly related to Mīmāṃsā. He has tried to refute Mīmāṃsā on the basis of his knowledge of orthodox systems by using the syllogisms. Moreover, he does not pay more attention to defend the position of logicians and omniscience of Buddha which is criticised in the pūrvapakṣa. However, the work is important for reasons more than one. It is perhaps, the first attempt of Buddhist, especially those belonging to the Mādhyamika school to refute other systems and establish their own doctrine of *śūnyatā* (emptiness). Only one hundred thirty eight verses have been studied for the M.Phil. dissertation.

Apart from these works, there are quite a few research articles regarding the controvertial notions between Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā. They are as follows :

(i) *Kumārila and Diṇnāga* by H. R. Rangaswamy Iyenger, Indian Historical quarterly, Sept. 1927, pp. 603-06.

The article compares some passages of the *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila and its *ṭīkā*, the *Nyāyaratnākara* of Pārthasārathimīśra with the passage of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Diṇnāga, now available only in Tibetan translations. A comparative study of these passages with those of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* would convince that Kumārila vehemently attacks the views of Diṇnāga.

(ii) *The controversy between Bhāvaviveka and Kumārila* was examined by Yasunori Ejima, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. no XX, no. 2. 1972 pp 99-104.

iii) John A. Taber discusses *nirālambanavāda* as the controversial notion such as, *Kumārila's Refutation of the Dreaming Argument : The Nirālambanavāda-adhikaraṇa*³³,

iv) J. M Verpoorten examines the 24th chapter of *Tattvasaṃgraha* which consists of refutation of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine *vedāpauruṣeyatva*³⁴.

Significance of the study - Here, it is proposed to undertake the study on the '*Refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas by the heterodox*

systems of Indian philosophy on the basis of original Sanskrit texts and the works on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system.

The study of the heterodox systems plays a vital role in the modern philosophical studies. Due to the limitations of this thesis, only a few texts are chosen here that are very significant from the point of view of controversy with orthodox systems. Unfortunately we don't have a large literature or original Sanskrit sources of Cārvāka system. A large number of original Sanskrit sources of Buddhist philosophy have been lost. In the course of time they were either destroyed or were taken outside India. P. V. Bapat shows the reasons for complete disappearance of Buddhist literature from India³⁵. They are as follows :

(1) The study was kept in limited to the appointed monks and beginners residing in the monasteries.

(2) The literature was mostly religious and was preserved in manuscripts in the libraries or in the cells of monasteries and was never kept in the houses of laymen.

(3) With the decay or destruction of monastries the Buddhist manuscripts were destroyed.

A major bulk of the Buddhist works available to us is in the form of manuscripts collected from the countries like Ceylon, Burma, Nepal, Tibet, China and Mangolia³⁶. Some of those works are the discoveries in various places. Besides there are some manuscripts collected, copied and photographed in Tibet by scholars, like, Rahul Samkrityayana and G. Tucci. The original Sanskrit manuscripts were found mainly in Central Asia, Gilgit, Nepal, Tibet and other countries³⁷. These discoveries have thrown some light on the development of Buddhist literature and the language in which it was written.

The Jaina philosophy was developed out of the canonical works of Jainas. Many glosses and commentaries were written on the sacred texts. Philosophical literature was first written in Prakrit and then in Sanskrit. A number of eminent scholars composed their treatises in Sanskrit. Hence, now we have a large literature to study from the point of view of philosophical problems. However, for the purpose of present study, it is confined

to study a few major works of the Cārvākas, Buddhists, and of the Jainas. They are Cārvāka system as being in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* of Mādhavācārya, *Tattvopa-plavasīṃha* of Jayarāśi, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Diṇnāga, *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti, *Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra*, the ninth chapter of *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* of Bhāvaviveka, *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* of Prabhācandra and *Ratnākarāvatārikā* of Ratnaprabhasūri. Translations of Ganganath Jha on major Sanskrit texts, especially on *Tattvasaṅgraha* has been considered here as reliable source.

Foot Notes

- 1) Shastri Ramaswami, Introduction to Tantrarahasya, p.xxv.
- 2) Ibid, p. xiv.
- 3) यद्येवं प्रत्युक्तः स माहायानिकः पक्षः। SB on JS 1.1.5, MD, Anandasharma ed. P.61.
- 4) Kher Chitrarekha, Buddhism, p. 12.
- 5) Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol. 15, p. 193.
- 6) Rani Vijaya, Buddhist phil, p. 12.
- 7) Bhat S., Refutation, Pp 8-10.
- 8) Rani Vijaya, Buddhist phil, p. 12.
- 9) Shastri Ramaswamy, Introduction to TR, p.xvii.
- 10) प्रायेणैव हि मीमांसा लोके लोकायतीकृता।
तामास्तिकपथे कर्तुमयं यत्नः कृतो मया॥ SV, 1.10.
- 11) Shastri Ramaswamy, Introduction to TR, P. XVI.
- 12) Ibid, p. xxvi.
- 13) Stcherbatsky. Th. Buddhist, Vol. 1, p.51.
- 14) Ibid.
- 15) Sankrityayana R., Introduction to PVB, p. viii.
- 16) Ibid.
- 17) Bhattacharya B., Foreword to TS, p. xiv.
- 18) Ibid, p. xv.
- 19) Ibid, p. xxxviii.
- 20) Encyclopedia of religion, Vol. IX, p. 30.
- 21) Thakur Anantlal, Introduction JSMN, Pp. 16-17.
- 22) Encyclopedia of religion, Vol. IX, p. 30.
- 23) Vidyabhushana S.C., Hist. Ind. Log., Pp. 168-70.
- 24) Ibid, p. 172.

- 25) Mehta Mohanlal, Jaina philosophy, p. 30.
- 26) Ibid, p. 30.
- 27) Vidyabhushana S.C., Hist. Ind. Log., Pp. 186-87.
- 28) Mehta Mohanlal, Jaina philosophy, p. 31.
- 29) Ibid, p. 32.
- 30) Vidyabhushana S.C., Hist. Ind. Log., Pp. 193-94.
- 31) Ibid, p. 198-200.
- 32) Ibid, p. 211.
- 33) Dwivedi R.C., Studies in Mīmāṃsā, Pp. 27-52.
- 34) Ibid, Pp. 117-129.
- 35) Bapat P.V., 2500 Years of Buddhism, Pp. 125-26.
- 36) Ibid, p. 126.
- 37) Ibid.

CHAPTER II REFUTATION OF VEDĀPAURUṢEYATVA

Position of Mīmāṃsā - The main thesis of the Mīmāṃsakas is that the Veda is a reliable means of knowing Dharma and that it is not the creation of a human being. If there existed any author or the composer of the Veda, he should certainly have been remembered through the long tradition.

Jaimini Sūtras refer to the refutation of *vedāpauruṣeyatva* as follows : Some people regard the Vedas to have been composed in recent times, because they are named after particular persons¹ and also because, we find a mention of ephemeral thing in them².

Śabara elaborates opponents view in the *pūrvapakṣa*, 'Vedic injunctions are the work of human beings. Veda belong to recent times, they have been composed in modern days and as the injunctions are all contained in the Vedas, they must be the work of human authors. As a matter of fact, we find that the Vedas are named after certain persons - being named as *Kāṭhaka* (composed by Kaṭha), *Kālāpaka* (composed by Kalāpa), *Paippalāda* (composed by Pippalāda) '*Maudgala*' (composed by Mudgala) and so forth. Such a nomenclature would not be possible, unless the texts had some connection, with the person and the person can have no connection with a text except that he is the same author. Qualification of a thing is always such, as is peculiar to that thing itself and the author can be only one for one text and the expounders might be many. Hence we conclude that there must be an author of the Vedic injunctions, even though we do not remember him³.

Śabara, further sets forth again the opponents view⁴. 'There are some statements in the Vedas which mention the birth and the death of some persons. For instance, see a statement viz. Babara, the son of *Pravahaṇa*, desired⁵; Kusravinda the son of *Uddālaka*, desired⁶ and so on. *Auddālaka* must have been born of *Uddālaka* and if so, the text speaking of him could not have existed before his birth. In this way also the non-eternality of the Veda becomes established.

Śabara gives an answer for the objections raised by the opponent while commenting on Jaimini's sūtras. He says that there is an unbroken tradition of the text among the students of the Veda; that there is no such presumption of an author of Veda is justifiable. People might call a text by the name of one who is not the author at all. *Kaṭha* and other persons have done superior expounding of the text and there are people who the text after the names of such exceptional expounders. We remember that Vaiśampāyana was a student of all the Vedic texts, *Kaṭha* taught only one particular recension. Among many students of several recensions, if any one concentrates upon a single recension, he becomes an expert in that recension and it is natural that he should be connected with that recension⁷.

Moreover, Śabara replies to the objection of the opponent that the term *Prāvāhaṇi* cannot mean 'the son of *Pravahaṇa*'. The prefix 'pra' is well-known as signifying excellence and the root 'Vah' as signifying the act of carrying. As regards the 'i' (in the term *Prāvāhaṇi*) it is known as signifying progeny as well as 'agent of an action' - so that the term *Prāvāhaṇi* signifies one who carries things in an excellent manner (and it cannot mean the son of *Pravahaṇa*) the term 'Babara', it is only a word imitative of sound. Thus the two words, *Prāvāhaṇi* and *Babara* express the everlasting thing only⁸.

In the context of relation between the word and its denotation, Śabara argues that the said relation could never have been created by a human being, because no such person can be cognised by means of sense - perception and the other means of cognition are also preceded by sense-perception⁹.

Further, he asserts that if the creator had existed long ago, it would not be impossible to remember him. In the case of the Himālaya mountain and the like, it would be impossible to forget the creator. However, in the case of a builder of a wall, a garden and the like are forgotten due to disappearance of the builder or the extinction of his country or of his family. In the case of words and their meanings, there is no total disappearance of persons making use of them.

If there were a person who created the relation and started its use, he would surely be remembered at the time of using the word. A certain usage becomes possible only when there is an agreement between the creator and the adopter of the usage. For instance, Pāṇini is the creator of the relation between the technical name *Vṛddhi* and the letters *āt-aic*. A person not accepting the work of Pāṇini as authoritative, could never apprehend the word *Vṛddhi*. Consequently one who would be making use of the Veda would surely remember the creator of the relation of words and their usage.

Therefore we conclude that no person created the relations and then composed the Vedas for the purpose of making use of them.

Even if there is a possibility of the creator being forgotten, we would not admit a creator of the relation, unless there were proofs for it. Even though it is possible for an existing thing not to be perceived, merely on the ground of that possibility we do not admit the existence of the Hare's horn, because there is no proof of it¹⁰.

Kumārila asserts while commenting on the śya that the study of the Veda is always preceded by its study by one's teacher, because it is mentioned by the expression 'Vedic study', like the Vedic study of the present day¹¹.

This argument would apply to Mahārata also; but it is countermanded by the distinct declaration of an author for it (in the person Vyāsa). As for the mention of the names in the Veda, these must be explained as *arthavāda*¹².

Students of the Veda do not have any idea of its author and

they cannot be taken as pointing to an author; hence any idea of an author of the Veda cannot be mistaken¹³.

So long as explanatory passages continue to exist in the Veda, there can be no assumption of any other grounds (for declaring the fact that the Veda has an author); as we find that even the people of the present day derive their notions of an author of the Veda from these (explanatory passages)¹⁴.

It is the main argument of Mīmāṃsakas that the Veda is not a work of a personal author and that being thus, they are free from any defects that are likely to be caused due to the authorship. The Veda must be regarded as the only source of knowledge (relating to Dharma), which is infallible in its self-sufficient validity.

Refutation by Cārvāka System : The system of the Cārvākas disregards the authority of the Veda. It maintains that the Veda cannot be a means of authoritative knowledge; the Veda is tainted by three faults, i.e., untruth, self-contradiction and repetition. Again, there are some Vedic scholars whose arguments regarding the authority of Vedic texts cancel each other. Again, they speak of the results that can never be achieved. In the Veda, there occur proper names which indicate that the Vedas were composed by human beings. Moreover, there are certain foolish statements resembling the sayings of a madman¹⁵.

'Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's staff and smearing oneself with ashes' - these are the means of livelihood for those who have neither intellect nor manliness - Thus said Bṛhaspati¹⁶.

According to this system, the Veda is not only human composition but even worse than that. The buffoon, the knave and the demon are the three authors of the Veda. The mention of, 'jarri, turphari' and so on is regarded to be the sayings of the learned ones¹⁷. All the obscene rites commanded for the queen in the Horse-sacrifice have been invented by knaves and eating flesh has been commanded by night prowling demons¹⁸.

Thus Cārvākas maintain that the exercise of religion and the practices of asceticism are merely a means of livelihood for men devoid of intellect and manliness. Since the so-called sacred

books - the three Vedas - have been composed by rogues; they can command no authority.

Refutation by Jayarāśi - The *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* is a treatise by Jayarāśi unique by itself. It is the only Sanskrit text of Cārvākas which has come down to us in which a full-fledged scepticism is propounded. Here, in the TPS, the author Jayarāśi adopts a critical method. He is of the opinion that there are no valid means of knowledge and in order to prove his thesis, he examines theories as regards the valid instruments of knowledge. While criticizing the doctrines of Mīmāṃsakas some quotations had been traced by the author from the original viz., Mīmāṃsā sūtras of Jaimini¹⁹ and the ṣya of Śābara²⁰ to refute *vedāpauruṣeyatva* the main doctrine of the Mīmāṃsā, he puts forth the pūrvapakṣa with citations from treatises of Kumārila and similar references from Śābara-ṣya²¹. However, it is interesting to note that one of the verses cited by him is not found in the published editions of the Ślokavārttika but occurs in the Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita²².

The pūrvapakṣa as presented by Jayarāśi is as follows - Some foolish say that the Veda is not being produced by human beings. Their speeches are not to be accepted, because of their invalidity due to passion etc. Brahman is not the author of the Veda. It is said that the Veda, like ether (*ākāśa*) is eternal, because its creator is not remembered. Therefore the faults related to Brahman did not appear²³.

He cites a verse from TS to support his pūrvapakṣa. The verse says that in the case of words uttered by human beings, there is always a room for doubt, whether there are defects or not. In the case of the Veda, however, since they have no author, there can absolutely be no suspicion for us regarding the possibility of defects²⁴.

Again, he cites a verse from SV which says that the conception produced by the Veda is authentic because it is brought about by faultless means - like the conceptions either by correct premiss or by the assertion of a trustworthy person or by sense-perception²⁵.

The cognition produced by the Vedic injunction is not doubtful as it is not produced with a shape unlike other objects. It is not confused, because unlike other objects it is not obstructed in other places and so on. The cognition which is obstructed in other places, like perceiving of shining mote and knowledge of gold in red cloth, is not reliable knowledge. Therefore the cognition produced by Vedic injunction is valid ²⁶.

According to him, the reason viz, unremembrance of an author, which proofs the eternity of the Veda is useless because in the case of such things as the builder of a wall, or of a garden and so on becomes forgotten and those are said to be uneternal. There is unremembrance due to disruption from country and time. It seems that a person, desiring a particular thing, (i.e. proper reason) reaches the ground of faults (*nigrahasthāna*) ²⁷.

It is not possible to check the reason with employing *kṛtakatvaviśeṣa* from *vipakṣa* on which negation of the thing is to be ascertained. The reason viz. *unremembrance of an author* is not proved since the followers of Kaṇāda (i.e. Naiyāyikas) remember the creator of the Veda and, moreover, ordinary people say that the Vedas were created by Brahman ²⁸.

Further, he raises a question : The reason, unremembrance of an author of the Veda is dispersed from the remembrance of all people or some people; if it is of all people, then it is difficult to understand by the followers Brahman. Whether they understand, then they only become omniscient and they are not to be considered as the followers of Brahman. If the author is not remembered by some people, then the reason becomes an inconclusive, because they do not remember the author even he is alive. And again, if you say, the author of the Veda is not remembered by some people, then there is a presumption, such as, that the author of the Veda is remembered as it is created by someone else ²⁹.

There is no invalidity for the Veda, although it is produced by a person. Invalidity occurs, however, due to the faults produced by persons. Therefore the faults produced by persons to be removed and not the activities of persons. If you say that the

faults belong to persons, then it is equal to the faults produced by senses, too ³⁰.

The *apauruṣyatva* of the Veda is not proved by the reason unremembrance of an author, because unremembrance of an author can be gained from the speeches of the scholars. For instance, while suspecting the (author of the) Veda, a scholar denies the *ātman* such as, 'I am not *Vidhātā* (Brahman) of the Vedas' ³¹.

If you say that there exists the validity for the Veda, due to the absence of the faults of a person (i.e. creator), then why do you not think that the Veda is invalid, due to the absence of the merits of a person (i.e. creator), if you think that the validity can be established on the basis of the intrinsic qualities and not the merits and demerits of the creator, then why do you not think of the invalidity due to the intrinsic faults of the same? Since it is possible to have a connection with the faults such as passion and so on, inspite of being of non-human origin, the same is possible in the case of the Veda ³².

Again, by employing the status of non-human origin, the fault i.e. authorship has been removed, but how can the faults of hearer be removed? Such as - while cognising the meaning (object), he will cognise the meaning not properly. Therefore, there may be contradictory reason due to the defects of instruments of the activities even though they have the status of non-human origin ³³.

Moreover, with the word sublation, a cognition of an opposite object is designated. However, if the sublation is not produced, there arises a doubt : Is it because the cognition which arises from Vedic injunction is true or is it because of the deficiency of the cause which may have produced the sublation? ³⁴

Apart from this, there are certain false cognitions which arise before the sublating cognition. Sublating cognition arises in course of different times; For instance, in some cases after a half month, in some cases after a month, in some cases after two or three years. However, in other cases due to defects of the cause it will not arise at all. And the cognition which arises from the Vedic injunction is not valid just due to this reason ³⁵.

Moreover, as regards the fact of being devoid of sublation, a question arises : Is it with regard to all people or is it with regard to some people? If it is with regard to all people, then it cannot be known, because the mental activities of all other people can hardly be followed. If you belong to second alternative i.e. the fact of being devoid of sublation with regard to some people, then the reason becomes inconclusive. For example, a person in whose case a cognition of real water arises in the place of unreal water, moves from one place to another and there he meets with death. There is no sublating cognition arising for him. Is this sublating cognition valid by that reason?³⁶

Or the cognition which produced by the Vedic injunction is false because of its being devoid of an object, since the object has the nature of duty cannot exist at the same time when the cognition through the Vedic injunction was produced or if it exists at the same time, the Vedic injunction will prove to be incompetent and sacrificial actions will be annulled. If the object which has the nature of duty doesnot exist, then how is it that the cognition derived from the Vedic injunction is not false? Otherwise, the cognition derived from the hair-net would not be false. If the cognition derived from the hair-net is false, then, in the same way the cognition derived from the Vedic injunction is also false.³⁷

Now one may argue : 'the object of cognition derived from the Vedic injunction does exist, therefore it is true. But the object of the cognition of the hair-net never exists', then the answer is; this is just like a maxim of the ascetic who proves the absolute truth but he himself consumes poison. The object of Vedic injunction at later time does not assist the cognition because at that time, the cognition is destroyed and at the time of cognition the object doesnot exist. Or it is the sublation which asserts the object that doesnot exist. For instance, it is found that the effect (*kārya*) like cloth etc. is being produced by the activities of threads and shuttle of loom etc. and afterwards there is an advice to the producer that 'Do thou employ the threads etc'. By this, the relation of *sādhya* and *sādhana* cannot be known and there is no

apūrva from which the advice becomes competent. Thus, like the above mentioned maxim, there is no validity for words by their stateness³⁸.

Refutation by *vaviveka* - *vaviveka* repudiates Mīmāṃsā concepts in the chapter *Mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra* (MTN) of his treatise *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (MHK). As far as the Veda is concerned, he rejects the Mīmāṃsā principle that the Veda is not a work of human being. He wants to examine the argument of the Mīmāṃsakas by avoiding the poison of partiality.

He objects that whatever comes down to us without interruption can also be called *āgama* then what is the truth as regards the authenticity of *āgama*?³⁹

He gives an example of a goldsmith to prove the validity of speech of a human being. Although a goldsmith is a human being, people generally believe in his testimony as regards the purity of gold. Therefore the reason given for invalidity of human speech cannot be accepted⁴⁰.

What is said in the Mīmāṃsā to establish the validity of the Veda on the basis of argument that it has not been produced by any human agency, is not valid; because the reason for the argument is unique and it does not serve the purpose⁴¹.

Further he goes on to argue that since the Veda has come down to us by an oral transmission, it is regarded to be a non-human product, then for the same reason, the Buddhist doctrine can also be regarded as not produced by human being; because the truth realised by the former Buddha is transmitted by the later Buddha⁴². Therefore the fallacy of inconclusiveness may occur by following reasons⁴³.

1) *Kṛtakatvānumāna* - by the inference of production of human beings.

2) *Pakṣabādhānumāna* - by the inference of prohibition of minor premise.

3) *Karturasmaranāsiddha* - unproved by unremembering of any author.

If you think that the Veda existed before the producer of the mantras who was born along with the mantras, your treatise

(i.e. Mīmāṃsā) not produced by a human being. The treatise does have a composer. It is produced with the author like the work produced by one recollecting one's former birth⁴⁴.

Why cannot the statements of the Veda be accepted as the creation of a person? because they are in accordance with the knowledge or the expositions in terms of letters. And also the statements at the Veda are to be accepted as creation of a persons; because like a gesture (*ingita*) the Vedas also produced from the intellect possessing the intended meaning⁴⁵.

It may be inferred that the Veda has been composed by wicked people, since it teaches killing of living beings, drinking of liquor and speaking lie, like the science of *Magas* (i.e. *Pārasika*)⁴⁶.

If you say that the killing of animals in the sacrifice is proper because it is accomplished by the mantras then it will be like giving poison as a gift which is also accomplished by mantras and a gift is recommended in the śāstra (then it will be) like, giving poison as a gift (which is also accomplished and a gift is recommended in the śāstra) and therefore, it is not desirable and conducive to harmful results⁴⁷.

An argument made by you that the relation with woman (wife) according to scripture leaves to deliverance is inconclusive, because the intercourse with forbidden woman under the influence of hypnotising mantras, magic, powders etc. is also in accordance with the scriptures. And another argument that by consuming Soma one becomes immortal is also inconclusive because it is also applicable to drinking any liquor⁴⁸.

The chanting of some of the mantras aims at cutting one's life, for that reason the use of such mantras is desired (by some people). However, it yields undedired fruit like the use of poison or weapons⁴⁹.

If the Veda is said to be resulting into the final deliverance as per the injunctions of one's own religions canons, then it is a common cause for the authoritative character of the other non-Vedic treatises too.

Refutation by Dharmakīrti - It seems that the objections

raised by Kumārila against the Buddhists, specially against Diṇṇāga, were over ruled by Dharmakīrti in his magnum opus *Pramāṇavārttika* and also in his other philosophical treatises⁵⁰.

As far as the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda is concerned, he asks if faults of the sentences belong to the utterances of human beings and if the Veda alone is valid, then why the Veda is not considered as invalid, since the reasons for truthfulness of sentences and merits pertain to human beings⁵¹.

Further, he argues : the reason for conveying the meaning is a convention of human beings and therefore there is a possibility of untruthfulness for the sentences of *apauruṣeya*⁵².

If there is a rule, like, one meaning for one sentence, then, there is no chance for another meaning. However, there may be a counterpart of opposition for sentence, since it conveys many meanings⁵³.

The status of non-human origin of the Veda is useless, like the bath of an elephant. Elephant removes the mud from the body through the bath and again takes the bath from the same (mud) water. Similarly, having the relation of human-beings, the Veda stands in need of convention which belongs to human beings⁵⁴. It, being the status of non-human origin of the Veda is desired due to unremembrance of authors, however, it is found that there are many speakers and, alas, darkness still pervades⁵⁵.

There is also a person who can be able to speak or write a treatise, which can be composed by others without any tradition⁵⁶.

There are many reasons, they are vitiated and cannot prove the beginninglessness as well as the non-human origin of the Veda. If the *apauruṣeyatva* is attributed to Veda, then that can be applied to the usage of Mlecchas as well as the sentences of heterodox systems, because in their cases too, the continuity of the previous impressions is devoid of beginning. Then, even though the non-human origin of that kind is established, what merit does it have?⁵⁷

The whole order of alphabets is created by men. This can be understood with the help of a maxim of the fuel (being the cause of) fire. When one sees the fire and understands that it is

produced by the fuel (i.e. wood), one can apply the same logic with regard to any fire, similarly, when one understands that a particular order of alphabets is created by a human being, one can apply the same logic to any order of alphabets - Vedic and non-Vedic as well. One may argue that the Vedic mantras used for removing poison etc. produce the results beyond imagination due to their being of non-human origin. In this case, it should be understood that the knowledge and the efficacy of the persons creating the order of mantras is absent in others. Hence their uniqueness is established⁵⁸.

There are some knowers of technique, who produce mantras. It is the powers of their lord (achieved) by following the procedure to by him. Therefore a person desirous of result should call the mantras as artificial and created by human beings⁵⁹.

Words themselves do not say that this is the meaning and this is not. Then the meaning should be comprehended by people. But they are subjected to passions and so on. Then who has made the difference that one is the knower of truth and not the other? In the similar way, it should be thought that there might be a scholar and his sentences should be non-contradictory as well as meaningful⁶⁰.

Thus, there is no possibility of cognitions in imperceptual objects and that is the only means of cognition which is non-contradictory. Hence, it can be concluded that the knowledge (non-contradictory) is known as *āgama*, than the status of non-human origin becomes useless. If there may be a possibility of the knowledge of *anāgama* in imperceptual objects, then it might be said that there must be a super-sensible person because a common man cannot cognise the meaning of the Veda due to his passions etc⁶¹.

The Veda itself does not convey its meaning. Then what is the fate of the meaning of Veda? There is a Vedic injunction, viz. 'one who desires the heaven should perform the *Agnihotra*. What is the logic, if one says that it does not mean that one should consume the flesh of a dog?' If one says that the meaning is as well known popular saying, then who is here who can see the

meaning beyond the capacity of the sense-organs and who has explained the meaning of the words that possess several meanings? The word such as 'heaven' or 'Ūrvaśī' and so on is seen as having a non-conventional meaning⁶².

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - So far as the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda is concerned, he repudiates on several grounds, such as this is the product of false pride of the twice-born people. There is no truth in this, even by the slightest chance, like the maxim *Ghuṇākṣara*⁶³.

Even though there is no author, the Veda cannot be regarded as saying what is true, because absence of excellence in its source which makes it truthful, as in the absence of defects the word is regarded as true⁶⁴.

It is only in the works of persons that the question arises, as to whether the excellences are there or not. However, there is no need for such an enquiry in the case and there is no slightest idea of being any excellence of all⁶⁵.

The Veda is reduced to futility in such sentences as six cakes. It might be argued that meanings of the Vedic sentences comprehended in respect of actions and active agents. Then the answer is that there may be such comprehension. Where there is explanation supplied by men, such as the deeds of *Ūrvaśī*⁶⁶.

Truthfulness does not become proved even there be no defects, because, another alternative must be accepted that is meaninglessness⁶⁷.

It might be said that the Veda stands in need of explanations, and these explanations appear in succession, the cognitions brought about by the Veda are held to be successive. However it cannot be so⁶⁸.

If the Veda was previously inefficient and is made efficient now by the explanations, then it becomes a source of knowledge through the help of personalities and therefore it is the work of a person⁶⁹.

The Veda, provides no knowledge to us until it is explained by persons who act as lamps. Consequently there is no reason for argument which is not the work of a person, because, the

knowledge proceeds from the explanations provided by persons. Thus the character even though it may be present in the non-human origin. Veda is of no use, because the only result produced by the Veda, i.e. knowledge is dependent upon persons⁷⁰.

Persons, being the agents, proceeding to explain the Veda, according to their whims could never be checked by any one. Consequently, with such defects as delusions, vanity etc. (*Mohamānādi*) they might provide wrong explanations of the Veda. Hence there is a room for such suspicion⁷¹.

The Veda, by itself without any support cannot make known its meaning, infact it stands in need of explanations by persons. Such explanations are like the stick held by the blindman⁷².

When pulled up by the explanations, the Veda might fall into a wrong path, and then it would not be right to regard the Veda as the eye, common to all, like the light⁷³.

Further, he continues his refutation on the same ground as follows - even though by itself, the Veda may be able to bring about cognitions, yet its validity cannot be clear because it is dependent on personalities⁷⁴.

The validity of a means of cognition is accepted on the ground of its bringing about cognitions in accordance with the real state of things. If the Veda depends upon explanations of men, the assumption of its validity cannot be right. The validity and reliability of the Veda may be due to eternal connection expressive of true things. Hence, all human beings by themselves are incapable of seeing things, because they are beyond the senses. The Veda certainly does not say 'such and such is my connection with the meaning' as regards the 'connection of the meaning' that would be fixed by men and it would not differ from being the work of person⁷⁵.

Again, he goes on to refute the Veda on the ground of tradition : While the Veda not having been proved to be valid, any beginningless line of pupils and teachers, even though assumed, cannot make it faultless, because not a single person among them is held to be capable of perceiving supersensuous things. Therefore, even though assumed, the traditional line of pupils and teachers can be only a line of blind persons. When a

blindman is led by another blindman, he is not sure to get the right path. Hence the assumption of the beginninglessness of the line of the pupil and teachers is entirely futile⁷⁶.

And again, refutation continues on the grounds like uncertainty, faith etc. If it is said that the cognition arises in regard to heaven and such things from the Vedic sentences like, *Agnihotra* etc. are found to be free from doubt and uncertainty. But it is not so. Because uncertainty does arise just in the same way as in another contrary assertion. Intelligent people do not perceive any difference between the two cases; in the sense, in regard to things beyond the senses there can be no certainty regarding their existence or non-existence. If it might be urged that 'this certainty does arise from Vedic sentence', then the answer is that there cannot be certainty regarding the contrary from another sentence⁷⁷.

The Vedic scholars derive their unshakable notions through their minds influenced by faith and this is equally present in other people's mind in respect of other assertions. For instance, similar unshakable notions are derived also by the Buddhists regarding trouble and suffering from sacrifices which involve the killing of animals, of this notion, we do not find any sublation till now. If it be said that there may be a sublation of it at some future time and place, the same is equally possible of the Vedic sentences also⁷⁸.

The author continues to refute the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda. If it is said that the Veda, not being the work of an author, has an inhering capacity of asserting true things, in the same manner it might be suspected that by itself it brings about the cognition of what is not true⁷⁹.

Further, he goes on posing a challenge to the opposition : If you are really eager to regard the Veda as valid and reliable, then try and prove that it is the work of a person free from defects and so forth. If it is composed by a faultless author, and is expounded by faultless expounders, it certainly be the means of cognition of truth⁸⁰.

As a matter of fact, the Veda cannot be regarded as a

source of right cognition, because it is not a work of man and it has been found that such thing as forest fire and like (which are not the work of man) are the source of false cognitions⁸¹.

From all this it follows that the reasons in support of (1) the Veda not being the work of a person, (2) its being a manifestation (3) its being eternal and (4) the eternal connection between the word and its meaning - have all been baseless or without proper basis.

Even though not cognisable by the five means of cognitions, the author of the Veda is not amenable to 'non-apprehension' alone. He is just like the author of story-books, whose author is not known. If the author of the story-books is inferred from the fact of their being expressive of clear meanings, then why cannot the author of the Veda be the same? Through the perception that the readers of the Veda are recognised as the 'makers' it cannot be right to regard them as 'manifesters' because the manifestation of eternal things is impossible⁸².

The Vedas being perceptible in their character, there is appearance of them when there is operation of the manifesters. If they existed even before the operation then they should be perceptible at time also⁸³.

The Veda is recognised as capable of being treated as the effect produced by the manifesters because it appears only when this is present like the sprout (*aṅkura*) in the form of seeds.

And also, because the Vedas appear in the sequential form in which they become manifested, like dramas and stories. The Vedas must be a work of an author and thus the author is cognised by means of inference also. Otherwise (if the Veda is not the work of a person) as the Veda would be eternal and all-pervading, there could be no sequential order in it; in the sense, there can be no sequence in what is eternal, as there can be no manifestation of it⁸⁴.

It is to be noted that the Veda is the work of a human being, as it speaks about wrongful sexual acts, killing of animals and telling of lies. The characters of like difficult to pronounce, the agreeableness of sounds, difficulty of comprehension, disagreeableness to ear etc., of the Veda are found in the words

of heterodox systems too. As regards such properties as capacity to cure poison etc. are found to be true and also found in the incarnations of *Vaiṇateya* and such persons⁸⁵.

If it be urged that at all the times persons are found telling lies, just as there is no confidence in regard to things present and also there is none regarding description of past events. By this reason of your own, there can be no person recognised as the author of any work at all, even though he may be declaring it to be his own work, then, abandon all hope in the truthfulness of the word which does not proceed from a personality. Some words have meanings contrary to what has been said in the Veda⁸⁶.

And again, in this way what could be proved would be only beginninglessness, not freedom from personal authorship. Under this, if the Veda is regarded as not the work of any person, then the same may be said in regard to the others also. The customs of the *Pārasikas* and others are based upon others and the doctrines of heterodox systems also may have its source in the ideas of other people. Even such freedom from authorship is proved, what is good would be, your attempt has been made only towards the establishing of truthfulness⁸⁷.

Regarding the time and person, the negative concomitance is doubtful, because it has not been proved that man is incapable of doing the work. By saying this, the idea of manifestation is also rejected. Hence the speaker himself should be regarded as the author. Thus, then in arguments, the instance is devoid of the probandum (*sādhyaśūnya*). Because it is depending upon the teaching of men and it has proved to be the product of effort. Therefore freedom from the speaker does not reside in the subject nor in the instance⁸⁸.

The eternality of the sentence has been rejected, the character of proceeding from the eternal sentence is recognised as non-existent in the subject and in the instance. Thus, the fact, the Vedic injunctions not being a work of person as well as reasons being unconvincing⁸⁹.

Thus, the Veda is something from which subject-matter is not known to men and it is like darkness for which only dull-

witted people have an attachment, like the attachment of Pārasikas. Those Pārasikas also ignorant of its meaning and they have recourse to such sinful acts like killing of animals and the like⁹⁰.

Thus, it has not been proved that the Vedic injunctions are valid means of right knowledge of duty, because its meaning cannot be ascertained by any one; either by himself or with the help of others. Therefore, a person is needed whose inner darkness has been dispelled by the light of knowledge and who is capable of teaching the clear meaning of the Veda⁹¹.

Refutation by Prācandra - According to Prācandra, in devoid of all means of cognition, *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda cannot be proved. He refutes all means of cognitions one by one: *pratyakṣa* cannot prove the *apauruṣeyatva*, because it is known for cognising only the wordness and it does not perceive the things like human or non-human origin. Sense-organs contact those things which are present. There is no relation of sense-perception with *apauruṣeyatva* because *apauruṣeyatva* is said only in the case of such things as have beginninglessness⁹².

Further, it cannot be proved by inference, because it is borne by the reason either the author is not remembered or it is borne by the denotativeness of the study of the Veda⁹³.

Here, the author raises many questions : What is this assumption? Is this an unremembrance of author or is this a prohibition of the remembrance of the author? If there is an unremembrance of author, then this reason cannot prove the status of non-human origin of the Veda, its being in wrong location, because the *apauruṣeyatva* is found in *ātman* too. Again, it might be argued that the non-creators of the Veda can be proved, because there is another example to be cited. The remembrance or the non-remembrance is possible, only in the case of a thing which has a creator, and not that which has no-creator, like Hare's horn as there is no remembrance of author, then this reason becomes useless, just like donkey's horn⁹⁴.

Moreover, it might be said that it can be proved because of its unbroken tradition and the author is not remembered then the reason becomes variable because there are found many

sentences which have an unbroken tradition and their author is also not remembered, such as *vaṭe vaṭe vaiśravaṇaḥ* (*Vaiśravaṇa* is in each and every tree). Hence, non-human origin cannot be applied for these types of sentences. In this manner, reason becomes unproved (*asiddha*). And again, Paurāṇikas remember the authorship of the Brahman such as '*vaktrebhyaḥ vedās tasya vinissṛtāḥ*' (Vedas came out from the mouths of Brahman), '*Pratimanvantaram caiva śrutiranyā vidhīyate*' (In every period of Manu, there is laid down a different śruti). '*Yo Vedāṁśca prahiṇoti*' (one who conveys the Vedas) etc. *Smṛti*, *Purāṇa* etc. and the various *śākhāḥ* of the Veda like *Kāṇva*, *Mādhyaṇḍina*, *Taittirīya* etc. are known after the name of sages. If it might be argued that they have been seen by the sages or they came to be known by the sages, then a question arises as how they were put aside even there is an unbroken tradition?⁹⁵

In the Veda, there are a number of contradictory statements about the remembrance of the author. Some people say that the *Hiraṇyagar* (Brahman) is the author, and others remember the author of *Aṣṭakā Smṛti* etc. This type of contradictory statements, however, also can be seen in the authorship of Kādambārī etc. Buddhists and others also remember the author of the Veda but the Mīmāṃsakas do not. Therefore authorship as well as the unremembrance of an author could be considered to be invalid. So the reason is unproved⁹⁶.

If there is an author; he should have been remembered while in the practice of religious acts, because people believe certainly unseen fruits in those religious acts, and that belief in unseen fruits is due to the remembrance of an adviser, just like, people say - because of the advice of the father etc., we perform the acts. In the same manner, there may be a remembrance of an author of the Veda, while performing the acts laid down by the Vedic scriptures. Grammarians remember the author of the Grammar i.e. Pāṇini. Hence the inference that the Veda is *apauruṣeya* because of unremembrance of its author even being able to remember' is invalid⁹⁷.

And again, an argument that the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda might be achieved independently then there may be doubt, such as the Veda is *apauruṣeya*. It is because of the unremembrance of its author or because it is identical with words and sentences. Hence the reason becomes invalid due to aforesaid doubt. If it may be argued again, such as, the unremembrance of an author might be accidental, then the remembrance of its author is also same. By this, what is said that 'the study of the Veda is always preceded by its study by one's teacher, because it is mentioned by the expression 'Vedic study' like the Vedic study of the present day' is also rejected⁹⁸.

It has been said that 'the chance of discrepancies in the words, depend upon the speaker and in certain places the devoid of discrepancies is due to its faultless speaker, because those removed by his good qualities, cannot possibly attach to his word and again in the absence of speaker there could be no discrepancies as those would have no substratum' is not good, because, there may be a question like : Can the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda, be achieved by any other means of cognition? i.e. by the denotativeness of the study of the Veda or by itself only? If it belongs to the first option, then the reason that the denotativeness of the study of the Veda becomes useless, otherwise that can be cognised by the inference through that reason only. Therefore, the reason as being no character is not proper⁹⁹.

If the reason is identical with character, then the characterised thing, i.e. *apauruṣeyatva* may be useless, because the character becomes only the indicative (*gamaka*) and not the characterised thing. In the same way, *āva*, *arthāpatti* and *anumāna* are not the proofs for the character, viz. unremembrance of an author¹⁰⁰.

It has been said by Kumārila that an object where the five means of cognition do not function leading the comprehension of the existence of that object we have non-apprehension as the sole means of cognition. The ascertainment of the non-existence of an object depends upon the validity of this as a means of cognition. There is no dispurse, however, that has been found in the case of five means of cognitions, because there is an existence

of inference which proves human-origin of the Veda. By saying this, not only the inference but the presumption is also rejected which is also a proof and decisive factor of the unremembrance of an author as accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas to achieve the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda. By arguing this, 'The time viz. past and future consists of their being an absence of the author of the Veda, because 'time', just like the present' is also refuted, since it is an inference¹⁰¹.

Āgama cannot be a proof to achieve *apauruṣeyatva* because there is a chance of *itaretarāśraya* such as - validity of the Veda can be achieved only if there is *apauruṣeyatva* and that can be achieved when the *āgama* is considered to be valid. There is no such sentences found in the Veda, which ascertains *apauruṣeyatva* and validity is not said for other sentences apart from the Vedic injunctions by the Mīmāṃsakas, otherwise, *pauruṣeyatva* may occur for those sentences, like '*Hiranyagars samavartatāgre*' (Brahman stood as first)¹⁰².

This *apauruṣeyatva* cannot be achieved by analogy through similarity, since there is an absence of a word or a sentence of well-known means of cognitions in relation to *apauruṣeya*. Again, it cannot be achieved by presumption, because of the absence of object of otherwise inapplicable which is against of *apauruṣeyatva*¹⁰³.

Further, if the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda can be said in the form of '*prasajyapratiṣedha* (it is laid-down by the use of negative particle (नञ्) connected with a verbal activity) then question arises : Is it cognised by the cognitions which function towards the comprehension of the existence of the object or is it cognised by the cognition *āva*. However, there is a prohibition of five means of cognitions which function towards the comprehension of the non-existence of the object for the achievement of *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda and non-apprehension is not capable of cognising the absence of human authorship, because of its non-existence, it cannot be argued in the form of *paryudāsa* (it is laid down by the use of negative particle (नञ्)

compounded with a noun) it also leads to a number of questions¹⁰⁴.

Let the Veda become *apauruṣeya*, then, it leads to many alternatives; Is it explained or not? if it is explained, then by whom? by itself only? However, it is not possible, because the Veda itself did not say, 'this is the meaning or this is not the meaning of my words and sentences' any where else and also there may not be a split in explanations too. Whether it is explained by the persons, there may be many faults, because people explain the Veda according to their own whims etc. and in different ways. If the explainer is super-sensuous then there may be contradiction in the *Dharma* (duty) and also there may not be such assumption, like, Vedic injunction is the only valid means of cognition in the *Dharma*¹⁰⁵.

Refutation by Ratnaprasūri - Ratnaprasūri, the author of *Ratnākarāvatārikā* refutes *vedāpauruṣeyatva* more elaborately. He criticises the doctrine of Mīmāṃsakas by quoting some verses from Śloka-vārttika of Kumārila under the title of Śrottriya school. According to him, Vedas are not *apauruṣeya*. If by the Vedas, only some letter-sounds are meant then the Vedas cannot be *apauruṣeya*, because letter-sounds are only peculiar modifications of matter. On the otherhand, if it be considered to be a body of unchanged scriptural sayings then the question arises as to how you call it the *apauruṣeyatva*? Perception cannot prove the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas as it deals with the present. It is said in SV that eye etc. perceive only what are connected with them and are existent at the present time¹⁰⁶.

It is contended that *pratyabhijñā* shows that the Vedas which one studied in his young age remain self-same even in his old age. Thus it may be a proof. The Jaina thinker argues that this is proved only by such atheistic sayings like, 'the body which is only a collection of material substances'. If it be urged that the Vedas are to be distinguished from the heterodox sayings in as much as the latter do not exist after they are uttered and that the Vedas, after they are uttered do still exist, although not in an explicit form, then the answer is that even the heterodox doctrines

continue to exist in an implicit way when they are no longer studied¹⁰⁷.

Pratyabhijñā revives only what has been perceived. It revives the facts of only some past incarnations. Then, how is it possible for recognition to establish that the Vedas were composed during the beginningless time? Since there is no precedent perception¹⁰⁸.

Inference also does not prove the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas. It would be opposed by the following inference, like, 'The Vedas were composed by some men, because they are embodied in letter-sounds, like the Kumārasaṃva and other books'. The Jaina contention is that there can be no book unless it is composed by a man who conceives its plan and arranges words in accordance with it. There are no sounds which have consistent meanings and which are expressed in letters, from anything, like, a conch-shell or a sea or a cloud which is other than a man¹⁰⁹.

Inference about the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas would be opposed by the following *āgama* 'There was Prajāpati only; the day was not; the night was not; he contemplated; thence arose enlightenment the four Vedas originated. It may be urged that this scriptural saying is not authoritative as well as it does not state or laydown any duty. The Jainas contend that such scriptural sayings as 'There was Prajāpati only' etc. do point to the fact of the Vedas having their authors and are authoritative to the Śrottriya, notwithstanding the fact that those sayings do not embody any command about duty. Hence there is also contradiction to *āgama*¹¹⁰.

The next argument of the Jaina thinker shows that how the said inference of Mīmāṃsakas is vitiated by fallacies in its reasons.

The reason, 'unremembrance of any author of the Vedas' about the *apauruṣeyatva* is invalid. He asks a question : Is this reason unqualified or qualified. If it be 'unqualified' then it is vitiated by the example of an ancient well, mansion, pleasure-garden etc. the author or the builder of a thing is unknown. In the case of an ancient well, an ancient house, or an ancient garden,

people may not know who built it in ancient times, the name of its creator may have been forgotten longback, but nobody would be prepared to say that the well or the house or the garden is *apauruṣeya*. On the the otherhand, if the reason is qualified, then, that would be unproved-with-respect-to-location'. The author criticizes the argument, 'The, Vedas are *apauruṣeya* because there being an unbroken tradition (*sampradāya*) their authors are not remembered,' as the reason, 'unremembrance of authors of the Vedas' does not inhere in the said unbroken tradition, but in something else, i.e. in man¹¹¹.

And again, if it be urged, like, 'The Vedas are *apauruṣeya* because their authors are not remembered, although there is an unbroken tradition of the Vedas, like the sky', then Jaina suspects like the qualifying element viz., an unbroken tradition is doubtful. A house which has admittedly a beginning can claim no absolutely unbroken line of its processors, it is doubtful if the Vedas which are claimed to be beginningless can have an unbroken line. This qualified element being 'proved doubtful'¹¹².

Further, he pointsout that the reason 'unremembrance of an author' shown by *Śrotriyas* is invalid, because it is 'unproved-to-bothsides', as it can be shown neither by the *Śrotriyas* nor by their opponents, i.e. Jainas. We follow the passages which point to the fact of their having been made, such as 'One who makes the Vedas', 'Prajāpati made the king Soma and from him the three Vedas were made". Apart from these, we find that various parts of the Vedas are attached to the names of some sages, e.g. *Kāṇva*, *Mādhyandina*, *Tittirī* etc. and these were the authors of those parts of the Vedas just as Manu (author of law-book) and so on. If it is urged that those parts of the Vedas were first revealed to or republished by them at the beginning of the present age, then, Jainas set aside this doctrine by saying that time is beginningless, so that if the parts of the Vedas were remembered at the beginning of each Kalpa to a particular sage whose name is borne by that part, then each such part would have borne the names of an infinite number of such sages, to whom it was revealed in the infinite number of past Kalpas¹¹³.

On the other hand, the Jainas have their own theory about it, viz., there was a devil, *Kālāsura* by name, who composed the Vedas.

And again, if it be said that there would be difficulty if the authorship of the Vedas be as ascribed to a particular person, then the reply is, that particular person may not be held to be their author and it does not prove that the Vedas had not their authors at all¹¹⁴.

Further, he refutes the two reasons shown by Kumārila 'All study of the Vedas is preceded by its previous study by the teacher; because it is only the study of the Vedas that is talked of just like present day study. The times both past and future are devoid of any author of the Vedas because they are times, just like the present time". Such as, 'The mind of those who have their eyes like those of the deer, is brittle like the horn of the deer', the study of this passage that is talked of just like any present day study as well as above said another reason were competent then the passage under consideration might as well be held to be a self-existent one from the beginningless time¹¹⁵.

After the criticism of perception and inference now he takes *arthāpatti* *Śrotriyas* argue that it is because the doctrine of *apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas is found to be consistent with the facts and not inconsistent with them. Word is tainted with the faults of its speaker. If the speaker is free from faults, his words may be faultless, but as the Vedas cannot be said to have been composed by a faultless speaker, speakers good or bad, cannot be the authors of the Vedas. If the Vedas are faultless, its only consistent explanation (by *arthāpatti*) would be that they were *apauruṣeya*¹¹⁶.

Now he begins his criticism on the argument of *Śrotriyas* based on *arthāpatti* by questioning the cognitionhood of the Vedas. The Vedas are invalid, as the instructions and injunctions contained in them are vicious, owing to instance on the killing of the animals. Words are valid, only if they emanate from a qualified person. It is well known that the utterances of a person, who is given to emotions of attachment etc. are false. If the argument is

neither a good person, nor a bad person made the Vedas, then the Vedas would be no better than meaningless sounds. The words of our forefathers which are relied on as words of authoritative persons turn out to be true. In the same manner, if the Vedas are to be treated as authoritative, their instructions are actually found out to be true in matters which can be experienced. In some cases, they do not turn out to be true and these should not be rejected as false but it is to be supposed that the results are somehow prevented due to defects in their operative conditions. Thus the Vedas are to be looked upon as authoritative and made by highly qualified person, who is absolutely free from all faults. (He is Arhat). He composes the *āgama* and explains it in humanly intelligible language. Therefore, the ordinary words as well as words of the *āgama* belong to humanly intelligible language¹¹⁷.

Thus, neither perception nor inference nor presumption nor scriptural sayings prove the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas.

Lastly he points out that it is impossible to say that the Vedas as a systematised body of letter-sounds must be either an arrangement of different parts or of successively rising parts because of the order in which they become explicit. This explicitness of letter-sounds is due to human efforts. Hence the systematised character of the Vedas, depends upon an order in which different parts become explicit. Thus status of the Vedas becomes a composition by human effort¹¹⁸.

To conclude, according to heterodox systems, the status of non-human origin of the Veda is impossible for the several reasons like Veda is tainted by three faults viz., speaking lie, self-contradiction and repetition. It is composed by human beings and is not *apauruṣeya*. The reason unremembrance of an author is not capable to prove *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda and unremembrance is possible due to disruption from country and time. People generally believe the words of goldsmith and similar personalities. Therefore validity of the Veda cannot be accepted. If the Veda is a non human product, then *āgama* (according to Jainas) should also be considered as such. Veda consists of killing of animals, consuming intoxicated liquor and sexual intercourse

with forbidden women and contradictory statements about remembrance of an author etc. Therefore Veda cannot be accepted as valid source of knowledge. Beginninglessness of the Veda is also not correct and lastly, *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda cannot be proved by any means of cognitions.

Foot Notes

- 1) वेदांश्चैके सन्निकर्षं पुरुषाख्याः । JS, 1.1.27.
- 2) अनित्यदर्शनाच्च । JS, 1.1.28.
- 3) पौरुषेयाश्चोदना इति अतोऽस्मर्यमाणेऽपि चोदनायाः कर्ता स्यात् । MD, Anandashrama ed. p. 120.
- 4) जननमरणवन्तश्च एवमप्यनित्यता । Ibid, P. 121.
- 5) Tai, Sam. 7.1.20.
- 6) Tai, Sam, 7.2.20.
- 7) यदुक्तं कर्तृलक्षणा प्रकृष्टत्वादसाधारणमुपपद्यते विशेषणम् MD, Anandashrama ed. pp. 122-23.
- 8) यच्च प्रावाहणिरिति तेन यो नित्यार्थस्तमेवेतौ शब्दौ वदिष्यतः । Ibid, pp. 123-24.
- 9) अपौरुषेयत्वात्सम्बन्धस्य तत्पूर्वकत्वाच्चेतरेषाम् । Ibid, p. 63.
- 10) ननु चिरवृत्तत्वात् नैतावता विना प्रमाणेन शशविषाणं प्रतिपाद्यामहे । Ibid, 63-66.
- 11) वेदस्याध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् । वेदाध्ययनवाच्यत्वाद् अधुनाध्ययनं यथा ॥ SV. 7-366.
- 12) भारतेऽपि भवेदेवं कर्तृस्मृत्या तु बाध्यते । वेदेऽपि तत्स्मृतिर्या तु सार्धवादनिबन्धना ॥ SV 7.367.
- 13) पारम्पर्येण कर्तारं नाध्येतारः स्मरन्ति हि । तेषामनेवमात्मात्वाद् भ्रान्तिः सेति च वक्ष्यते ॥ SV, 7.368.
- 14) तेषु च ध्रियमाणेषु न मूलान्तरकल्पना । तथाह्यद्यतनस्यापि ते कुर्वन्तीदृशीं मतिम् ॥ SV. 7.369.
- 15) अनुतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषैर्दूषिततया जीविकामात्रप्रयोजनत्वात् । SDS, p. 4-5
- 16) अग्निहोत्रं त्रयो वेदास्त्रिदण्डं भस्मगुण्डनम् ।

- बुद्धिपौरुषहीनानां जीविकेति बृहस्पतिः ॥ Ibid, p.8.
- 17) त्रयो वेदस्य कर्तारो भण्डधूर्तनिशाचराः ।
जर्भरीतुर्फरीत्यादि पण्डितानां वचःस्मृतम् ॥ Ibid. p.14
- 18) अथस्यात्र हि शिश्रं तु पत्नीग्राह्यं प्रकीर्तितम् ।
भण्डैस्तद्वत् परं चैव ग्राह्यजातं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥
मांसानां खादनं तद्वन्निशाचरसमीरितम् ॥ Ibid
- 19) सत्सम्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षम् JS 1.1.4; TPS, Sanghavi and Parikh ed. p. 58.
- 20) यत्र च दुष्टं करणं यत्र च मिथ्येति प्रत्ययः स एव असमीचीनः प्रत्ययः । SB on JS, 1.1.5; Ibid.
- 21) i) चोदनाजनिताबुद्धिः प्रमाणं दोषवर्जितैः ।
कारणैर्जायमातत्वात् लिङ्गाप्तोक्ताक्षबुद्धिवत् ॥ SV, 2.184.
ii) नित्यो वेदः कूपारामदिवदस्मरणं भवितुमर्हति ।
SB on JS, 1.1.5, MD, Anandashrama ed. p. 63.
iii) न च स्वर्गकामो यजेत मिथ्याप्रत्ययः ।
SB on JS, 1.1.2, MD, Anandashrama ed. p. 17.
- 22) दोषाः सन्ति न सन्तीति पौरुषेयेषु युज्यते ।
वेदे कर्तुरभावात्तु दोषाशकैव नास्ति नः ॥ TS, 2895, TPS. p.116.
- 23) अन्ये तु कुमतिमतानुसारिणो वदन्ति तदायत्ता दोषा व्यपगता भवन्ति। Ibid.
- 24) Vide no. 22.
- 25) चोदनाजनिता बुद्धिः लिङ्गाप्तोक्ताक्षबुद्धिवत् । Ibid,
- 26) न च चोदनाजनितं तस्मादवितथम् । Ibid.
- 27) यत्तावदुक्तम् हेत्वन्तरं नाम निग्रहस्थानम् । Ibid.
- 28) अथवा सत्यपि विशेषणोपादाने ब्रह्मणा वेदाः प्रणीता इति । Ibid, p. 117.
- 29) अपि च किमशेषजनस्मरणनिवृत्तिः विशेषप्रतिषेधस्य शेषाभ्यनुज्ञाविषयत्वात्। Ibid.
- 30) न च पुरुषजन्यत्वेन सर्वत्र प्रामाण्यानाश्वासः स्यात् । Ibid.
- 31) न च अस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वेन वेदानां विधाता इति । Ibid. p. 118.
- 32) भवतु वा अपौरुषेयो वेदः तथा वेदेऽपि भविष्यति । Ibid.
- 33) किंच, अपौरुषेयत्वेन वाक्यानां प्रमाणप्रतिलम्भः । Ibid.

- 34) किंच, बाधाशब्देन इति सन्दिह्यते । Ibid.
- 35) अपि च बाधारहितत्वे न चैतावता प्रमाणं चोदनाजनिता बुद्धिः । Ibid, pp. 118-19, Vide, Eli Franco, Perception p. 304.
- 36) किं च बाधारहितत्वमपि किमेतावता तत्प्रमाणं भवतु ? TPS, p. 119, Ibid. pp. 304-05
- 37) अथवा चोदनाजनितविज्ञानस्य तदिहापि तदेवास्तु। TPS, p. 119, Ibid.
- 38) अथ चोदनाजनितविज्ञानार्थस्य वाचकत्वेन प्रमाण्यं न युज्यते । TPS, p. 119.
- 39) सम्प्रदायानुपच्छेदादागमस्यागमत्वतः ।
सर्वस्यागमतासिद्धेः किं तत्त्वमिति धार्यताम् ॥ MTN, 19. t S., Refutation p. 104.
- 40) नृवाक् चेद् दोषदुष्टत्वादप्रमाणपितीष्यते ।
सौवर्णिकादि वाक्येन हेतुस्स्याद् व्यभिचारवान् ॥ MTN 23., Ibid, p. 105.
- 41) प्रमाण्यमथ वेदस्य साध्यतेऽकर्तृमत्वतः ।
असाधारणता हेतोस्स्यादसिद्धार्थतापि च ॥ MTN 24, Ibid.
- 42) अनुवादादकर्तृत्वे बौद्धमप्यसत्त्वकर्तृकम् ।
पूर्वबुद्धाभिसम्बुद्धं यतो बुद्धैरनूद्यते ॥ MTN 25, Ibid.
- 43) कृतकत्वानुमानाच्च पक्षबाधानुमानतः ।
कर्तुरस्मरणासिद्धेर्हेतोश्च स्यादसिद्धता ॥ MTN, 26, Ibid.
- 44) समन्त्रस्यैव सम्भूतमन्त्रकर्तुः पुरा यदि ।
शास्त्रं वः समभिप्रेतं तत्कर्तृकमकर्तृकम् ॥ MTN 27.
सकर्तृकत्वं शास्त्रस्य किमेवं न प्रतीयते ।
तत्सहोत्पन्नकर्तृत्वाज्जातिस्मरकृतिर्यथा ॥ MTN 28, Ibid, pp. 105-106.
- 45) प्रतिपत्त्यानुगुण्येन वर्णाम्नायादथापि वा ।
गृह्यते वेदवाक्यानां न किं पुरुषकर्तृता ॥ MTN 29.
इतश्च वेदवाक्यानां मता पुरुषकर्तृता ।
विवक्षितार्थधीजन्म कारणत्वाद् यथेङ्गितम् ॥ MTN 30, Ibid, p. 106.
- 46) अनुमेयश्च वेदोऽयमसत्पुरुषकर्तृकः ।
भूतर्हिसासुरापानमिथ्योक्तेर्मगशास्त्रवत् ॥ MTN 31, Ibid.
- 47) विषोपयुक्तिवद्विंसा यदि मन्त्रपरिग्रहात् ।
नाभीष्टनिष्फलदा शास्त्रोक्तेर्वापि दानवत् ॥ MTN 32, Ibid.

- 48) मन्त्रकर्षणवृणाद्यैरगम्यागमनं हि यत् ।
तेनानेकान्तिकः पूर्वो मध्यपानेन चोत्तरः ॥ MTN 33, Ibid, p. 106.
- 49) आयुच्छेदप्रयोगत्वादिष्टो मन्त्रपरिग्रहः ।
अनिष्टफलदः कर्तुर्विषयास्त्रप्रयोगवत् ॥ MTN 34, Ibid, p. 107.
- 50) स्वशास्त्र एव चेदुक्ते सिद्धस्संसारमोचकः ।
सामान्येन च हेतूक्तौ स्यादन्यतरसिद्धता ॥ MTN 35, Ibid, p. 104-07.
- 51) गिरां मिथ्यात्वहेतूनां दोषाणां पुरुषाश्रयात् । PV, 3.225 ab.
गिरां सत्यत्वहेतूनां गुणानां पुरुषाश्रयात् ।
अपौरुषेयं मिथ्यार्थं किं नेत्यन्ये प्रचक्षते ॥ PV, 3.226.
- 52) अर्थज्ञापनहेतुर्हि सङ्केतः पुरुषाश्रयः ।
गिरामपौरुषेयत्वेऽप्यतो मिथ्यात्वसम्भवः ॥ PV, 3.227.
- 53) गिरामेकार्थनियमे न स्यादर्धान्तरे गतिः ।
अनेकार्थाभिसम्बन्धे विरुद्धव्यक्तिसम्भवः ॥ PV, 3.229.
- 54) असंस्कार्यतया पुम्भिः सर्वथा स्यान्निरर्थता ।
संस्कारोपगमे मुख्यं गजस्नानमिदं भवेत् ॥ PV, 3.231.
- 55) अपौरुषेयतापीष्टा कर्तृणामस्मृतेः किल । PN, 3.240 cd.
सन्त्यस्याप्यनुवक्तार इति धिक् व्यापकं तमः ॥ PV, 3.241 ab.
- 56) वक्तुं समर्थः पुरुषस्तस्यान्येऽपीति कश्चन ।
अन्यो वा रचितो ग्रन्थः सम्प्रदायाद् ऋते परैः ॥ PV, 3.242
- 57) हेतवः प्रवितन्त्यन्ते सर्वे ते व्यभिचारिणः ।
सर्वथाऽनादिता सिध्येदेवं नापुरुषाश्रयः ॥ PV, 3.245.
तस्मादपौरुषेयत्वे स्यादन्योऽप्यनराश्रयः ।
म्लेच्छादि व्यवहाराणां नास्तिक्यवचसादपि ॥ PV, 3.246
अनादित्वात् तथाभावः पूर्वसंस्कारसंततेः ।
तादृशेऽपौरुषेयत्वे कः सिद्धेऽपि गुणो भवेत् ॥ PV, 3.247.
- 58) कर्तृसंस्कारतो भिन्नं सहितं कार्यभेदकृत् ।
सा चानुपूर्वीवर्णानां प्रवृत्ता रचनाकृतः ॥ PV, 3.307.
सर्वो वर्णक्रमः पुम्भ्यो दहनेन्धनयुक्तिवत् ।
असाधारणता सिद्धा मन्त्राख्यक्रमकारिणाम् ॥ PV, 3.309.
- 59) पुंसां ज्ञानप्रभावाभ्यामन्येषां तदभावतः ।
येऽपि मन्त्रविदः केचिद् मंत्रान् कांश्चन कुर्वते ॥ PV, 3.310.
कृतकाः पौरुषेयाश्च मन्त्राः वाच्याः फलेप्सुना । PV, 3.311 cd.

- 60) अर्थोऽयं नायमर्थो न इति शब्दा वदन्ति न । PV, 313 cd.
कल्प्योऽयमर्थः पुरुषैस्ते च रागादिसंयुताः ।
तत्रैकस्तत्त्वविन्नान्य इति भेदश्च किं कृतः ॥ PV, 3.314.
तद्वत् पुंस्त्वे कथमपि ज्ञानी कश्चित् कथं न वः ।
यस्य प्रमाणमविसंवादि वचनं सोऽर्थवद् यदि ॥ PV, 3.315.
- 61) न ह्यतन्तपरोक्षेषु प्रमाणस्यास्ति संभवः ।
यस्य प्रमाणमविसंवादि वचनं तत्कृतं वचः ॥ PV, 3.316.
स आगम इति प्राप्तं निरर्था पौरुषेयता ।
यद्यत्यन्तपरोक्षेऽर्थेऽनागमज्ञानसंभवः ॥ PV, 3.317.
अतीन्द्रियार्थवित्कश्चिदस्तीत्यभिमतं भवेत् ।
स्वयं रागादिमान्तरं वेत्ति वेदस्य नान्यतः ॥ PV, 3.318.
- 62) न वेदयति वेदोऽपि वेदार्थस्य कुतो गतिः ।
तेनाग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इति श्रुतौ । PV, 3.319.
खादेत्क्षमांसमित्येष नार्थ इत्यत्र का प्रमा ।
प्रसिद्धो लोकवादश्चेत् तत्र कोऽतीन्द्रियार्थदृक् ॥ PV, 3.320.
अनेकार्थेषु शब्देषु येनार्थोऽयं विवेचितः ।
स्वर्गोर्वश्यादिशब्दश्च दृष्टोऽरुढार्थवाचकः ॥ PV, 3.321.
- 63) सर्वमेतद् द्विजातीनां मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितम् ।
घुणाक्षरवदप्यत्र सूक्तं नैषां हि किञ्चन ॥ TS, 2351, Jha Eng. trans.
- 64) कर्तर्यसत्यपि ह्येषा नैव सत्यार्थता ब्रजेत् ।
तद्वेतुगुणवैकल्याद् दोषाभावे मृषार्थवत् ॥ TS, 2352.
- 65) गुणाः सन्ति न सन्तीति पौरुषेयेषु शङ्क्यते ।
आनर्थक्यमतः प्राप्तं गुणाशङ्कैव नास्ति नः ॥ TS, 2353.
- 66) आनर्थक्यमतः प्राप्तं षड्रूपादिवाक्यवत् ।
अर्थाश्चेत् सम्प्रतीयन्ते क्रियाकारकयोगिनः ॥ TS 2355
एषा स्यात् पुरुषाख्यानादुर्वशीचरितादिवत् ।
प्रतिपत्तिरतादर्थ्येऽप्यस्य प्रकृतितस्तव ॥ TS, 2356.
- 67) दोषाभावेऽपि सत्यत्वं न सिद्धत्यन्यभावतः ।
आनर्थक्याख्यामप्यसस्ति तस्माद् राश्यन्तरं परम् ॥ TS 2357.
- 68) अथापि सहकारीणि व्याख्यादीनि व्यपेक्षते ।
तेषां च क्रमसद्भावात् तद्विज्ञानं क्रमीष्यते ॥ TS, 2362.
- 69) प्रागशक्तः समर्थश्च यदि तैः क्रियते पुनः ।

- प्रसक्तः पौरुषेयोऽयं ज्ञानाङ्गं हि नराश्रयात् ॥ TS, 2364.
- 70) न हि तावत् स्थितोऽप्येष ज्ञानं वेदः करोति न : ।
यावन्न पुरुषैरेष दीपभूतैः प्रकाशितः ॥ TS, 2365.
ततश्चापौरुषेयत्वं भूतार्थज्ञानकारणम् ।
न कल्पं ज्ञानमेतद्वि पुंव्याख्यानात्प्रवर्तते ॥ TS, 2366.
सत्यप्येषा निरर्थातो वेदस्यापौरुषेयता ।
यदिष्टं फलमस्या हि ज्ञानं तत्पुरुषाश्रितम् ॥ TS, 2367.
- 71) स्वतन्त्राः पुरुषाश्चेह वेदे व्याख्यां यथारुचि ।
कुर्वाणाः प्रतिबहुं ते शक्यन्ते नैव केनचित् ॥ TS 2369.
मोहमानादिभिर्दोषैरतोऽमी विप्लुताः श्रुतेः ।
विपरीतानामपि व्याख्यां कुर्युरित्यभिशङ्क्यते ॥ TS 2370.
- 72) वेदो नरं निरांशतो ब्रूतेऽर्थं न सदा स्वतः ।
अन्धातयष्टितुल्यां तु पुंव्याख्यां समपेक्षते ॥ TS, 2373.
- 73) स तथा कृष्यमाणश्च कुवर्त्मन्यपि सम्पतेत् ।
ततो नालोकवद् वेदश्चक्षुर्भूतश्च युज्यते ॥ TS 2374.
- 74) स्वतन्त्रस्य च विज्ञानजनकत्वे सति स्फुटम् ।
प्रामाण्यमपि नैवास्य सम्भाव्यं पुरुषेक्षणात् ॥ TS, 2375.
- 75) यथार्थबोधहेतुत्वात् प्रामाण्यं ह्यवकल्पते ।
पुंव्याख्यापेक्षणे चास्य न साध्वी मानकल्पना ॥ TS, 2376.
सत्यार्थनित्यसम्बन्धमात्रात् प्रामाण्यमस्तु वा ।
अतीन्द्रियं तु तं योगं नैव कश्चिद्व्यवस्यति ॥ TS, 2381.
अतीन्द्रिया यतस्तेऽर्थास्तत्स्थो योगोऽप्यतीन्द्रियः ।
अनत्यक्षदृशः सर्वे नराश्चैते स्वतस्सदा ॥ TS, 2382.
- 76) इत्थं माने स्थिते वेदे शिष्याचार्यपरम्परा ।
अनादिः कल्प्यमानापि नादोषत्वाय युज्यते ॥ TS, 2377.
यस्मादेकोऽपि तन्मध्ये नैवातीन्द्रियदृष्टमतः ।
अनादिः कल्पिताऽप्येषा तस्मादन्धपरम्परा ॥ TS, 2378.
अन्धेनान्धः समाकृष्टः सम्यग्वर्त्मं प्रपद्यते ।
ध्रुवं नैव तथाप्यस्या विफलाऽनादि कल्पना ॥ TS, 2379.
- 77) नन्वारेकादिनिर्मुक्ता स्वर्गादौ जायते मतिः ।
अग्निहोत्रादिवचसो निष्कम्प्याक्षबुद्धिवत् ॥ TS, 2386.
नैवं संशयसञ्जातेर्विपरीतान्यवाक्यवत् ।

- प्रेक्षावन्तो हि नैतेषां भेदं पश्यन्ति कश्चन ॥ TS, 2388.
नातीन्द्रिये हि युज्येते सदसत्ताविनिश्चयौ ।
निश्चयो वेदवाक्याच्चेदन्याहङ् न किमन्यतः ॥ TS, 2389.
- 78) श्रोत्रियाणां तु निष्कम्पाबुद्धिरेवोपजायते ।
श्रद्धाविवशबुद्धीनां सान्येषामन्यतः समा ॥ TS, 2390.
तथा हि सौगतादीनां धीरकम्प्योपजायते ।
अपायदुःखसम्भूतिर्यागात् प्राणिवधान्वितात् ॥ TS, 2391.
अस्याश्च न धियः काचिद् बाधा सम्प्रति दृश्यते ।
कचित् कदाचिच्छंक्या चेदेदवाक्येऽपि सा समा ॥ TS, 2392.
- 79) अपि चापौरुषेयस्य यथा प्राकृतमिष्यते ।
सत्यार्थत्वमसत्यत्वमेवमाशङ्क्यते न किम् ॥ TS, 2397.
स्वतः सत्यार्थबोधस्य हेतुत्वात् सत्यतास्य हि ।
एवं मिथ्यावबोधेऽपि हेतुत्वं शङ्क्यते स्वतः ॥ TS, 2398.
- 80) किञ्च वेदप्रमाणत्वे निर्बन्धो यदि वो ध्रुवम् ।
निर्दोषकर्तृकत्वादौ तदा यत्नो विधीयताम् ॥ TS, 2399.
निर्दोषेण हि कर्त्रायं कृतोऽदोषैः प्रकाशकैः ।
द्योत्यमानश्च लोकेऽस्मिन् भूतार्थज्ञानसाधनः ॥ TS, 2400.
- 81) न नराकृतमित्येव यथार्थज्ञानकारि तु ।
दृष्टा हि दाववह्न्यादेर्मिथ्याज्ञानेऽपि हेतुता ॥ TS, 2402.
- 82) अतश्चापौरुषेयत्वव्यक्तित्वसाधनम् ।
नित्यशब्दार्थयोगश्च व्यर्थ एवोपवर्णितः ॥ TS, 2406.
तत्पञ्चभिरगम्योऽपि नाभावो नैव गम्यते ।
कर्ता श्रुतेरविज्ञातकर्तृकाख्यायिकादिवत् ॥ TS, 2412.
अथापि सार्थकत्वेन विभक्तार्थतयापि वा ।
तेषां कर्ताऽनुमीयेत, श्रुतेरपि तथा न किम् ॥ TS, 2413.
अध्येतारश्च वेदानां कर्तारोऽध्यक्षतो गताः ।
न हि ते व्यञ्जका युक्ता नित्यानां व्यक्तचसम्भवात् ॥ TS, 2417.
- 83) उपलभ्यस्वभावानां तद्व्यापारे समुद्भवः ।
तेषां प्रागपि सद्भावे उपलब्धिः प्रसज्यते ॥ TS, 2418.
- 84) तत्कार्यव्यवहारादि योग्यो वेदोऽवसीयते ।
तद्व्यापारोऽस्य सद्भावाद् बीजादेरङ्कुरादिवत् । TS, 2419.
व्यञ्जनक्रमरूपत्वान्नाटकाख्यायिकादिवत् ।

- वेदानां पौरुषेयत्वमनुमाप्यवगच्छति ॥ TS, 2420.
 अन्यथा क्रमरूपत्वं नित्यत्वाद् व्याप्तिश्च न ।
 नाभिव्यक्तिक्रमश्चास्ति नित्यत्वेव्यक्तचयोंगतः ॥ TS, 2421, Ibid.
- 85) सम्भाष्यते च वेदस्य विस्पष्टं पौरुषेयता ।
 काममिथ्याक्रियाप्राणिहिंसाऽसत्याभिधा तथा ॥ TS, 2786.
 दुर्भणत्वानुदात्तविलष्टत्वाश्रयतादयः ।
 वेदधर्मा हि दृश्यन्ते नास्तिकादि वचस्वपि ॥ TS, 2787.
 विषापगमभूत्यादि यच्च किञ्चित्समीक्ष्यते ।
 सत्यं तद्वैततेयादि मन्त्रवादेऽपि दृश्यते ॥ TS, 2788.
- 86) सर्वदा चैव पुरुषाः प्रायेणानृतवादिनः ।
 यथायत्वे न विश्रम्भस्तथातीतार्थकीर्तने ॥ TS, 2792.
 इत्येतेनत्वदुक्तेन न्यायेन च सिध्यति ।
 कर्ता कश्चित् क्वचित् ग्रन्थे स्वां कृतिं कथयन्नपि ॥ TS, 2793.
 ततश्चापौरुषेयेषु सत्याशा त्यज्यतामियम् ।
 वेदार्थविपरीता हि तेष्वर्थाः प्रतिपादिताः ॥ TS, 2794.
- 87) अपि चानादिता सिध्येदेवं नानरसंश्रयः ।
 तस्मादकर्तृत्वेवा स्यादन्योऽप्यागमोऽकृतः ॥ TS, 2795.
 तथा हि पारसीकादि व्यवहाराः पराश्रयाः ।
 नास्तिकानां च सिद्धान्तः परसंस्कारभाविकः ॥ TS, 2796.
 ईदृश्यकर्तृकत्वे च कः सिद्धेऽपि गुणस्तव ।
 अवैतव्यनिमित्तं हि यत्नोऽयं भवतोऽखिलः ॥ TS, 2797, Ibid.
- 88) कालत्वपुरुषत्वादौ सन्दिग्धव्यतिरेकिता ।
 पूर्ववत्कारणाशक्तेर्नराणामप्रसाधनात् ॥ TS, 2798.
 व्यक्तेश्च प्रतिषिद्धत्वात् वक्ता कर्तैव गम्यताम् ।
 तत्प्रयोगद्वयेऽप्युक्तं साध्यशून्यं निदर्शनम् ॥ TS, 2799.
 नरोपदेशापेक्षत्वात् कृतकस्य च साधनात् ।
 स्वार्थे वक्त्रनपेक्षत्वं धर्मिदृष्टान्तयोरन च ॥ TS, 2800.
- 89) नित्यत्वेऽस्ते च वाक्यस्य धर्मिदृष्टान्तयोरपि ।
 नित्यवाक्योद्भवत्वस्य स्पष्टासिद्धिः प्रतीयते ॥ TS, 2801.
 इत्थं चापौरुषेयत्वे चोदनाया अनिश्चिते ।
 सन्धिग्राहिसिद्धतादोषः पश्चिमेष्वपि हेतुषु ॥ TS, 2802.
- 90) नराविज्ञातरूपार्थं तमोभूते ततः स्थिते ।

- वेदेऽनुरागो मन्दानां स्वाचारे पारसीकवत् ॥ TS, 2806.
 अविज्ञातवदार्थाश्च पापनिष्यन्दयोगतः ।
 तथैवामी प्रवर्तन्ते प्राणिहिंसादिकल्मषे ॥ TS, 2807.
- 91) धर्मं प्रति न सिद्धातश्चोदनां प्रमाणता ।
 स्वतोन्येभ्यश्च मन्देभ्यस्तदर्थानवधारणात् ॥ TS, 2808.
 ज्ञानालोकव्यपास्तान्तस्तमोराशिः पुमानतः ।
 श्रुत्यर्थानां विविक्तानामुपदेशकृदिष्यताम् ॥ TS, 2809.
- 92) अपौरुषेयत्वप्रसाधकप्रमाणाभावाच्च तत्सम्बन्ध सत्त्वेनाप्यसङ्गात् IPKM
 of Prācandra, Mahendrakumar Shastri ed. pp. 391-92.
- 93) नाप्यनुमानं तत्प्रसाधकम् शब्दवाच्यत्वलिङ्गजनितं वा स्यात् Ibid.
 p. 392.
- 94) किमिदं कर्तुरस्मरणं नाम खरविषणवत् । Ibid.
- 95) अथ सम्प्रदायाविच्छेदे किन्नाडिकतत्वं स्याद्विशेषाभावात् । Ibid pp.
 392-93.
- 96) अथ वेदे सविगानकर्तृविशेषे तथा चासिद्धो हेतुः । Ibid. p. 393.
- 97) ननु वेदे कर्तृसद्भावाभ्युपगमे तदप्यसम्बद्धम् । Ibid, p. 394.
- 98) किञ्च, अतः स्वातन्त्र्येणापौरुषेयत्वं पौरुषेयत्वसाधकानुमानस्य बाधा, इत्यपि
 प्रत्याख्यातम् । Ibid, pp. 395-96.
- 99) अथ गुणवद्वक्तृकत्वेनैव तन्न निर्विशेषणोऽयं हेतुः प्रकृतसाध्यसाधनः ।
 Ibid, pp. 397-98.
- 100) अथ सविशेषणः प्रामाण्यस्यैव प्रतिषिद्धत्वात् । Ibid.
- 101) किञ्च सदुपलम्भक इत्यपि प्रत्युक्तम् । Ibid pp. 398-99.
- 102) नाप्यगमतोऽपौरुषेयसिद्धिः इत्यादिप्रचुरतर वेदवाक्यानां श्रवणात् ।
 Ibid, p. 399.
- 103) अपौरुषेयत्वधर्माधारतया कस्यचिदप्यभावात् । Ibid.
- 104) किञ्च अपौरुषेयत्वं प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधरूपं प्रतिपादितत्वात् । Ibid. p. 400.
- 105) अस्तु वाऽपौरुषेयो वेदः धर्मे चोदनैव प्रमाणम् इत्यवधारणानुपपत्तिश्च ।
- 106) ये तु श्रोत्रियाः इति वचनात् । RKT, Dalsukh Mahvania ed. Part
 II. p. 89.
- 107) यैव श्रुतिर्मया प्रागध्यायि इति सकलं समानम् । Ibid.
- 108) किञ्च अनुभवानुचरणचतुरं तन्न तत्र प्रत्यक्षं क्षमते ।
- 109) नाप्यनुमानम् विशिष्टवर्णाद्यात्मकत्वस्यैव काप्यसम्भवाद् । Ibid,

91-92.

- 110) प्रजापतिर्वेदमेकमासीत् सिद्ध आगमबाधोऽपि । Ibid, pp. 93-94.
 111) यत् कर्त्रस्मरणं साधनम् अन्यत्राश्रये पुंसि वर्तनात् । Ibid, p. 96.
 112) अथापौरुषेयी श्रुतिः तत्र कर्तुः स्मरणात् । Ibid.
 113) मनु श्रोत्रियाः श्रुतौ कालेऽनन्तमुनीनामाङ्कितत्वं तासां स्यात्
 Ibid, p. 97.
 114) जैनाश्च कालासुरमेतत् कर्तारं न पुनाः कर्तुमात्रस्मरणमपि । Ibid. p. 97.
 115) वेदस्याध्ययनं सर्वं वर्तमानकालवत्, इतिवदप्रयोजकत्वात् । Ibid, p. 97-98.
 116) अथ अर्थापत्तेरपौरुषेयत्वनिर्णयो
 अन्यथानुपपत्तेरपौरुषेयोऽयमिति । Ibid. p. 99.
 117) अस्तु तावदत्र एवास्योक्तवत्सद्भावात् । Ibid, pp. 99-103.
 118) अपि च इयमानुपूर्वी पौरुषेयी श्रुतिः । Ibid, p. 103.

CHAPTER III

REFUTATION OF SVATAH-PRĀMĀNYA

Position of Mīmāṃsā - The doctrine of self-validity of knowledge forms the corner stone on which the whole structure of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy is based. The Mīmāṃsā philosophy asserts that all knowledge is valid in itself. The knowledge itself clarifies its own truth and it does not depend upon any other extraneous condition or on any other cognition for its validity.

Self-validity, according to Mīmāṃsā philosophy, is that the rise of knowledge is never perceived by us to be dependent of an object and all objective facts are dependent on it for its revelation. This is known as self-validity of knowledge in its production (utpatti). As soon as knowledge is produced, objects are revealed and there is no link between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on which knowledge depends for producing its action. Thus knowledge is not only independent in its origination but in its own action as well¹.

In some cases of illusory perception, a later perception or cognition carries with it the notion that our original knowledge is invalid. Thus the invalidity of any knowledge may appear by later experience and then we reject the first knowledge. This is what Mīmāṃsā philosophy says that the validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise and invalidity may be derived from later experience. A cognition or knowledge attained is proved invalid when later on knowledge *bādhakajñāna* occurs in or when our organs etc. are known to be faulty and defective.²

Thus the validity of knowledge certified at moment of its production or origin need not be doubted unnecessarily even after enquiry. All knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently by itself as a general rule, unless it is shown

to be invalid later on. Memory is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon previous experience and cannot be regarded as arising independently by itself³.

Jaimini does not refer to self-validity of knowledge directly in his aphorisms. However, we can find the origin of the doctrine of self-validity in the definition of *Dharma*, while commenting on this definition, Śabara clearly refers to the self-validity of the Veda, such as, the idea brought about by the assertion, 'Desiring heaven, one should perform sacrifices' is not an uncertain one. Infact, the idea is definitely certain that heaven should follow and when it is cognised for certain it cannot be false. It is never found to be checked by any other cognition at any time or in regard to any person or under any circumstances or at any place. Therefore it follows that it is not false or wrong⁴.

That cognition alone is false which having appeared becomes checked by the notion, 'such is not the actual case'. In the assertion of ordinary men, if it emanates from a trustworthy person or if it pertains to something that is directly perceived by the senses, it must be true. On the contrary, if it pertains to something that cannot be perceived directly by the senses, this is unreliable. However, in the case of Veda, there is no room for illusion or wrong knowledge as there is no human agency involved, while in the case of human instructors, there is always a chance of mistakes, illusions and ignorance. On the otherhand, in the case of teachings emanating from human sources is not always competent with truth. But in the case of Vedic assertion there is nothing to indicate its falsity⁵.

In regard to validity of cognitions, a question arises: Is the validity inherent in the cognition itself or something extraneous to itself? Four alternative views have been set forth by Kumārila⁶ in the Śloka-vārttika, they are as follows :

- a) Validity and invalidity are both inherent in cognition.
- b) Both are extraneous.
- c) Invalidity is inherent and validity is extraneous.
- d) Validity is inherent and invalidity is extraneous.

Kumārila rejects first three alternative views of the opponents, such as;

(a) The view of the Sāṃkhya that 'the validity and invalidity are inherent' cannot be accepted, because both are naturally contradictory⁷.

(b) The view of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika is that 'the validity and invalidity are wholly extraneous can be rejected unless a cognition by itself would be neither valid nor invalid and it would bear no character at all⁸.

(c) The Bauddhaś view is that by its nature cognition by itself must be regarded as invalid and its validity as due to extraneous factors⁹. This is to say that the validity of cognitions should depend upon efficiency and consequent reliability of persons. But in the case of the Veda, there is no author according to Mīmāṃsā system and therefore the Veda could not be reliable source of knowledge regarding *Dharma*.

It is the view of Mīmāṃsakas that all cognitions are inherently valid and invalidity that is imposed upon the cognition, when it is found in its source has been defective¹⁰.

Jainas' argument is that both alternatives i.e. knowledge is valid or is made valid by the situation, are true. But when it is remembered, or when it leads to some action it may be valid either by itself or due to something else¹¹.

As far as the present topic is concerned, we discuss the grounds of refutation of the self-validity of cognitions by the heterodox systems, i.e. Bauddhas and Jainas.

Kumārila, in this regard, declares that it should be understood that the validity of all means of cognition is inherent in them. Thus it follows that every cognition as cognition must be valid and it may be set aside when some defects are found in the cognition process as evidenced by the cognised object being in reality¹².

Kumārila rejects the validity of dream cognitions by saying that the qualities of the sense-organ alone is said to the cause of validity of cognition but the validity of these qualities of sense organ is denied for two reasons, viz. the occasional disorder of

the organs of perception and the occasional absence either of the organs or of their capabilities. It is the mistaken idea that the cognition of falsity is due to faults in the cause. As a matter of fact, the invariable concomitance of faults leads to the absence of qualities and this absence establishes invalidity of cognition¹³.

Moreover, he states the purity of cause must be admitted to be the means of validity of a cognition; while the invalidity being natural, can only be indicated by the absence of such purity¹⁴.

For the opponents 'objection, i.e. 'as much as there is no human agency and of the impossibility of any purity belonging to it, there can be no validity for the injunction', Kumāṛila deliberately replies, 'You should understand that the validity is inherent in all means of cognitions. A positive by itself non-existing cannot be brought into existence by any other agency'¹⁵. Further, he states that it is only for the sake of its birth that positive entity requires a cause, when it once comes into existence its application to its various effects proceeds naturally out of itself¹⁶.

If even on the birth of conception, the object not be comprehended until the purity of its cause has been ascertained by other means. In the sense, a cognition should be made to depend upon the qualities of its cause for the purpose of denoting the object. This second cognition would be true only on the ascertainment of the purity of its cause. Finally it would lead to an infinite regression. However, validity should be said to be itself for the cognition and nothing is needed. Because in the absence of any cognition of faults invalidity becomes precluded by itself¹⁷.

Further, he states how invalidity takes place. As he says, invalidity is three-fold, falsity, ignorance and doubt. Among these falsity and doubt are being positive entities and brought by faults in the cause. However, in the case of ignorance, we do not admit the action of such faults, because all ignorance is due to devoid of cause. As a matter of fact, invalidity of cognition does not lead to any infinite regression as is found in the case with theory

of cognition of qualities being the cause of validity. Invalidity occurs to the cognition directly through contradictory cognition. So long as, however, the former is not checked, the contradictory cognition cannot be produced. For instance, a snake with regard to the rope¹⁸.

Even when the discrepancy of the cognition is known this knowledge refers to another object, but it is implied that two cognitions refers to common objects. Hence the first cognition is contradictory. However, this rule is not applicable to all cases. The second cognition in which there is neither the valid until there is cognition of any discrepancy nor contradiction in it. But when such a cognition arises, the second cognition becoming invalid and former becomes valid. In the absence of cognition of discrepancies or faults, the validity of the cognitions is due to the cognitions by itself and where there is no such cognition of discrepancies there is no chance for doubt. Thus, there is no need of postulating more than three conceptions. It is for this reason that we hold to the doctrine of self-validity¹⁹.

Next, Kumāṛila proceeds to assert that the chance of discrepancies (faults) in an assertion depends upon the speaker. In certain places, the absence of faults is due to its having faultless speaker, because faults are removed by his good qualities and these faults cannot attach to his assertion or in absence of any speaker there could be no discrepancies as there is no substratum to them²⁰.

In truthful human assertions we find two factors viz., absence of faults and presence of qualities. The qualities must be held to help only in removal of faults and that (absence of faults) follows the absence of two kinds of invalidity and thus the fact of validity being inherent in words remains safe. At the time of ascertainment of cognition in the absence of faults there is no any active part of qualities, but they continue to be recognised all the same, because an absence of faults help by their mere presence²¹.

Now, Kumāṛila states his argument on another point. In the case of the means of cognition other than Vedas, agreement

with the object is not the criterion because more than one cognition treating the same object becomes alternatives and therefore the cognition of that object can be due to only one of these. That subsequent cognition could only serve to specify the conception of an object, where the preceding means has not succeeded to rightly ascertain its nature. Whether the validity of subsequent cognition is depending upon the another, than we would require one such means for the purpose of validity of every cognitions of knowledge and such then we would reach to an infinite regression²².

In this connection, Kumārila replies vehemently for the objection (i.e. if you admit an inherent validity in any one of these) made by an opponent (i.e. Dharmakīrti according to Nyāyaratnākara) such as, then to what special cause is due your repugnance to such inherent validity pertaining to the very first cognition? And again, if you say that the non-support of other cognitions is the ground for invalidity, then a perception by the ear would have to be considered invalid because that is non-supported by ocular perception. If it be argued that 'one perception of the ear could be supported by some another perception', then in the Veda also there would be as many as hundred conceptions, following upon its alterance. In both cases, i.e., perception of the ear and the conceptions of the Veda, there is no conception produced by any other means of cognitions. Hence the conception that has been firmly brought about and does not stand in need of any support of other cognitions must be accepted to be valid means of cognition²³.

If it be argued that sense-perception and other means of cognitions are not comprehended as valid or is it not possible to carry on any business by such cognitions when they are not comprehended, then Kumārila replies as such, even prior to comprehension they have an independent existence of their own and they come to be comprehended subsequently through other cognitions. Hence, the fact of its being comprehended does not make any use in validity, because the experience of the object is gained by the former alone²⁴.

Next, Kumārila says regarding the invalidity that even the invalid means does not by itself advertise its false character. The idea of silver really perceives the shell to be a piece of silver. Thus an invalid means, by itself, signifies its own character and leads to men accordingly. The falsity of an object is not perceived by its very first conception. The recognition of invalidity is due to one's consciousness of the falsity of its subject itself or of the falsity of the cause of that conception. Thus, thereby falsity alone is recognised and by no other means. The truthfulness or a validity of a conception is proved to be inherent in it. Hence, where the falsity or invalidity is proved that is only by these two causes²⁵. If you argue that the validity of the Veda is not proved although there are many conceptions produced from the Veda', then, that is not proper, because assertion is due to malignity. The validity of the Veda cannot be proved by one's own wish or command. Nor can any desirable conception be valid, because it is desirable. Hence, the Veda like light, being common to all persons, it is not proper to dispute on its validity. Due to the imperfections of human beings, there is every chance being open to contradiction. While in the Veda, the fact of its non-human origin, serves to establish its validity²⁶.

If the Veda is of human origin, then those who declare it to be true, false, would have to inherent without any grounds, its author, his merits, defects and its acceptance by great men, however, nothing is postulated by Mīmāṃsakas besides what is directly seen i.e., the Veda alone is valid by itself²⁷.

Refutation by Śāntarākṣita - Śāntarākṣita vehemently begins the refutation of all arguments made by Kumārila. If it be urged that 'the things like, Jar stand in need of a cause, when once they have got their existence, they become operative by themselves towards their own effects', then, that cognition which you have asserted as not lasting after being born, becomes non-existent after having secured its existence. Then, what sort of activity could it have?²⁸

In a context. Kumārila has declared the unity and eternity of cognitions²⁹. Under this view, the proposition put forward

would go against what has been accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas. If the cognition is held to be non-momentary and even eternal, then this goes against what has been accepted and it is also nullified by following reasons.

(a) It has been demonstrated in detail that all things are in 'perpetual flux'.

(b) As for the eternal thing, it is never produced; then what is the need could it have of a cause? For these reasons, it can be said that by itself the cognition cannot be valid. The validity comes only later in relation to its effects, because it is featureless like the sky-lotus. Or cognition may be non-momentary and it may be itself be operative towards bringing about the conviction regarding its validity, but in that case why should there be doubt etc. In as much as certainty regarding its validity would be obtained from the cognition itself, there can be no chance for doubt or wrong cognition. This is because conviction and wrong cognition are mutually destructive, wrong cognition establishes itself only when becomes excluded. Hence the reason given by you for establishing the validity of the cognition arising from the Vedas viz., it arises from causes free from defects and so on, is of no use. If there is any suspicion of the two kinds of invalid cognitions (doubt & wrong cognition) then there would be no certainty regarding validity since the things would have formed the object of wrong cognition³⁰.

Next, the author proceeds to point out 'self-contradiction' on the part of the Mīmāṃsaka by saying that when a thing becomes the object of doubt or misconception there can be no certainty regarding the real form of that thing, such as in the case of post. Here, the author points out opponent's view is contrary to inference. For instance, the post is proved from the experience of crow, the fire from the smoke, and invalidity from the defects arising from causes. In this way, the absence of intrinsic validity is proved by inference. Because, validity has been found to be subject to doubt and misconception. Therefore it should be understood that any certainty can be obtained only extraneously³¹.

The author then states the position of the Mīmāṃsaka that

'it is only in the sentence in which the negative word is found that there is denial of something and in all other sentences, it is the positive denotation itself that is apprehended' and now the author comments that in your statement the cognition produced by the Veda is valid, the negative word has not been used'. Therefore, it does not mean the denial of invalidity³².

Further, he asks if the validity of all cognitions is inherent in them by themselves, then why there is a difference of opinion among disputants? Some asserts that 'validity of cognitions is always inherent, self-valid, in themselves', while others assert that in some cases, the validity is self-sufficient, while in others it is due to extraneous factors. There is no rule in determining it. It means that the dispute is always the effect of misconceptions, and that is always contrary to firm conviction. Consequently, the proposition that 'the validity of cognitions is intrinsic is contrary to inference³³'.

Further, he proceeds to say that where the conviction regarding self-validity is not obtained, what is cognised is invalidity after its birth of the knowledge of the defects arising from causes. Consequently the invalid cognition will equally intrinsic in its case cannot be said to be reverse to validity. Therefore no one would act in pursuance of the cognition which is not confirm with reality, because there is always a certainty regarding its non-confirmity³⁴.

Next, the author proceeds to point out that the instance of jar etc. are inadmissible. In the case of jar, there is no time for action apart from the time of birth, because it has a momentary existence. Hence the instance of jar is inadmissible. For their birth, the jar etc. are not depend upon the potter and such cases. But they do depend upon their own constituent causes and other things. So that of the jar itself, there can be no action. This is to say here that no single jar is known to exist after the moment of its birth. For this simple reason that all things are momentary³⁵. The author then responds to Mīmāṃsaka view that the knowledge does not depend upon causes for the ascertainment of its validity. It is like a jar, which depends upon causes for its production. But

then it becomes independent and it no depends upon causes does not for performing the function of heating water etc³⁶.

According to the Buddhist, the first cognition's practical efficacy is intrinsically valid. But the later cognitions are extrinsically valid. Here Mīmāṃsaka might ask, "what peculiar feature is in the second cognition than the previous cognition, why is it not regarded to be like previous cognition?" The author gives the answer for this question, like, 'it is confirmity with the real state of things that is called validity and there is no feature of it except the repeated cognition of effective action. The cognition envisaging effective action is clearly apprehended because confirmed by the same. Thus it does not stand in need of any subsequent cognition of the same effective action³⁷.

If the previous cognition does not envisage a real entity, then the second cognition, in the form of confirmation by confirmity to the real state of the thing would not appear at all, because its cause would not be there. Hence it follows that so long as the cognition envisaging effective action does not appear. There is always a suspicion of the previous cognition being invalid, because of the causes of misapprehension. Regarding this, there are many chances for suspecting it to be wrong, viz. (a) The non-perception of its effect.

(b) Perception of similarity.

(c) Inefficiency of the cognition and so on.

When, there appears the cognition envisaging effect there are no such chances as there is direct perception of action³⁸.

It has been argued by Mīmāṃsakas, that the first cognition would need corroboration by the second cognition. So we seek for the corroboration of that corroborative cognition also³⁹. Then the answer is 'even in case where the validity has been apprehended, there can be no certainty regarding it, because of the presence of the causes of misconception and in such cases, the validity is ascertained only extraneously. Hence there is no need for further corroboration by another corroborative cognition as there is in the case of the previous cognition⁴⁰.

And again, he gives answer to the argument made by

Mīmāṃsaka. The argument is that if the validity of some cognition be held to be self-valid, why should there be hostility to the same being the case with the previous cognition⁴¹. The answer to this is that of the second cognition, the validity is self-valid, because there are no causes for misapprehension. However, the first cognition, cannot be self-valid due to the possibility of misapprehension⁴².

In regard to the conch-shell before our eyes, it is found that the effective action resulting from its cognition is produced by white object. It is learnt that the cognition of the white conch-shell is not produced by eyes affected by jaundice. On the otherhand, there arises the cognition of yellow colour in connection with the conch-shell made of gold. The validity of that cognition is ascertainant on the cognition is produced from flawless causes. Just as this happens in the case of the cognition of the white colour in connection with the white conch-shell, which has led to effective action⁴³.

Now, the author proceeds to show that what has been said by him which should be quite acceptable to the Mīmāṃsaka. He says that 'the author of the Śābara Bhāṣya [SB 1.1.5] also has said the same thing by the mention of attack of hunger etc., hence it is through sheer delusion that the infinite regress has been urged⁴⁴.

It has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsaka that 'the validity must be regarded as inherent in all cognitions as a general rule⁴⁵. The author provides the answer, 'If self-validity of cognitions is the general rule and it is discarded when there is either an annulment of it or there is the cognition of defectiveness its sources, then validity becomes due to the absence of annulment and the cognition of the absence of the source being defective and thus, the validity becomes extraneous. This absence of cognition is an independent means of cognition and is called non-apprehension⁴⁶.

For the same reason, the invalidity of cognitions may be proved to be inherent in them. Therefore it can be asserted that the self-invalidity of cognitions is the general rule and it is

discarded when there is either absence of annulment or absence of the cognition of its source being defective. If you assert 'validity' on the ground of absence of sublating cognition, and absence of sublating cognition is known non-apprehension and the validity of the latter also is ascertained on the ground of the absence of sublating cognition, and this process leads to infinite regress⁴⁷.

Even when no sublating cognition is found, there arises suspicion due to doubt, because the non-apprehension of sublating cognition is not always concomitant with its absence. Even in a case, where no sublation has actually appeared its presence can always be suspected. Even though a man has the insublated cognition of conch-shell as yellow through out his life, such a cognition does not become valid. The author holds that suspicion of sublation is not due to stupidity but there is some ground for it. When there is cognition of the perfectness of the cause and that of confirmity to reality, there arises no suspicion in the mind of the wise. *Mīmāṃsaka* had refer to lord, Kṛṣṇa who condemned suspicion on this, the author says there lord Kṛṣṇa is refering to and condemning the suspicion which is made by a foolish person⁴⁸.

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, that 'when in regard to a cognition a certain sublation is possible, and on being sought for, is not found; then regard to that cognition it has to be concluded that there is no sublation at all. The answer that author gives to this is that if the determination of validity is dependent upon the place, time, the man and the circumstances then, it is clear that the definite cognition of validity is dependent upon extraneous causes. For instance, the place and time have been ascertained through the absence of sublation, the ascertainment of validity of the initial cognition clearly follows from other means of cognition⁴⁹.

Next he shows that what is itself unknown cannot serve as an indicator. He says that so long as the excellences are not recognised, the absence of defects cannot be perceived. Then it cannot be right that the assertion valid by itself is indicated by the absence of defects. Because, not being cognised the absence

of defects cannot serve as an indicator. People know the stick, but they cannot have any idea of the stick-holder. Thus the idea of the self-validity being indicated by the absence of defects becomes discarded by self-contradiction. Here, it is to be noted that the absence of defects can qualify the word only when ascertained by that means of cognition which consists of non-apprehension and in this way validity of cognition would be due to something extraneous to itself. Even the excellences are there, the cognition of the defects can be appeared. If there is non-cognition of excellences there cannot be the knowledge of absence of defects⁵⁰.

Kumārila has argued that 'at the time of the cognition of the absence of defects the excellences do not function on being themselves cognised. Infact, it is by mere presence that they help in the cognising of the absence of defects'⁵¹. Śāntarākṣita, however does not agree with this point. If the knowledge of excellences is not necessary, then in the case of statement of reliable person, there will be neither a doubt nor a false apprehension with regard to existence or non-existence of defects in that statement. Actually someone does entertain a doubt or false cognition with regard to such a statement until he realises that the statement is locus of many excellences. It does not know the absence of two forms of invalid cognition (doubt and misconception). Hence there is no determination of validity⁵².

Next, he points out that the assertion that "there is validity when there is absence of defects" refers to absolute negation of defects then the latter can never be proved. It cannot be proved by apprehension as it is a negation. Nor can it be proved by non-apprehension as that would involve an infinite regress. Such as, if the absence of defects and that of the two kinds of invalid cognition are proved by non-apprehension and this absence of apprehension is proved by another non-apprehension then there is infinite regress⁵³.

Further, he states that, 'the relative negation, absence of defects would be the same as excellences. Hence he concludes that the cognition of the said absence also would be the same as

the cognition of excellences. The absence of two kinds of invalid cognition also becomes same as valid cognition and also would be of the nature of the intended valid cognition. In case, the absence of the two kinds of invalid cognition is cognised by itself, then the question arises : 'How could you ascertain that the rest of it is valid? If it be argued that 'the ascertainment is through presumption, or through inference or through some other means of cognition, then this ascertainment will be extraneous. Again it follows that the invalidity is inherent in cognitions. As the same arguments apply to that view, (i.e. from excellences follow the absence of defects etc.) also. Therefore it is the absence of excellence that follows from the defects and from that absence follows absence of validity. Therefore, the general law is undenied. In as much as this general law is concerned, it can be asserted in regard to invalidity, just as in regard to validity, because it is in the nature of apprehension that cognition is regarded as invalid. It is rejected by the right knowledge according to the reality of objects and by the cognition of the excellences of its sources. The invalidity, however, is not discarded by the excellences, because they have not been cognised. Therefore, he concludes that being not denied, the invalidity remains established as being inherent in cognitions⁵⁴.

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka that if validity of cognition depends upon its consistency with other valid cognitions then the cognition at an object which arises once and vanishes and not be valid, similarly no validity could belong to auditory cognition, because it could not be corroborated by the eye (*pratyakṣa*) and other means of cognition⁵⁵. The author gives an answer to this that it is not correct, there can be no corroboration of auditory cognition by the eye and other means of cognition, because colour, sound and so on are dependent upon same circumstances and are mutually concomitant and in the same line they are cause of each other. Through these, there is connection among their cognitions also: just as smoke and the effect of fire. Thus auditory cognition would be valid due to being corroborated by other cognitions. In the case of validity of sense perception, there is definite basis in the form of

corroboration by other cognitions produced by other sense-organs. However, it is not found to be the case with the Veda. The first cognition of water, which appears is produced by the eye, then there follows the later cognitions related to drinking and bathing dependent upon the other organ and the body⁵⁶.

It has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsaka that 'the validity of verbal and other cognitions is not to be proved by means of inference'⁵⁷. The author says in this connection that even the validity of perception is ascertained by means of the following inference. "A certain perception is valid, as it is produced by flawless causes, like other perceptions"⁵⁸. Here, it is noted that the eye and other organs do not apprehend things themselves, but they serve as the cause of cognition of those things.

Now he turns to refute the self-validity of the Veda. It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsakas that 'In the case of words emanating from personalities there is always room for doubt, whether there are defects are not. However, in the case of Veda, there being no author, there can be absolutely no suspicion regarding the presence of defects'⁵⁹. The Buddhist philosopher refutes delebrately by stating that there is always room for doubt in the words of emanating personalities whether there are defects or not. It has been proved that there must be an author of the Veda and it is not true that we have no suspicion regarding the presence of defects in it. It is not proper to accept that the validity of the Veda is accepted on the ground of its being self-sufficient, because, as a matter of fact, that is dependent upon the author. In case, however, there is no corroborative cognition nor perfection in its source, the appearance of doubt and invalidity is inevitable in the Veda⁶⁰.

Further, he emphasises that it is not correct to say that 'when the cognition brought about by any sentence is the same at all times and places and in all men' because, the cognition brought about by any one sentence is never found to be the same in all times and in all places and in all men. In all cases there arises a doubt like, is it true or not. For instance, 'Heaven is attained by the performance of *Agnihotra*' etc. are heard by all

men. But it is devoid of all elements of certainty. Even in Brāhmaṇas there is difference of opinion in regard to Heaven and such things. Hence the cognition derived from the Veda is not found to be the same in all men⁶¹.

As regards the firmness of the conviction produced by the Vedic injunction is to be rejected. As a matter of fact the firmness is always doubtful, because it stands on the same foot as the notion derived from human assertions like, 'the performance of *Agnihotra* does not lead to Heaven'. Being this circumstance, how the Brāhmaṇas who are not omniscient, assert the cognition produced by the Vedic injunction is the same at all places and times⁶².

Further, he states that there is a subverting cognition in the form of inference. Therefore by the rejection of the soul and other things mentioned in the Veda, it becomes clear that the cognition derived from the Veda cannot be valid. The fact of its having a defective source is always open to suspicion. If the capacity of validity is inherent in all cognitions just as the capacity to burn is inherent in fire, then such validity should belong to wrong cognitions also. Thus it opens to suspicion that the cognition provided by the Veda, proceeds from a defective source. For all this, the self-validity of the Veda is not possible and it should be accepted by you that the Veda has been composed and expounded by persons who are definitely recognised as free from defects. Here, this is to say that if this view is accepted then the validity would be extraneous, otherwise then there can be no validity at all⁶³.

Then again, according to your view, "that the validity of the Veda being self-sufficient, it always brings about certainty regarding its subject matter, so that there can be no delusion regarding it. As it is eternal, there can be no room for doubt or ignorance or misconception in the Veda". All the attempt that has been made by Vedic scholars to preserve the text of the Veda has been superfluous, for these reasons you should accept the view that there has been an author of the Veda who is capable of seeing things beyond the things, who has shaken off the entire mass of darkness and ignorance and who is conversant with the

meaning of the Veda and its divisions⁶⁴.

Refutation by Prabhācandra - According to Prabhācandra the determination of validity is intrinsic as well as due to some other cause. He explains that the validity of valid means of cognitions due to the other factors in their origination. It is by itself as well as by other extraneous factors at the stage of consciousness⁶⁵.

In this connection the author directly attacks Kumārila by asking : What do you mean by saying that the validity of all means of cognitions arises by itself?

(1) Do you mean that the validity arises without any causes?; it will not arise because of the general rule of place and time

(2) Do you mean that the validity is related to its causal factors (*svasāmagrī*), then there arises the fallacy of *siddhasādhana* because it is a well known fact that all cognitions originate due their respective causes.

(3) Do you mean that the validity of all cognitions is due to the fact that they are cognitions? Then it can be said that the specific effect, viz. validity cannot be produced by the general cause, viz. cognition. Here an inference can be presented as follows : 'Validity is produced by its specific causal factors, as it is a specific product, like invalidity'. As the invalidity arises from the specific causes, viz. the defective sense-organs etc. in the same way we can argue that the validity also arises due to the specific causes, viz. the sense-organs etc. possessing good as there is no difference between the two cases⁶⁶.

Next, the author turns to the question of determination of validity at the stage of consciousness. At the stage of consciousness the validity of cognitions would not be intrinsic if one has not had a course of repeated observation. Because such cognition may involve doubt or illusion. On the otherhand both validity and invalidity are determined by themselves when one has had a repeated course of observation.⁶⁷

Next, the Jaina philosopher refutes Kumārila's opinion, by saying that if according to Mīmāṃsakas, the perception cannot

prove the qualities, then the question is; Does the non-apprehension of qualities prove the absence of them? If sense-organ is the nature of power, then that will be absence of defects, like that of qualities as well. As so the superstratum cannot be perceived if the substratum is imperceptible. Hence there is no chance either for qualities or for defects to be perceived in organs⁶⁸.

Again, if you say that it (sense-organ) may be proved by in the form of *vyakti* (individual), then there also question arises: Can you prove the absence of qualities by *ātmapratyakṣa* or by the perception of someone else? The answer to the first option is that, like the qualities, the defects too will not be proved, because the qualities or defects cannot be proved by self-perception. If you hold the second option, i.e. the qualities cannot be known by the perception of someone else, then the answer is that it is not proved. As the defects like jaundice (disease of eye) etc. are perceived by others. In the same way, the qualities, like *nairmālya* (cleanness) etc. can be perceived by others⁶⁹.

Further, Mīmāṃsaka holds that the qualities of sense-organs cannot be known through inference, because the concomitance of the probans with the qualities cannot be known either through perception or through inference. On this, the author says that the invariable concomitance can be known through an independent cognition, known as *ūha* and also there is question : How can you know the defects which prove invalidity of cognitions? Because the case of defect is similar to the case of qualities. The Mīmāṃsaka holds that cleanliness is nothing but the absence of dirt. So it cannot be regarded as positive quality. The author does not agree with this. Because, according to him, the absence of defects as the specific nature of an opposite entity. If it has no specific self nature at all, then it will be like a horn of a donkey, because it will not be the effect of anything⁷⁰.

Thus it should be accepted that the absence of faults does imply the existence of qualities, like cold is implied by the absence of fire. Because qualities and defects exist in mutual exclusion⁷¹.

Therefore it may be said that the absence of invariable concomitance of the reason and absence of defects in the organs

means the qualities of removing defects (*malāpagama*). It is rightly said by you that "the qualities must be held to any removal of defects and from the absence of these defects, proceeds the absence of the two kinds of invalidity". Thus by saying like, "qualities must be held to any removal of defects" you have said qualities must be from qualities" only. Thus the validity is nothing but the two kinds of invalidity. And if that is due to the existence of qualities, then why should be not accepted that the validity is extrinsic?⁷²

You have said, "When an entity has been acquired existence its application to various effects proceeds naturally by itself". That is merely saying. Consistent knowledge is valid which is capable to determinate the object as it is. If it depends on causes for its own existence, then how will its application to the effects be their by itself? It is rightly pointed out that, 'in the case of jar (*ghaṭa*), the production of jar depends upon such causes as the lump of clay, the potters stick, the wheel and other things', as they are efficient causes. However, in the case of cognition a cognition comes to an end immediately after it acquires its existence, then a question arises : What kind of activity of it would be there by itself?⁷³

Again, Jaina philosopher continues his attack by asking; What is the effect of cognition towards which it becomes active by itself? There are two alternatives : (1) Right determination (2) Determination that the cognition is valid. If you accept the first alternative, then it would mean that the cognition create itself. That is improper, because nothing can have activity with itself. The second alternative is not also accepted, because sometimes the determination that the cognition is valid does not take place due to the cognition of illusion etc. and sometimes even contrary determination takes place⁷⁴.

In the case of inference, the determination of invariable concomitance is the quality of reason and absence of invariable concomitance is the defect⁷⁵.

It is well known that the *āgama* is valid, because it is a work of an intelligent person. Hence it is not proved as

apauruṣeya.⁷⁶ It cannot determine the truth by itself, because it would always do so. Vedas will not reveal the truth, if they are manifested by human efforts because human beings being subjected to the faults, like passions. Their manifestation cannot be proved to be true. Therefore acceptance of *apauruṣeyatva* out of fear from invalidity, is like the bath of an elephant⁷⁷.

The author concludes that the validity is not intrinsic in its origination. Then he turns to show that the validity is not intrinsic in the state of its consciousness. Here the question is : Is this consciousness (cognition of validity) uncaused or caused? It cannot be uncaused, because in that case there will be absence of place, time and self nature. It cannot be caused, because then also question arises : Is the determination of validity caused by itself or by some other cognitions? It is not caused by itself, because self-illumination is not accepted (by Mīmāṃsakas). If it is the determination of validity caused by some other cognition, then there is no such activity of perception in the consciousness of validity as the perception acquires the existence when the organs contact with an object. And there is no contact of organs with validity by mental perception, because we do not have that type of experience, i.e. consciousness of validity⁷⁸.

The determination of validity cannot be proved by the means of inference, as there is no such reason which has invariable concomitance. If manifestation of the object is reason, then a question arises : Is the reason qualified by correspondence with real objects or is it not qualified at all? Is this qualification known the first cognition itself, or by some other cognition? If it is by the first cognition itself, then there is a fallacy of mutual dependence. If the qualification known by someother cognition, then there is infinite regress. And again, if you say that the reason is not qualified at all, then there is *ativyāpti*⁷⁹.

The Mīmāṃsaka has had asserted the fallacy of circularity in the thesis that the earlier cognition is proved to be valid through the knowledge of consistency with the practical efficacy. The author, however, contents that there is no such fallacy. A person suffering from cold feels enjoyment after touching the fire and

associates the touch of fire with the visual form of it. Later on the sees the visual form he infers that there must be the hot touch as experienced before. This happens when he has not experienced the fire repeatedly. If, on the otherhand, he has a repeated experience of fire, then, he does not require any such inference⁸⁰.

The author shows that in the direct cognition of practical efficiency, the question of validity does not arise and rules out the Mīmāṃsā objection that Buddhists / Jainas are unduly descreminating between the very first cognition (the cognition of practical efficiency) and later cognitions⁸¹.

Further, the Mīmāṃsaka had been consistency with the other cognitions is the ground for validity, then the auditory would have to be considered false on the ground of its not being supported by ocular and other perceptions. This is also improper, because it is often seen that the doubt concerning the sound produced by *Vīṇā* is removed by perceiving the particular visual form of *Vīṇā*. Hence there is no consistency between two cognitions⁸².

Next, the Mīmāṃsā statement, i.e. 'The determination of validity in a cognition is due to the absence of sublation and the faulty - cognition - causing - factors', is also merely saying, because there also question arises : Does the determination of *bādhakābhāva* exist before the activity or after the activity? If you say that the determination of absence of sublation exists before the activity, then there may be validity for illusion also. And again, if you say that it exists after the activity, then the absence of sublation is futile, because the activity has already takes place. Moreover, there is no means to the determination of absence of sublation. If you say that the *anupalabdhi* is the means, then there is a question: Is this non-apprehension prior to the activity or later. If it is prior, then it cannot help one to determine the absence of later sublating factors. Nor can it be later, because before the activity any ordinary person cannot determine that there will be non-apprehension of sublating factors later on. Moreover, the later non-apprehension is futile, because the activity has already taken place. Now, does this non-

apprehension pertain to all knowers or it pertains to oneself? You cannot accept the first option, because no ordinary person can ascertain that all the knowers will have the non-apprehension of sublating factors. The non-apprehension cannot pertain to oneself only, because in that case it will be inconclusive⁸³.

It is also not proper, what you have asserted, that "In the case of the Veda, the assertion of freedom from reproach is very easy to put forward, because there is no speaker in this case and for this reason the invalidity of the Veda can never be imagined". However, the inference stands against to it. viz., "The conception produced by the Veda is not authentic, because it is produced by the causes whose faulty character is unrefuted, like the conception of two moons". The reason here is not unproved, because the absence of faults is not proved in the absence of speaker who hold good qualities. There is neither the fallacy of *anaikāntika* nor *viruddha*, because it is well known in the instance of false cognition, that there is an invariable concomitance between being caused by faulty causes and invalidity⁸⁴.

Refutation by Ratnaprabhasūri - Ratnaprabhasūri clearly states that the validity and the invalidity of knowledge at their origination are due to something other than itself, while their consciousness is due to itself and other⁸⁵.

There are qualifying attributes and mystifying attributes in the factors that cause the origin of mode of knowledge. Where the knowledge causing factors are good then the knowledge is valid, if the that factors are faulty then the knowledge is invalid. Thus, validity and invalidity of knowledge are depending upon others viz., goodness or badness of the factors. Where from the observation of the same phenomenon, the same knowledge arises, then that knowledge is valid. But when the same phenomenon is observed at each time, but the knowledge is varying, then that knowledge is invalid. Thus, where the observation of a phenomenon is repeated many times the knowledge of validity comes of itself and hence is intrinsic. Whereas when there is no repeated observation of a matter, the evidence and the aspects of the phenomenon under observation and relevant things are to be

examined for the knowledge of validity. So the knowledge of valid in that case is not intuitive, but is dependent on other factors⁸⁶.

As regards the invalidity of knowledge, the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that it is extrinsic in origination, because it is due to faults in generating factors. And it is extrinsic in consciousness, because it depends upon the sublating factors⁸⁷.

The Jaina thinker criticises the Mīmāṃsaka's argument. If the faults are real and can be known, there is no reason why the qualities should not be real and cognisable in a like manner. If it be argued that the defects located in the sense-organs are perceived as real, then it may be said that the qualities also may be perceived as real. If it be argued that the qualities are not real but are only the absence of the faults, then such are not perceivable by the senses. Then why cannot the faults be conceived as the absence of qualities? Even if the qualities be held to be absence of the faults, they are not unsubstantial and unreal. It is clearly said by Bhaṭṭa, i.e. Kumārila that absence is not *Tuccha* or totally unreal. If it is so, the Jainas' theory that 'the validity of knowledge is dependent on other (para) is practically accepted.⁸⁸

Here, Mīmāṃsā thinkers might say : Let, for the sake of argument, the qualities be real yet they cannot be directly perceived, as the senses in which they inhere are super-sensuous. We can perceive the qualities residing only in the loci of the senses. On this, Jaina says that the something would apply to faults as well. Since the senses are super-sensuous faults, residing them also super-sensuous.⁸⁹

On this Mīmāṃsaka might urge that although faults of senses are not perceived their existence can be inferred. On this the Jaina answer is that the same kind of inference can also be available on proving qualities in the senses. Hence validity would be extraneous in its origination⁹⁰.

Next argument on the Mīmāṃsā theory is that the knowledge of the validity of a knowledge arises from *saṃvādivedanā* Jainas hold that *kāraṇaguṇajñāna* and *bādhakābhāvajñāna* are included in consistent knowledge. It

consists in a knowledge of the form 'the object of the present knowledge is apprehended to be similar to that of the previous knowledge. Such consistent knowledge gives the knowledge that the given previous knowledge is valid. The knowledge of good-qualities inherent in the knowledge causing factors is possible, because qualities like defects are real and knowable. Such knowledge gives the knowledge that the given knowledge is valid⁹¹.

The refutation continues on the Mīmāṃsā contention about the impossibility of the knowledge of absence of sublating. When a knowledge arises there cannot be any other knowledge along with it, sublating it. Two modes of knowledge, a given knowledge and the knowledge of the sublating cannot be simultaneous. However it is true that absence of sublating knowledge does not refer to any sublation. It refers to the future sublation. It is also true that we cannot directly perceive future things. But this, not need of invalidate any inference about the future. For instance, the rise of constellation, *Kṛttikā*, then the constellation *Śakata* will arise next. This inference is quite sound. Hence there will be nothing sublating in future⁹². According to the author consistent proves validity of knowledge is either the knowledge of same object as is given before or the knowledge of some other object. For instance, a pitcher is perceived in a dimlight; later on, when the same object is brought into clear light, the later perception shows that the earlier perception of a pitcher was valid. The determination of some other object than the given object may sometimes show that the given knowledge was valid. For example *arthakriyājñāna* is different from the knowledge of the original object yet it proves the validity of the later. There is no *cakraka* here. For the generation of *pravṛtti* (the urge) the original given knowledge need not be known to be valid at the very beginning. The urge arises from the doubt about the validity of the given knowledge and a consequent desire to determine the validity or otherwise. The *arthakriyājñāna* determines it and gives the knowledge of the validity of a given knowledge⁹³.

According to Jaina thinker, the knowledge of the practical efficiency involves repeated observation and is certain in its

origination. The validity of the knowledge of the practical efficiency arises thus in and from itself. Next point is that the observation of an object different from the object of the given knowledge, when the both objects belong to the same class, sometimes gives the knowledge that the given knowledge is valid. If the two phenomena do not belong to the same class, the experience of one of them may sometimes confirm the knowledge about the other phenomenon. For instance, the knowledge of the taste of a fruit confirms the knowledge of the colour of that fruit. Hence it can be said that when two phenomena belong to the same class and do not contradict each other, the experience of later phenomenon is consistent knowledge and such gives the knowledge that earlier experience about the other phenomenon was valid⁹⁴.

The Jaina thinker proceeds to examine the word 'sva' (itself). He asks : What do you mean by 'sva' (itself)? It cannot mean the given knowledge (*ātmā*). Mīmāṃsaka is bound to mean by 'sva' (itself), the knowledge which grasps something related to the given knowledge (*ātmīya*) And if he means the later, he has already accepted the Jaina position, viz., validity proved by the related knowledge⁹⁵.

In this connection, the Jaina thinker refers to the Mīmāṃsā theory that the process of cognition is proved to be valid by the same means by which the cognition itself is proved. That is, it is proved by *arthāpatti* that *arthaprākāṭya* of cognition would otherwise be inexplicable. Now question arises : What is this clarification of the object? If it means the revelation of the true nature of the object, then again question arises as to how this true nature of the object is known? It cannot be said that true nature of the object becomes clear when the knowledge of the object is known to be valid. Then it would lead to *parasparāśraya*. Again, it cannot be said that the true nature of the object becomes clear due to some other valid knowledge, because in that case there would be *anavasthā*⁹⁶.

According to Mīmāṃsā, the knowledge of the nature of the object of cognition arises from the knowledge itself and that gives rise to the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge and

that is due to the given knowledge itself. The Jaina thinker, however, points out that it may be argued in some way that the knowledge of invalidity of a knowledge also is due to the given knowledge itself⁹⁷.

And again, if it be urged that the knowledge of invalidity of a knowledge is due to the knowledge of *bādhaka* and not to the knowledge itself, then, it is to be said against the Mīmāṃsā theory that the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge is due to the knowledge of the *saṃvādaka*. If *arthaprākāṭya* is meant simply the apprehension of the true nature of the object of cognition, then it is clear that such *arthaprākāṭya* does not give the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge only but also the knowledge of invalidity which is against the Mīmāṃsā theory⁹⁸.

To sum up, refutation of self-validity has been made by Buddhists and Jinas. There is no exponent of *Cārvāka system*, who criticizes the doctrine of Mīmāṃsā. As far as the Buddhism is concerned, Śāntarakṣita who refutes the views of Kumārila and shows a number of faults in the arguments of opponents with justifications or showing the reasons. According to him, all things are in perpetual flux and hence there is no unity and eternity could be found in cognitions. Moreover, the cognition by itself cannot be valid. Validity can be seen only later in relation to its effects. When a thing becomes the object of doubt, then there is no certainty for the real form of that thing. Certainty can be obtained only extraneously. Practical efficacy of the first cognition is intrinsically valid but later cognitions are extrinsically valid. However, the first cognition, cannot be self-valid due to the possibility of misapprehension. Further he replies the question the validity must be regarded as inherent in all cognitions as a general rule, the self-validity of cognitions is discarded when there is an annulment of it or there is the cognition of defectiveness of its sources. Thus validity becomes extraneous. The determination of validity is dependent upon the place, time and the circumstances, then it is clear to say that the validity of cognition depends upon extraneous causes.

In the case of the Veda, he admits that there must be an

author. It is not proper to establish that the Veda is self-sufficient. There is no corroborative cognition nor perfection in the sources, the existence of doubt and invalidity is unavoidable in the Veda.

Jaina thinker Prabhācandra emphasizes the determination of validity is due to other factors in their origination and it is by itself and other extraneous factors at the stage of consciousness. Both validity and invalidity are determined by themselves one has had a repeated course of observation. Another exponent Ratnaprabhasūri have used the method of questioning and finding mistifying factors in the arguments of Mīmāṃsakas. Both exponents put forward contrary inferences, like 'validity is produced by its specific causal factors as it is a specific product, like invalidity' etc. According to them, āgama is valid because it is a work of an intelligent person. Vedas do not reveal the truth; they are manifested by human efforts and human beings are subjected to the faults. Thus manifestation cannot be proved to be true.

Foot Notes

- 1) Dasgupta, HIP, pp. 374-75.
- 2) Ibid, p. 375.
- 3) Ibid.
- 4) न च 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' न च निश्चितमवगम्यमानमिदं मिथ्या स्यात् । M.D. Anandashrama ed. p. 17.
- 5) यो हि जनिता प्रध्वंसते तावत्पुरुषबुद्धिप्रभवमप्रमाणम् । Ibid.
- 6) सर्वज्ञानविषमिदं तावत्परीक्ष्यताम् ।
प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः किं परतोऽथवा ॥ SV. 2,33
स्वतोऽसतामसाध्यत्वात् केचिदाहुर्दयं स्वतः ।
अपरे कारणोत्पन्नगुणदोषावधारणात् ॥ SV, 2,34.
- 7) स्वतस्तावद् द्वयं नास्ति. विरोधात् परतो न च । SV, 2,35 ab.
- 8) निःस्वभावत्वमेवं हि ज्ञानरूपे प्रसज्यते । SV. 2, 35 cd.

- तस्मात्त्वाभाविकं तेषामप्रमाणत्वमिष्यताम् ।
 प्रामाण्यञ्च परापेक्षम् अत्र न्यायोऽविधीयते ॥ SV, 2.58
 अप्रामाण्यमवस्तुत्वान्न स्यात्कारणदोषतः ।
 वस्तुत्वात्तु गुणैस्तेषां प्रामाण्यमुपजन्यते ॥ SV, 2.39.
- 10) Jha G. N. Pūrvamīmāṃsā p. 85.
 11) Raju P.J. Structural p. 119.
 12) स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमिति गम्यताम् । SV, 2.47 ab.
 13) इन्द्रियादि गुणाश्चास्य कारणम्, तदसद् द्विधा ।
 दुष्टत्वादिन्द्रियादीनामभावेऽन्यतमस्य वा ॥ SV, 2.42.
 अत एव च वो भ्रान्तिर्दोषैर्मिथ्यात्वधीरिति ।
 तद्व्याप्तेस्तु गुणाभावस्तत्कृता ह्यप्रमाणता ॥ SV, 2.43.
 अन्यव्यतिरेकाभ्यामप्रामाण्यं न दोषतः ।
 नाज्ञाने दृश्यते ह्येतत्कारणाभावहेतुके ॥ SV, 2.45.
- 14) तस्मात् कारणशुद्धत्वं ज्ञानप्रामाण्यकारणम् ।
 स्वभावतोऽप्रमाणत्वं तदभावेन लक्ष्यते ॥ SV, 2.44.
 15) स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमिति गम्यताम् ।
 न हि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन शक्यते ॥ SV, 2.47.
 16) आत्मलाभे च भावानां कारणापेक्षता भवेत् ।
 लब्धात्मनां स्वकार्येषु प्रवृत्तिः स्वयमेव तु ॥ SV, 2.48.
 17) जातेऽपि यदि विज्ञाने तावन्नार्थोवधार्यते ।
 यावत्कारणशुद्धत्वं न प्रमाणान्तराद् भवेत् ॥ SV, 2.49
 तत्र ज्ञानान्तरोत्पादः प्रतीक्ष्यः कारणान्तरात् ।
 यावद्वि न परिच्छिन्ना शुद्धिस्तावदसत्समा ॥ SV, 2.50
 तस्यापि कारणे शुद्धे तज्ज्ञाने स्यात् प्रमाणता ।
 तस्याप्येवमितीच्छंश्च न क्वचिद् व्यवतिष्ठते ॥ SV, 2.51.
 यदा स्वतः प्रमाणत्वं तदान्यनैव गृह्यते ।
 निवर्तते हि मिथ्यात्वं दोषाज्ञानादयन्तः ॥ SV, 2.52.
- 18) अप्रामाण्यं त्रिधा भिन्नं मिथ्यात्वाज्ञानसंशयैः ।
 वस्तुत्वाद् द्विविधस्यात्र सम्भवो दुष्टकारणात् ॥ SV, 2.54
 अविज्ञाने तु दोषाणां व्यापारो नैव कल्प्यते ।
 कारणाभावतस्त्वेव तत्सिद्धं नस्त्वदुक्तिवत् ॥ SV, 2.55
 दोषतश्चाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः प्रामाण्यवादिनाम् ।

- गुणज्ञानानवस्थावन्न दोषेषु प्रसज्यते ॥ SV, 2.56
 साज्ञाद्विपर्ययज्ञानाल्लघ्वेव त्वप्रमाणता ।
 पूर्वावाधेन नोत्पत्तिरुत्तरस्य हि सिध्यति ॥ SV, 2.57.
 19) दुष्टकारणबोधे तु सिद्धेऽपि विषयान्तरे ।
 अर्थतुल्यार्थतां प्राप्य बाधो ॥ SV, 2.58 abc.
 तत्र दोषान्तरज्ञानं बाधधीर्वा परा न चेत् ।
 तदुद्भूतौ द्वितीयस्य मिथ्यात्वादाद्यमानता ॥ SV, 2.59.
 स्वत एव हि तत्रापि दोषाज्ञानात्प्रमाणता ।
 दोषज्ञाने त्वनुत्पन्ने न शङ्क्या निष्प्रमाणता ॥ SV, 2.60
 एवं त्रिचतुरज्ञानजन्मनो नाधिका मतिः ।
 प्रार्थ्यते तावतैवैकं स्वतः प्रामाण्यमश्रुते ॥ SV, 2.61., Ibid.
- 20) शब्दे दोषोद्भवस्तावत् वक्तृधीन इति स्थितिः ।
 तदभावः क्वचित् तावद् गुणवद्वक्तृकत्वतः ॥ SV, 2.62.
 तदगुणैरपकृष्टानां शब्दे संक्रान्त्यसम्भवात् ।
 यदा वक्तुरभावेन न स्युर्दोषा निराश्रयाः ॥ SV, 2.63.
 21) पौरुषेये द्वयं दृष्टं दोषाभावो गुणास्तथा ।
 प्रामाण्यं तत्र गुणतो नैव स्यादित्युदाहृतम् ॥ SV, 2.64.
 तस्माद् गुणेभ्यो दोषाणामभावस्तदभावतः ।
 अमाण्यद्वयासत्त्वं तेनोत्सर्गोऽनपोदितः ॥ SV, 2.65.
 22) अन्यस्यापि प्रमाणत्वे सङ्गतिर्नैव कारणम् ।
 तुल्यार्थानां विकल्पत्वादेकं तत्र हि बोधकम् ॥ SV, 2.73.
 यत्रापि स्याद् परिच्छेदः प्रमाणैरुत्तरैः पुनः ।
 नूनं तत्रापि पूर्वेण सोऽर्थो नावधृतस्तथा ॥ SV, 2.74.
 सङ्गत्या यदि चेष्टेत पूर्वपूर्वप्रमाणता ।
 प्रमाणान्तरमिच्छन्तो न व्यवस्थां लभेमहि ॥ SV 2.75.
 23) प्रथमस्य तथाभावे प्रद्वेषः किं निबन्धनः ॥ SV, 2.76 cd
 श्रोत्रधीश्चाप्रमाणं स्यादितराभिरसङ्गतेः ।
 स्याच्चेत्तज्जनितेनेव ज्ञानेनान्येन सङ्गतिः ॥ SV, 2.77.
 वेदेऽपि शतकृत्वः स्याद् बुद्धिरुद्धारणानुगा ।
 साधनान्तरजन्या तु बुद्धिर्नास्ति द्वयोरपि ॥ SV, 2.78.
 यथा त्वेकेन्द्रियाधीनज्ञानान्तरनिबन्धना ।
 सङ्गतिः कारणं प्राप्ता तथा वेदेऽपि कल्प्यताम् ॥ SV, 2.79

- तस्माद् दृढं यदुत्पन्नं नापि संवादमृच्छति ।
 ज्ञानान्तरेण विज्ञानं तत्प्रमाणं प्रतीयताम् ॥ SV, 2.80.
- 24) ननु प्रमाणमित्येवं प्रत्यक्षादि न गृह्यते ।
 न चेत्यमगृहीतेन व्यवहारोऽवकल्पते ॥ SV, 2.82
 प्रामाण्यं ग्रहणात्पूर्वं स्वरूपेणैव संस्थितम् ।
 निरपेक्षं स्वकार्येषु गृह्यते प्रत्ययान्तरैः ॥ SV, 2.83.
 तेनास्य ज्ञायमानत्वं प्रामाण्ये नोपयुज्यते ।
 विषयानुभवो ह्यत्र पूर्वस्मादेव लभ्यते ॥ SV, 2.84.
- 25) अप्रमाणं पुनः स्वार्थग्राहकं स्यात्स्वरूपतः ।
 निवृत्तिस्तस्य मिथ्यात्वे नागृहीते परैर्भवेत् ॥ SV, 2.85.
 न ह्यस्त्यातथाभावः पूर्वोक्तार्थस्तथात्ववत् ।
 तत्राप्यर्थान्यथाभावे धीर्यद्वा दुष्टकारणे ॥ SV, 2.86.
 तावतैव च मिथ्यात्वं गृह्यते नान्यहेतुकम् ।
 उत्पत्यवस्थं चैवेदं प्रमाणमिति मीयते ॥ SV, 2.87.
 अतो यत्रापि मिथ्यात्वं परेभ्यः प्रतिपाद्यते ।
 तत्राप्येतद् द्वयं वाच्यं न तु साधर्म्यमात्रकम् ॥ SV, 2.88.. Ibid.
- 26) तद्विषयैवार्थबोधश्चेत् तादृग्धर्मो भविष्यति ।
 ममासिद्धमिदं किन्तु वेदाज्ज्ञातेऽवबोधने ॥ SV, 2.92.
 वक्तुं न द्वेषमात्रेण युज्यते सत्यवादिना ।
 द्वेषादसम्मतत्वाद्वा न च स्यादप्रमाणता ॥ SV, 2.93.
 न चात्मेच्छाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां प्रामाण्यमवकल्पते । SV, 2.94 ab
 न चाभिलाषिकं ज्ञानं प्रामाण्येनावधार्यते ।
 तस्मादालोकवद्देवे सर्वसाधारणे सति ॥ SV, 2.95.
 नैवं विप्रतिपत्तव्यम् ।
 पुरुषाशक्तितस्तत्र सापवादत्वसम्भवः ॥ SV, 2.96acd
 वेदस्यापौरुषेयत्वे सिद्धा त्वेवं प्रमाणता । SV, 2.97ab., Ibid.
- 27) कर्तृमत्वे तु वेदस्य सम्यङ्मिथ्यात्ववादिभिः । SV, 2.97cd
 कर्ता गुणाश्च दोषाश्च महाजनपरिग्रहः ।
 एवमादि विना युक्त्या कल्प्यं मीमांसकैः पुनः ॥ SV, 2.98., Ibid.
- 28) आत्मलाभे घटादीनां कारणापेक्षितेष्यते ।
 लब्धात्मनां स्वकार्येषु प्रवृत्तिः स्वयमेव तु ॥ TS 2920.
 यत्तु ज्ञानं त्वयापीष्टं जन्मानन्तरमस्थिरम् ।

- लब्धात्मनोऽसतः पश्चाद् व्यापारस्तस्य कीदृशः ॥ TS, 2821.
- 29) व्यापारः कारणानां व्याप्रियेतेन्द्रियादिवत् ॥ SV, 4.54-55.
- 30) अथाप्यक्षणिकं ज्ञानं नित्यं चाभ्युपगम्यते ।
 अभ्युपेत विरोधोऽयमेवं युक्त्यावबाधनम् ॥ TS, 2024.
 साधितक्षणाभङ्गं हि सर्वं वस्तु सविस्तरम् ।
 नित्यं च जन्यते नेति कारणापेक्षितास्य का ॥ TS, 2925.
 अतश्च शक्यते वक्तुं स्वतः एव न वर्तते ।
 पश्चात् प्रमा स्वकार्येषु नैरुप्याद् गगनाव्भवत् ॥ TS, 2926.
 अस्तु वा अक्षणिकं ज्ञानं स्वतः एव प्रवर्तते ।
 स्वप्रामाण्यविनिश्चित्ये चेत् कथं संशयादयः ॥ TS, 2927.
 प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो यस्मात् तत्र तन्मात्रभाविकः ।
 तस्मिन् जाते च सन्देहविपर्यासावनास्पदौ ॥ TS, 2928.
 निश्चयारोपमनसोर्बाध्यबाधकभावतः ।
 समारोपविवेके हि निश्चयो वर्ततेऽखिलः ॥ TS, 2929.
 ततश्च चोदनाजन्यमतिप्रामाण्यसिद्धये ।
 दोषवर्जितहेतूत्थभावाद्युक्तिरपार्थिका ॥ TS, 2930.
 अप्रमाणद्वयाशङ्का यदि वर्तेत तत्र तु ।
 प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो न स्याद् भ्रान्त्या तद्विषयीकृतः ॥ TS, 2937.
- 31) यः सन्देहविपर्यासप्रत्ययैर्विषयीकृतः ।
 स्थाणुवन्न हि तत्रास्ति तदा तद्वृत्तिनिश्चयः ॥ TS, 2938.
 बलिभुग्धूमहेतूत्थदोषादिप्रत्ययैर्यथा ।
 स्थाणुतेजोऽप्रमाणादि परेभ्यो व्यवसीयते ॥ TS, 2939.
 यत्सन्देहविपर्यासविषयत्वं गतं तथा ।
 परतो निश्चयस्तस्य प्रमाणत्वस्य गम्यताम् ॥ TS, 2940.
- 32) अयं च भवतां पक्षः यत्र वाक्ये नञः श्रुतिः ।
 तत्रैवान्यप्यवच्छेदः स्वात्मैवान्यत्र गम्यते ॥ TS, 2941.
 चोदनाजनितानुद्धिः प्रमाणमिति, नेह च ।
 प्रयोगोऽस्ति नञस्तेन नाप्रामाण्यनिवर्तनम् ॥ TS, 2942.
- 33) किञ्च सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं निश्चितं यदि ।
 स्वतः एव तदा कस्मात् मतभेदः प्रवादिनाम् ॥ TS, 2943.
 येनैकैः स्वतः एवेति प्रोच्यैर्नियम उच्यते ।
 किञ्चित् स्वतोऽन्यतः किञ्चित् परैश्चानियमो मतः ॥ TS, 2944.

- विवादो भ्रान्तितो यस्मात् सा च निश्चयबाधिता ।
निश्चिन्वन्तस्ततस्तत्त्वं विवदेरन्न वादिनः ॥ TS, 2945.
- 34) नियते यस्य नैवास्ति स्वतः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः ।
परिशेष्यबलात् तस्मिन्प्रामाण्यं प्रतीयते ॥ TS, 2951.
अर्थान्धतात्वहेतूत्थदोषज्ञानानपेक्षया ।
जन्मानन्तरमेवातस्तदप्रामाण्यनिश्चयात् ॥ TS, 2952.
अप्रमाणे प्रमाणत्वविपर्यासो न सङ्गतः ।
अतोऽसंवादिनो नैव कश्चिद् वर्तेत तद्गतेः ॥ TS, 2953.
- 35) जन्मातिरिक्तकालश्च क्रियाकालो न विद्यते ।
क्षणिकत्वाद् घटादीनामित्यसिद्धं निदर्शनम् ॥ TS, 2954.
तेषामुत्तरकालं हि कुलाद्यनपेक्षिणाम् ।
स्वोपादानाद्यपेक्षत्वात् स्वतो नास्ति प्रवर्तनम् ॥ TS, 2955.
- 36) जनने हि स्वतन्त्राणां प्रामाण्यार्थविनिश्चितेः ।
स्वहेतुनिरपेक्षाणां तेषां वृत्तिर्घटादिवत् । TS, 2849.
मृत्पिण्डदण्डचक्रादि घटो जन्मन्यपेक्षते ।
उदकाहरणे त्वस्य तदपेक्षा न विद्यते ॥ TS, 2850.
- 37) ननु कोऽतिशयस्तस्य प्राक्तनादस्ति येन तत् ।
परतः पूर्वविज्ञानमिव नाभ्युपगम्यते ? ॥ TS, 2957.
उच्यते - वस्तुसंवादः प्रामाण्यमभिधीयते ।
तस्य चार्थक्रियाभासज्ञानादन्यन्न लक्षणम् ॥ TS, 2958.
अर्थक्रियावभासं च ज्ञानं संवेद्यते स्फुटम् ।
निश्चीयते च तन्मात्रभाव्यामर्शनचेतसा ॥ TS, 2959.
अतस्तस्य स्वतः सम्यक्प्रामाण्यस्य विनिश्चयात् ।
नोत्तरार्थक्रियाप्राप्तित्ययः समपेक्ष्यते ॥ TS, 2960.
- 38) आद्ये ह्यवस्तुविषये वस्तुसंवादलक्षणम् ।
द्वितीयं न प्रवर्तेत यस्य हेतोरसम्भवात् ॥ TS, 2962.
तस्मादर्थक्रियाभासं ज्ञानं यावन्न जायते ।
तावदाद्येऽप्रमाशङ्का जायते भ्रान्तिहेतुतः ॥ TS, 2965.
अनन्तरं फलादृष्टिः सादृश्यस्योपलम्भनम् ।
मतेरपदुतेत्यादि भ्रान्तिकारणमत्र च ॥ TS, 2966.
कार्यावभासिविज्ञाने जाते त्वेतन्न विद्यते ।
साक्षाद्वस्तुनिवद्भायाः क्रियायाः प्रतिवेदनात् ॥ TS, 2967.

- कस्यचित् तु यदिष्येत स्वतएव प्रमाणता ।
प्रथमस्य तथाभावे प्रद्वेषः केन हेतुना ॥ TS, 2854.
- 40) तस्मिन् सदपि मानत्वं विनिश्चेतुं न शक्यते ।
उत्तराद्यक्रियाज्ञानात् केवलं तत् प्रतीयते ॥ TS, 2870.
- 41) मौलिके च प्रमाणत्वे प्रमाणान्तरसाध्यता । TS, 2852ab.
- 42) भ्रान्तिहेतोरसदुभावाद् स्वतस्तस्य प्रमाणता ।
प्रथमस्य तदाभावे प्रद्वेषो भ्रान्ति सम्भवात् ॥ TS, 2972.
- 43) सितसाध्यक्रियावाप्त्या यथा शङ्खे पुरःस्थिते ।
कामालाक्रान्तनेत्रोत्थं विज्ञानं नेति गम्यते ॥ TS, 2990.
विशुद्धकारणोत्पादात् त्वस्याः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः ।
निष्पादितक्रिये कस्यौ सिताकारमतेरिव ॥ TS, 2992.
- 44) क्षुदाद्यनुपद्यातादिवचनादिदमुक्तवान् ।
भाष्यकारोऽप्यतो मोहादनवस्थेह चोद्यते ॥ TS, 2993.
- 45) यदि स्वतः प्रमाणत्वं सर्वत्रौत्सर्गिकं स्थितम् । TS, 2996ab.
- 46) यदि स्वतः प्रमाणत्वं सर्वत्रौत्सर्गिकं स्थितम् ।
बाधकारणदुष्टत्वज्ञानाभ्यां तदपोद्यते ॥ TS, 2996.
बाधकारणदुष्टत्वज्ञानाभावात् प्रमाणता ।
प्राप्तैवंच परस्मात् ते भवेत् प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः ॥ TS, 2997.
तथाहि तदभावोऽयमभावाख्यं प्रामान्तरम् ।
त्वत्पक्षेऽनुपलम्भाख्यमनुमानं तु मन्मते ॥ TS, 2998.
- 47) अनयैवोपपत्त्या स्यादप्रामाण्यमपि स्वतः ।
तत्रापि शक्यते वक्तुं यस्मान्नायोऽयमीदृशः ॥ TS, 2999.
तस्मात् स्वतोऽप्रमाणत्वं सर्वत्रौत्सर्गिकं स्थितम् ।
बाधकारणदुष्टत्वज्ञानाभावादपोद्यते ॥ TS, 3000.
तथा बोधात्मकत्वेन बुद्धेः प्राप्ताऽप्रमाणता ।
यथार्थज्ञानहेतूत्थगुणज्ञानादपोद्यते ॥ TS 3001.
तथा हि बाधकाभावात् प्रामाण्यं भवतोच्यते ।
बाधाभावोऽप्यभावाख्यं प्रमाणान्तरमिष्यते ॥ TS 3002.
तस्यपि बाधकाभावात् प्रामाण्यमभिधीयते ।
तत्र तत्रैवमिच्छायां व्यवस्था नोपलभ्यते ॥ TS 3004.
- 48) यदि चोत्पद्यते शङ्कानुपलम्भेऽपि संशयात् ।
बाधाभावाविनाभूतं यस्मान्नानुपलम्भनम् ॥ TS 3012.

- ततश्चाजातबाधेनाप्याशङ्क्यं बाधकं पुनः ।
 छलेन वस्तुनस्तत्त्वं न हि जात्ववतिष्ठते ॥ TS 3015.
 आजीवितात् समुत्पन्नं बाधप्रत्ययवर्जितम् ।
 शङ्खे पीतनीभं ज्ञानं प्रमाणं न हि जायते ॥ TS 3016.
 सनिमित्तैव तेनेयमाशङ्का न तु मोहतः ।
 शुद्धिसंवाददृष्ट्यै तु नाशङ्का सुधियो भवेत् ॥ TS 3018.
 अत्रापि यः पुनः शङ्कां कश्चित्पुरुते जडः ।
 संशयात्मकताऽनेन मन्ये तं प्रतिनिन्दिता ॥ TS 3020.
 49) देशकालनरावस्थाभेदापेक्षाप्रकल्पिते ।
 प्रामाण्यनिश्चयेऽन्यस्माद् व्यक्तं प्रामाण्यनिश्चितिः ॥ TS, 3021.
 तथाहि देशकालादौ बाधाभावात् सुनिश्चितौ ।
 प्रमाणान्तरतः प्राच्ये ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः ॥ TS 3022.
 50) स्वतो वाक्यं प्रमाणं तद् दोषाभावोऽपलक्षितम् ।
 न युक्तमपरिज्ञानद् दोषाभावो ह्यलक्षणम् ॥ TS, 3038.
 न हि दण्डापरिज्ञाने पुंसां दण्डीतिलक्ष्यते ।
 तल्लक्षितं स्वतो मानमित्येतच्च पराहतम् ॥ TS, 3039.
 दोषाभावः प्रमाभावात् प्रमाणान्निश्चितात्मकः ।
 वाक्यस्य लक्षणं युक्तं परतोऽतः प्रमास्थितिः ॥ TS, 3040.
 नृदोषविषयं ज्ञानं तेषु सत्सूपजायते ।
 न नाम दोषाभावे तु गुणाज्ञाने कथं मतिः ॥ TS, 3041.
 51) तदा न व्याप्रियन्ते तु ज्ञायमानतया गुणाः ।
 दोषाभावे तु विज्ञेये सत्तामात्रोपकारिणः ॥ TS, 3043; SV, 2.67.
 52) यद्येवम्, संशयो न स्याद् विपर्यस्ता मतिस्तथा ।
 दोषाः सन्त्यस्य नो वेति सन्त्येवेत्यात्पसम्पत्ते ॥ TS, 3044.
 तत्सन्देहविपर्यासौ भवतश्चात्र कस्यचित् ।
 यावद् गुणगणाधार इत्यसौ नावगम्यते ॥ TS, 3045.
 दोषाभावस्य चाज्ञानादप्रमाद्वयनास्तिता ।
 कथं प्रतीयते येन भवेत् प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः ॥ TS, 3047.
 53) दोषाभावे प्रमासत्त्वमितीदं च निषेधनम् ।
 केवलं यदि कल्प्येत तत्सिद्धिर्नैव सम्भवेत् ॥ TS, 3058.
 अभावानुपलम्भेन तत्सिद्धिर्नावकल्पते ।
 अनवस्थितिदोषाच्च न युक्तानुपलम्भतः ॥ TS, 3059.

- 54) पर्युदासात्मकं तच्चेत् तद्विविक्तान्यदर्शनात् ।
 दोषाभावपरिज्ञानं गुणज्ञानात्मकं भवेत् ॥ TS, 3061.
 विवक्षितप्रमाणज्ञानस्वरूपं च प्रसज्यते ।
 अप्रमाणद्वयासत्त्वज्ञानं तद्व्यतिरेकि च ॥ TS, 3062.
 अप्रमाद्वितयासत्त्वे ज्ञाते स्वातन्त्र्यतोऽथवा ।
 परिशिष्टः प्रमात्मेति भवतो निश्चयः कुतः ॥ TS, 3063.
 अन्यथानुपपत्त्या चेन्नन्वर्थापत्तितो भवेत् ।
 अनुमातेऽन्यतो वापि स्यादेवं निश्चयोऽन्यतः ॥ TS, 3064.
 अस्मादेव च ते न्यायादप्रामाण्यमपि स्वतः ।
 प्रसक्तं शक्यते वक्तुं यस्मात् तत्राप्यदः स्फुटम् ॥ TS, 3065.
 तस्माद् दोषेभ्यो गुणानामभावस्तदभावतः ।
 प्रमाणरुपतास्तित्वं तेनोत्सर्गोऽनपोदितः ॥ TS, 3066.
 यस्मादुत्सर्गभावोऽयं विवक्षामात्रनिर्मितः ।
 शक्योऽभिधातुं विस्पष्टमप्रमाणेऽपि मानवत् ॥ TS, 3067.
 यतो बाधात्मकत्वेन बुद्धेः प्राप्ता प्रमाणता ।
 यथार्थज्ञानहेतूत्थगुणज्ञानादपोद्यते ॥ TS, 3068.
 गुणेश्चाज्ञायमानत्वान्नाप्रामाण्यमपोद्यते ।
 अनपोदितसिद्धं च स्वतस्तदपि संस्थितम् ॥ TS, 3069.
 55) सकृज्जातविनष्टे च भवेन्नार्थे प्रमाणता ।
 श्रोत्रधीश्चाप्रमाणं स्यान्नेत्रादिभिरसङ्गता ॥ TS, 2899.
 56) श्रोत्रबुद्धेरपि व्यक्ता नेत्रादिमतिसङ्गतिः ।
 एकसामग्र्यधीनं हि रूपशब्दादि वर्तते ॥ TS, 3079.
 परस्परविनिर्भागात् सन्तत्यान्योन्यकारणम् ।
 तेषामस्त्येव सम्बन्धस्तदेवं सुपरिस्फुटम् ॥ TS, 3080.
 तद्वियामपि तद्द्वारा धूमेन्धनविकारवत् ।
 श्रोत्रधीस्तत्प्रमाणं स्यात् तदन्यमतिसङ्गतेः ॥ TS, 3081.
 एवं नानेन्द्रियाधीनविज्ञानान्तरसङ्गतिः ।
 प्रत्यक्षे कारणं क्लृप्ता वेदे त्वेषा न दृश्यते ॥ TS, 3083.
 तथा हि सलिलज्ञानमाद्यमुत्पद्यतेऽक्षिजम् ।
 पानस्मानादि निर्भासं जिह्वाकायाश्रितं परम् ॥ TS, 3084.
 57) साध्या न चानुमानेन शब्दादीनां प्रमाणता । TS 2905ab.
 58) निश्चितोक्तानुमानेन प्रत्यक्षस्यापि मानता ।

- शुद्धकारणजन्यत्वात् तत्प्रमाणं तदन्यवत् ॥ TS, 3090.
- 59) दोषाः सन्ति न सन्तीति पौरुषेये तु शङ्क्यते ।
वेदे कर्तुरभावाच्च दोषाशङ्कैव नास्ति नः ॥ TS, 2894.
- 60) दोषाः सन्ति न सन्तीति पौरुषेयेषु शङ्क्यते ।
कर्तुर्वेदेऽपि सिद्धत्वाद् दोषाशङ्का न नास्ति नः ॥ TS, 3070.
अतो यदनपेक्षत्वाद् वेदे प्रामाण्यमुच्यते ।
तदसिद्धं यतः सोऽपि कर्तारं समपेक्षते ॥ TS, 3071.
यदि संवादिविज्ञानं न वा हेतुविशुद्धता ।
निश्चिता संशयोत्पत्तेस्तदा वेदे न मानता ॥ TS, 3072.
- 61) एकेनापि तु वाक्येन देशकालनरादिषु ।
लभ्यते नार्थसंवादः सर्वस्मिन् संशयोदयात् ॥ TS, 3085.
अग्निहोत्रात्पवेत्स्वर्ग इतीत्यं श्रूयते समम् ।
निश्चयाङ्गवियुक्तं हि शब्ददुर्मात्रकम् ॥ TS, 3086.
स्वर्गादौ मतभेदश्च विप्राणामपि दृश्यते ।
लभ्यते नार्थसंवादः तस्मादिह नरादिषु ॥ TS, 3087.
- 62) चोदनाजनिते ज्ञाने दाढ्यं प्रागपहस्तितम् ।
सन्दिग्धोहि तथाभावस्तद्ग्राह्यस्यान्यसाम्यतः ॥ TS, 3088.
असर्वदर्शिभिर्विप्रैः कुत एतद् विनिश्चितम् ।
चोदनाजनिताबुद्धिः सर्वसंवादिनीति च ॥ TS, 3089
- 63) नापि ज्ञानान्तरेणैव तत्कालेऽसन्निधानतः ।
तस्याप्यव्यक्तभावत्वादनष्टापत्तितोऽपि वा ॥ TS, 3102.
वेदे तु बाधकं मानमुक्तमेवानुमात्मकम् ।
तदुक्तात्माद्यपोहेन तस्मान्मानं न युज्यते ॥ TS 3103.
पौरुषेयत्वसिद्धेश्च शङ्क्या दुष्टानिमित्तता ।
वह्नेरिव स्वतः शक्तिर्मित्याज्ञानेषु वा भवेत् ॥ TS, 3104.
चोदनाप्रभवं ज्ञानमतो दुष्टनिमित्तकम् ।
शङ्क्यते, दृष्टदोषाच्च शङ्क्यदोषं न भिद्यते ॥ TS, 3105.
तस्मात्स्वतः प्रमाणत्वं वेदस्यापि न युज्यते ।
तेन निश्चितनिर्दोषकृताख्यातत्वमिष्यताम् ॥ TS, 3106.
- 64) स्वतः प्रामाण्यपक्षे तु निश्चयं कुरुते स्वतः ।
वेदः स्वार्थस्वरूपे च तन्न मोहादिसम्भवः ॥ TS, 3118.
अतश्चाज्ञानसन्देहविपर्यासास्पदे स्थिते ।

- नोपदेशमपेक्षेत द्विजपोतोऽपि कश्चन ॥ TS, 3119.
अभिव्यक्तयन्यथात्वं चेन्नित्ये सा न त्वपाकृता ।
अतो रक्षामपि प्राज्ञा निष्फलामस्य कुर्वते ॥ TS, 3121.
अतीन्द्रियार्थदृक् तस्माद् विधूतान्तस्तमश्चयः ।
वेदार्थप्रविभागज्ञः कर्ता चाभ्युपगम्यताम् ॥ TS, 3122.
- 65) तस्य स्वापूर्वार्थत्यादिलक्षणस्य अभ्यासानभ्यासापेक्षया ।
PKM. Mahendrakumar Shastri, ed. p. 149.
- 66) ये तु सकलप्रमाणानां गुणविशेषणविशिष्टेभ्यो विशेषाभावात् । Ibid.
p. 150.
- 67) ज्ञप्तावनभ्यासदशायां स्वकार्यकारि नान्यथा । Ibid. p. 151.
- 68) यत्तावदुक्तम् गुणदोषाणामप्यभावः । Ibid. p. 159.
- 69) अथव्यक्तिरूपे नैर्मल्यादयो गुणा अपि । Ibid.
- 70) यच्चेन्द्रियगुणैस्सह स्वरविषाणवत् ॥ Ibid. p. 160.
- 71) तथा च गुणदोषाणां शीतसद्भाव वत् । Ibid. p. 161.
- 72) ततो हेतोर्नियमविरहस्य कथं न परतः प्रामाण्यम् ? Ibid. p. 161.
- 73) यद्योक्तम् लब्धात्मनां स्वकार्येषु वृत्तिः स्वयमेव स्यात् । Ibid. p. 164.
- 74) किञ्च, प्रमाणस्य किं कार्य कचित्तद्विपर्ययदर्शनाच्च Ibid. p. 165.
- 75) अनुमानोत्पादकहेतोस्तु तद्वैकल्यं दोषः । Ibid.
- 76) आगमस्य तु अपौरुषेयत्वस्यासिद्धेः Ibid.
- 77) अपि च, अपौरुषेयत्वेनापि गजस्नानमनुकरोति । Ibid. pp. 165-66.
- 78) तन्न प्रामाण्यस्योत्पत्तौ एवं विधानुभवाभावात् । Ibid. p. 166.
- 79) नाप्यनुमानतः निर्विशेषणातत्प्रतिपत्तौ चातिप्रसङ्गः । Ibid. p. 167.
- 80) यच्च संवादात्पूर्वस्य प्रामाण्ये प्रामाण्यं निश्चित्य प्रवर्तते । Ibid.
- 81) अर्थक्रियाज्ञानं तु इत्यादि प्रलापमात्रम् । Ibid. p. 168.
- 82) यच्चेदमुक्तं कथमितराभिरसङ्गतिः ? Ibid. p. 170.
- 83) प्रमाणे बाधकारण तन्नामुपलब्धिनिमित्तम् । Ibid. pp. 172-73.
- 84) ततश्चेदमयुक्तम् मिथ्याज्ञाने सुप्रसिद्धत्वात् । Ibid. pp. 175-76.
- 85) तदुभयमुत्पत्तौ परत एव ज्ञप्ती तु स्वतः परतश्च ।
Dalsukh Malvania RKT ed. Vol. 1, p. 110.
- 86) ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं च त्रायमानोऽसौ परत इति । Ibid.
- 87) Ibid. pp. 110-12
- 88) अत्राभिदध्यते कथं न परतः प्रामाण्योत्पत्तिः ? Ibid. p. 115

- 89) अथाऽऽसतां नैर्मल्यादयोगुणाः दोषा अपि प्रत्यक्षलक्ष्याः स्युः । Ibid.
- 90) अथ अप्रामाण्यं तथा गुणानुमानेऽपि । Ibid.
- 91) यच्चावाचि प्रमाणप्रवृत्तेरनिवारणात् । Ibid, p. 117.
- 92) यत्तु बाधकाभावज्ञानपक्षे शक्योदयानुमानं नास्त्वमियात् । Ibid.
- 93) यत्पुनरवादि 'संवादिवेदनं तु' संशयादपि भावात् । Ibid, pp. 117-18.
- 94) अर्थक्रियाज्ञानस्य तु पूर्वोत्तरज्ञानगोचरयोरव्यभिचारस्तत्रैव । Ibid, p. 119.
- 95) किञ्च स्वत एव प्रामाण्यनिर्णयस्य स्वीकृतत्वात् । Ibid.
- 96) अथ येनैव ज्ञानमात्रं प्रमाणादिति । Ibid, p. 120.
- 97) अथ स्वतस्तद्विशेषणग्रहणम् प्रामाण्यवदप्रामाण्यस्यापि स्वतो निर्णीतिर्न स्यात्? Ibid.
- 98) अथ तत्र बाधकादेवाप्रामाण्यनिर्णयो तत्रापि सद्भावात् । Ibid, p. 121.

CHAPTER IV REFUTATION OF ŚABDANITYATVA

Position of Mīmāṃsā - The main thesis of the Mīmāṃsakas is that what the Veda asserts must be true, never false, because it is not dependent upon a speaker or any author. According to Mīmāṃsakas, the word and its meaning are eternal and independent, since the Veda consists of sentences which are made of words are also eternal and independent. Therefore, the knowledge derived from the Veda must be true.

The origin of the concept, i.e. word is eternal, the relation of the word and its meaning is also eternal can be found in the Jaimini sūtra. Jaimini says; "The relation of the word with its denotation is inborn, instruction is the means of knowing it (*Dharma*), and it is infallible regarding all that is imperceptible, it is a valid means of knowledge as it is independent"¹. While commenting upon this, Śabara clearly asserts : The relation of the word with its meaning is eternal and it does not originate from a human being. The notion derived from the Vedic injunction must be right. However, in the case of notion derived from words emanating from human beings, there might be doubts regarding its validity, because in that case, what is asserted would be dependent for its validity upon things extraneous to itself. As a matter of fact, the notion derived from the injunction is not of a doubtful character, such as, 'this may or may not be so', despite any other time or place or in any other circumstances. If you say that the notion derived from this Vedic injunction must be false, because we have found another statement made in the Veda to be false. But this is only an inference and as such becomes sublated

by the aforesaid direct cognition.²

Next, while answering the objection of the opponent Śabara explains the possible relation of the word and its denotation. He says : The only relation that is possible to assert in the case, that is the relation which subsists between the denoter and the denoted which is the relation called the name and named.³ This relation could never have been created by a human being, because it follows from the fact that there could not have been any person to create the relations. He cannot be admitted, because no such person can be cognised by means of sense - perception and the rest which are also preceded by sense-perception. Even if he had existed a long time back, it would not be impossible to remember him. In the case of such important things as the Himālaya mountain and the like, it would not be possible to forget the creator. In the cases, such as, the builder of a wall, or a creator of a garden and so on the creator is forgotten as the result of the disappearance of the builder etc. either due to the disruption of his country or the extinction of his family. However, in the case of words and their meanings, there is no total disappearance of persons making use of them. If there is a person who created the relation and started its use, he would be remembered at the time of using the word. A certain usage becomes possible only when there is an agreement between the creator and the adopter of the usage. For instance, Pāṇini is the originator of the relation between the technical term *Vṛddhi* and the letters *āt-aic* denoted by it. A person making use of words independently of Pāṇini or one not accepting the work of Pāṇini as authoritative, could never apprehend the word *Vṛddhi* standing for those respective letters. One who is able to understand the relation between the words and their usager in Pāṇini and Piṅgala and so on would surely remember the creator of those works. If there is a creator of the relation between the words and their denotations in the Veda, persons making use of them would surely remember him. However it is not so. Hence it follows that no person created the relations of words and then for the purpose of making use of them, composed the Vedas.⁴

Further, even if there is a possibility of creator, being forgotten, we could not assume a creator of the relation unless there are proofs for it. For instance, even though it is possible for an existing thing to be not perceived, on the ground of that possibility, we do not admit the existence of Hare's horn, since there is not proof of it. Therefore, it follows that the relation between words and their meanings cannot be regarded as created by a person.⁵

And again, if it be argued that in the absence of a creator of the relation of the word and its meaning, the meanings are never comprehended, then a creator can be deduced by presumption. In reality, however, there is no another way, for instance, we find that when older people are making use of words for their own purpose, the younger ones who happen to hear those words, do understand them. When the old people were young they understood the words as used by the older people and these older people understood them from other older people. This process has gone on without any beginning in time. So long as the explanation based upon the usage of older people is available, it would not be right to presume a creator of relations. Further, the upholders of the 'usage theory' point to a fact of direct perception while the opponents only presume a creator of relations and it is sure that the presumption has no force as against a fact of direct perception. From all this it follows that there can be no creator of the relation of word and its meaning.⁶

Next, he asserts that it is infallible : It is found that just as the word 'go' denotes the animal with the dewlap in one place, so does it also in the most inaccessible places. Then, how could it be possible for the many creators of the relation to come together for this reason also there can be no creator of relation of word and its meaning.⁷

The existence of the relation is proved by positive and negative concomitance and this is learnt only by experience. This relation of denotations is deduced from the fact that until the relation has been grasped the word does not provide the idea of the denotated 'universal' and when the relation is grasped, the

universal becomes cognised. All this indicates the denotative potency of the word.⁸

If it be urged by the other party that we admit that there is a relation between the word and its denotation, but you must admit that this relation is dependent upon the experience of people, something evanescent, not eternal.⁹ The answer to this is given by Kumārila as follows - If the denotativeness of words is something created by some sort of convention among men, then there are only three ways in which this convention could function.¹⁰

1) A convention would be set up for the benefit of each man, would the relationship fixed by such convention be one and the same for all men or would it be different with each individual? If it is one and the same for all, then it cannot be artificial and the idea of its being diverse and different would be contrary to all experience.¹¹

2) This convention would be set up each time the word is pronounced. However, this is impossible, because a single utterance and the convention based there upon can never fix for all time the convention between the word and its denotation, nor could it account for the usage of the same for all time.¹²

3) The convention would be set up by God himself for all time at the time of creating the world. This is also impossible, because in the first place, there is no such thing as beginning of the world. And secondly, there is no God or creator of the world who could setup the convention.¹³

Further, even granting that there has been creation, the Veda and its component words and their meanings could have had no beginning in time.¹⁴

As regards the verbal expression, the young inexperienced observer perceives the word, the experienced person and the object by his senses and next, cognises the fact of the hearer, having understood by inference based upon the action and lastly he comes to recognise the fact of denotability resting upon both the denoting word and the denoted meaning through presumption based upon the fact of the inexplicability. Hence it follows that

the relation between the word and its meaning is comprehended by three means of right cognitions, i.e. perception, inference and presumption.¹⁵

Mīmāṃsakas hold that the words are eternal, what is denoted by them is also eternal and the relation between these two is also eternal. After having established the eternality of the relation of the word and its meaning Jamini sets forth six sūtras regarding the non-eternality of words and refutes them by twelve sūtras. Opponent shows many reasons regarding the non-eternality of the word. They are as follows : 1) The relation between the word and its meaning is not eternal, because the word itself is not eternal. The word is found to be destroyed, so that when it comes to be produced again, its relation to its meaning found to be artificial. Again, no one comprehends the meaning of a word heard for the first time. As a matter of fact, it is seen to follow after effort. Hence, we infer that the word is produced by the effort.¹⁶

(2) When the word is uttered, it does not stand for a moment. As a matter of fact, the word is not perceived even there are no causes of its non-perception in the shape of obstruction and the like. It cannot be urged that it has not reached the substratum, because its substratum is the *ākāśa* (ether) and it is perceived even by our ear-cavity.¹⁷

(3) In day to day business, people make use of such expressions, as 'make the word', 'do not make the word' and they do not feel that they are referring to the same word.¹⁸

(4) As a matter of fact, a word can be heard in several places and it could not be possible if the word is one and eternal. Unless there is a plurality of eternal things. It is only possible, in the case of products, which are mainly that on their being produced in several places, they come to be connected with those several places.¹⁹

(5) In the case of such expressions as '*dadhy atra*' the original form '*i*' becomes modified into '*ya*'. As a rule, whatever is liable to modification must be non-eternal. Further, there is some similarity between '*i*' and '*ya*' which also shows that the

one is the modification of the other.²⁰

(6) It is found that when a word is uttered by many persons, the sound heard is very loud. If the word is only manifested, then the sound heard would always be the same, whether it is uttered by many or few people. From this, it follows that some portion of the word is produced by each of the speakers and it is by reason of the augmentation thus caused in the word that a louder sound is heard.²¹

Next, Śabara rejects the objections made by the opponent in the following way.

(1) By means of clear reasons, the eternality of the word can be established. On the strength of this notion of this eternality, the right conclusion would be that 'the word is manifested by human efforts'. Thus, it is found that the fact that the word is being 'seen after effort' is equally compatible with both views.²²

(2) For the second objection, he answers that on the strength of the notion of eternality, we assume that there must be some cause that brings about the perception of the word. And therefore we find that there is perception of the word only there are certain conjunctions (*saṅgyoga*) and disjunctions (*vibhāga*) which are manifest the word and these do not cease, since it is clear from the fact that the word is heard and conjunctions and disjunctions are not perceptible. And also it is the fact that the air-particles disturbed by the sound provoking stroke strike against the stagnant air-particles and produce conjunctions and disjunctions (i.e. ripples) on all sides which go on spreading as long as the momentum lasts and as far the sound, it is heard only so long and so far as the ripples do not cease, and after they have ceased, the sound is not heard. Thus there is no incongruity at all. For this reason only, that the sound is heard at a greater distance when the wind is favourable.²³

(3) In day to day practice, people make use of such expressions 'make the sound' and 'do not make the sound. If it is beyond doubt that the word is eternal, then the meaning of such expressions would be 'make use of the word', just as the expression 'make the cowdung', the term '*kuru*' (make) means collecting.²⁴

(4) The answer for the fourth objection is that being only one Sun, he is seen as occupying several places, like Devadatta facing the East in the morning, sees the Sun at that time in front of himself. While the another standing to the right of Devadatta does not see two Suns, one straight in front of himself and another oblique to himself, but straight in front of Devadatta. Therefore there is only one Sun. But his exact location is not grasped. Therefore there is an illusion. In the sameway, in the case of the word also, its exact location cannot be grasped. When the form of the word is only one, if there are various places where the word is heard, then that would be diverse but not the word itself. For this reason, there is nothing incongruous even in the view that the word is heard in several places.²⁵

(5) The term '*dadhy atra*' is not a case of modification of an original. Infact the resultant '*ya*' is a letter totally different from '*i*' and people going to make use of the letter '*ya*' but not the letter '*i*', in the manner, in which people desiring to make a mat take up the reeds. We perceive similarity between two things, but one is not called either the material cause (original) or the product (modification) of other. Hence, the objection is not applicable.²⁶

(6) Śabara rejects the objection, 'there is an augmentation of the particles of the sound', like, it is not so, because sound has no parts as is shown by the fact that we cannot perceive any component parts of sound. As it is without parts, no augmentation of it is possible. Hence, there can be no augmentation of the word. Here, it is the fact that when the word is pronounced by one its sound is soft. But when it is pronounced by several persons, those same letters on account of being taken up continuously by such conjunctions and disjunctions as fill all the space in the ear-cavity come to be heard as 'augmented' and hence having parts. That augmentation is of the noise but not of the word.²⁷

After having rejected the views of the opponent, Śabara delebarately asserts that the word must be eternal, because its utterance is for the purpose of another. On the other hand, if the word does not cease to exist, then it is only right that on hearing


the word many times there is comprehension of its meaning. Next, he asserts that whenever the term 'gauḥ' is pronounced, there is always the notion of all cows. Then it follows that the word denotes the class (*ākṛti*). The word 'gauḥ' is eternal as well as the same word that is uttered many times and heard many times. And again, it is thus by the process of negative and positive concomitance, it can be concluded that the word comes to be recognised as denoting the class. From this, it follows that the word must be eternal.²⁸

And again, people speak of the word 'go' being uttered eight times and they should not speak of the word 'go' itself being eight in number. The use of such expression shows that people recognise the same word and that they never speak of the word which is heard today as being different from the word which was heard yesterday. Here, there is a notion that, 'this is the same as the word which was previously cognised by perception and also there is another notion that this is similar to that' by inference. Inference does not appear against the perception, nor it establishes its objects against perception.²⁹

Moreover, we cannot find any material cause of the production of the word and we do not recognise any particle of air in the production of the word. We do not feel by touch any air-particles in the word. Therefore, the word cannot be a product of air. And also there are indicative Vedic texts, such as - 'By means of word which is eternal etc.' From all these, it follows that the word is eternal.³⁰

Kumārila has entered into a long explanation and refutes strongly the views of the opposition and established that the words are eternal, what is denoted by them is also eternal and the relation of the word and its denotation is also eternal.

Refutation by Jayarāśi - Jayarāśi refutes the concept that the relation between the word and its meaning is natural, because that is not cognisable either by perception or by inference. If it be urged that the relation between the word and its meaning should have cognised by presumption, then the answer is that it would not arise, because presumption is based on perception etc.



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If there is non-existence of perception etc. then there is an absence of presumption too. This is a means of cognition distinct from inference. The relation of the word and its meaning is not cognised by inference as presumed by you. Because presumption is not an inference.³¹

In this situation, in the absence of relation it may not possess denotativeness, since there is no denotativeness of words, a sentence based on words also not have denotativeness. How does it not have denotativeness? Because, a sentence preceded by the well known relation between the word and its meaning is said to have denotativeness. If the relation between the word and its meaning is not well known, then the denotativeness of the sentence cannot be proved logically. And when there is no denotativeness for a sentence, how can a Vedic sentence have validity?³²

If it be argued that the sentence, even though not preceded by (the relation) between the words and their meaning, can be called as one having denotativeness, then all people will understand the Veda by merely reading it. Then, how will you understand the validity of Vedic sentences which speak of the unseen matters? If you say that it is possible, because they are the parts of the Vedas, it is not so; because the *arthavāda* sentences are inconclusive in that respect. Such as - 'the stones fly', or 'the Sun is related to *Viṣṇu*'.....etc.³³

Refutation by Bhāṇaviveka - Regarding the eternality of the word Bhāṇaviveka states the position of the Mīmāṃsakas. He says : the word is eternal and it is manifested by utterance of syllables. The relationship of the word and its meaning is also eternal and it is connected with the object. From that relation the understanding with regard to the object arises for one who understands it.³⁴

Further, he shows reasons regarding the eternality of word³⁵. They are as follows -

- (a) it should work only once (no other activity).
- (b) it is repeated again and again.
- (c) it is recognised.
- (d) it is perceived by the auditory organs.

(e) it has wordness.

Next, he refutes in the uttarapakṣa, as follows : if the word is ascertained to be eternal for the reason of *advipravṛtti*, then there may be a fault of inconclusiveness which affects the reason, because a lamp also works only once. Hence the eternality of the word is unreal. Or, otherwise why should the word not be accepted as non-eternal on account of its existence? like an action (which also exists but is non-eternal) or it may be regarded as perishable because it is caused by consciousness, like the activities of body.³⁶

As for the reasons viz., repetition and recognition both lack positive concomitance with permanence, because repetition and recognition are not seen in permanent objects.³⁷

Next, he says that the wordness is not the reason to prove the eternality of word, because eternality of wordness itself is not prove, and it is not manifested by sounds, because the manifestation is denied. In this connection he asks a question that 'if the word is perceived by ears how is it regarded to be manifested by sound? If you say that the word is known through convention then it will be reduced to cognition. Knowledge cannot be born before the origin of conventions in that regard, because like the universe, conventions have no beginning and every convention is repetition.³⁸

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - Regarding the eternality of word, it has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka that 'the eternality of the word is established on the basis of audible recognition'. The Buddhist philosopher, rejects it by stating that recognition is an illusion and it also involves concepts. Therefore it is not a perception'. Hence, there can be no certainty regarding eternality of word. He points out that *pratyabhijñā* is not found to be present in the same form in all cases. When certain words (sounds) are uttered by birds - like Parrot, the Śārikā and like - there is always the notion of diversity, as it is uttered by Parrot and 'it is uttered by Śārikā' and so forth. Hence it can be said that recognition does not appear in all cases. If it be urged that this is due to the diversity of manifesters of the sounds, then he shows the reasons for rejecting this idea of the manifestation of

sounds. By the same line of reasoning, all this would be one. Now it is clear that there can be no manifesters and manifested, because when the thing is one and indivisible, then the notion precludes all notions of diversity. Next, there can be no determination that these words are human and other words not uttered by persons, if you fully depend upon recognition.³⁹

It might be urged that there is distinction between common words and Vedic words that the latter have definite sequence, then he rejects this idea by saying that 'the order of sequence in the manifesting agencies, palate and other speech-centres, is something that pertains to men'.⁴⁰

It is argued by the Mīmāṃsaka that 'even though the flame is momentary, yet there is recognition' the answer to this is that there is eternal universal which can be recognised, such as - flameness. Further, he proceeds to show that this can be applied to the letters also. He says that such recognition is possible in the case of letters which are perishable. Moreover, we also find difference amongst the sounds such as, slow, fast and so on, in regard to these there can be no recognition.⁴¹

Further, he goes on to reject the idea of Mīmāṃsakas. 'In the reasons that have been put forward in proof of the idea of the oneness of the word, there is no invariable concomitance, because they are incompatible with the contrary'.⁴²

Mīmāṃsakas had argued that we can accept pots etc. as one on the ground they share namely potness etc., because oneness of pots etc. is contrary to our experience. The author argues on this that same line of argument can be applied to the letters. If the individuals themselves are urged to be one and the same, then the reason would be inconclusive, because multiplicity of the indivisible letter has been definitely recognised in every use of them, by means of sense-perception etc. If it be asked that how is the diversity of individuals perceived by sense-perception? then, the given answer is that the diversity in form of 'agreeable' and 'disagreeable' and so on is directly perceived. The diversity among cognitions is cognised on the ground of their appearing in succession. The cognitions of the individual cow-words

appearing at different times, places etc., cannot denote one and the same object, because they actually appear as diverse, like the cognitions of taste colour, etc.⁴³

All these cognitions of the word 'go' which appeared yesterday and today cannot denote the same object like the appearing cognitions of colour, taste etc. If it is not so, then all the cognitions would have one and the same object.⁴⁴

The author contents that actually the word is not one but the common man thinks that there is a repeated use of one and the same word. The common man also thinks that the relationship of words with their meaning is one and universal. However, in reality there can be no relationship between the word and its meaning, because there is no difference between them and also one is not born from other. Therefore a relationship of the word and its meaning has only been imposed by people, under an illusion. In fact, the whole position of the word and its meaning is chaotic, because there is no invariable concomitance between them.⁴⁵

It is argued by the Mīmāṃsaka that 'the word is not artificial and it never perishes because it has an eternal relationship with an eternal entity like *ākāśa* (ether) and the atom.' However, neither the probans nor the corroborative instance is sound in this connection. Further, it is asserted that in as much as the word heard once, envisages various universals in an indefinite form, it does not convey its own meaning immediately. When the word is heard several times certain universals are excluded and after a long time the exact meaning is known. So the word is stable during this process and there is nothing which can destroy it later. Hence the word is eternal.⁴⁶ The author answers this objection by saying that let it be, the case is that it has taken a long time in explaining the fact of the word cow being expressive of the one universal cow. As extracted from among the several universals, on the basis of deluded people cognising it in one and the same form. However, in reality, the things are momentary. Therefore, the word is not stable during this process.⁴⁷

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka that, some people

assert when a sound is cognised is by the ear as affected by the degree of the pitch, than there is apprehension of the peculiar degree of pitch, brought about on account of its being mixed up with the sound.⁴⁸ The author answers to this : Argument at the time of hearing the sound there is absence of the perception of air currents reaching the ear and embellishing the auditory organ. When the sound is cognised through the ear as embellished by the pitch there is idea of the pitch as related to the sound and this idea is clearly annulled by direct perception.⁴⁹

Next, he says that under the variations of fast, middling and slow, the - sound does not appear as different. Under this circumstance, when the cognition envisages something in a form that does not belong to it. Hence there is no real object of the exact form, the cognition is clearly objectless.⁵⁰

Moreover, he proceeds to say that there is no cause for wrong cognition. It cannot be said that there should be a 'manifested' for eternal thing, in accordance with its embellishments and modifications. Consequently there cannot be diversity of cognitions in regard to the sound. Just as the lamp restricts the potency of the eye to the perception of the Jar, in the same way the articulation restricts the potency of the auditory organ to the apprehension of the sound. In this connection, there arise a number of questions⁵¹ like :

(1) If it stands by itself, the sound is capable of being apprehended by the auditory organ, then why is it not apprehended while the auditory organ is not embellished?

(2) If the sound is not capable of being apprehended how could it become apprehended even at a later time?

The author, next proceeds to show that the idea of the cognition having the nature of the cognition of the sound is untenable, unless there is some connection between them. There are two kinds of relationship among things, viz., the relation of identity and the relation of cause and effect. None of these two relationships is possible between the sound and its cognition. This relation cannot be identity, because the two are different. Nor is the produced from other, because the sound is not produced and if it is produced then it would appear at all times. Hence the

cognition of that sound would either be produced at all times or it would not be produced at all. Such being the uncertainty of things the assumption of the embellishment of the auditory organ is entirely futile. Cognition would be possible only if the embellishment is occasional. The idea of embellishment is a kind of potency which is derived from the effect in the form of the cognition. Now this cognition may either appear at all times or not appear at all. Therefore, the explanation based upon the embellishment of the auditory organ is unsound. From all this, it can be said that there is no room for the view that there is manifestation of eternal things. And also it follows there is no room for any distinctions that are made on manifestation as those of long, short, order of sequence and so on.⁵²

Further, he sets forth the argument in support of the view that the sound is non - eternal. He states that as far as there is no manifestation is possible, the cognition of the sound must have its character, 'invariable concomitant' with the birth, like a jar and such things. Consequently, both producing and manifestation brought about by effort and articulation and their capacity determined by presumption based upon the nature of the effects.⁵³

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka that when a man is looking at the Sun and the water, his eyerays proceed in two ways, viz., one upwards and one downwards. A person does not perceive the Sun, because it is not in a straight line with the bodily substratum of the visual organ, while what is perceived by the downward rays is the Sun shining above presented indirectly. And because it is the same Sun that is not presented, the observer thinks that 'what is seen is below'. Thus it is the Sun itself that is seen below through the intervening medium of the down word rays.⁵⁴

The author gives an answer to this assertion that what is perceived by the downward rays is the Sun shining and the perceiver regards the Sun shining as actually down in the water. If the Sun is actually perceived just as it stands, then it could be cognised as such not otherwise. Similarly, in the case of mirror

it is not true. Through illusion that man cognises the face as facing the west, in reality, however he perceives is the face as presented by the eyerays proceeding eastward to the rays as proceedings westward. For the reason, the perception of the reflected image cannot have the man's own real face as its objective basis, because figure is something different from the real face, just as in the case of perception of taste and sound etc.⁵⁵

Next, he points out that the reason here put forward cannot be regarded as inadmissible. He argues that in a smaller mirror the face appears as smaller though really a large and a tree reflected in the water appears as upside down and as sunk in the water. It shows that the reflected image always varies with reflecting surface regards its largeness, smallness etc., not so the object reflected and if it be regarded as the cognition of that object, then all cognitions of colour, sound and otherthings would envisage all things. Hence it cannot be one and the same.⁵⁶

It has been urged in the Śābara Bhāṣya it might be urged that it is not possible for one and the something to be seen simultaneously at several places; but the foolish says this should look at the Sun, where one and the same Sun is in several places. It might be that its exact position is not ascertained on account of remoteness, hence there is an illusion. The same may be regarded to the word-sound; there is no definite cognition of the exact position.⁵⁷ The author answers to this is that the idea that appears in men as to 'The Sun being over my head' is surely wrong, because all living beings see the same Sun at the same time and not different Suns. If there is second solar disc existed it would surely be seen and yet it is not seen. Hence it is concluded that only one Sun exists. In the case of word-sound, however, it has never been ascertained to be one and the same, because it is simultaneously characterised by multiplicity. Even when speakers pronounce the letter 'Ga' at one and the same time, the difference among them is clearly apprehended.⁵⁸

It has been argued that just as the single person, Devadatta passing from place to place, one after other, does not become different, so the word also does not differ simply, because it is

heard in several places. The author answers to this, when a man passes from place to place, one after another, it is so because he is in a perpetual flux. If it is not so then there could be no going. If he remained fixed permanently, then he is not disassociated with his previous position and he would continue to remain there, and he could not get another place.⁵⁹

It is argued that a word whose relationship to its denotation has not been apprehended can never be expressive. If it is expressive, then each and every new word could express its meaning.⁶⁰ The author asserts upon this argument that the words and things are entirely different from one another are capable of providing the same ideas. Hence it is not true that the words become expressive only when its relationship to its denotation has been apprehended, because in reality the word by itself is not expressive at all. As a matter of fact, all cognitions produced by words are expressive of unreal things, because of the fact that there can be no denotation of the universal or of the specific individuality and such things. In reality however, people through illusion come to treat and speak of the word. For instance, a 'cow' as one only, regarding all as the same. This has been said by a 'Great Brāhmaṇa' (Mīmāṃsaka) on the basis of the diversity of word is entirely baseless.⁶¹

Further, he states that the words do not bring about cognition of things directly, since there is no invariable concomitance between the words and external things. All words indicate the presence in the speaker of the desire to speak of the things. They are definitely known through perception and non-apprehension as the effect of the desire to speak. Therefore the relationship between them is clearly that of cause and effect and it could not be known except through convention. When the convention is there, then there occurs the causal relationship of the word with the object varying with the speakers intentions. On this account that it has been declared to be 'due to convention' and as much as 'it is manifested by convention, the said relationship comes to be spoken of as 'convention' itself, but not directly. As a matter of fact, the convention as constituting the

relationship does not belong to the two factors, viz., the word and its meaning. It belongs to the man. The relationship between the two is that one serves to manifest the other. This relationship also is not directly, nor do other hold the convention to pertain to each utterance, nor is the convention made by God or any other being at the beginning of the creation. The relationship with each being must be different, because of 'perpetual flux', for the idea of similarity that is not incompatible with difference.⁶²

Further, if you say that the relationship is only a kind of potency and there can be no diversity in potency, then the potency of the word and its meaning would be one and the same, as there would be no distinction, even if there is some distinction there could be no relationship between the potency and those two (word and its meaning). If there is something produced, then it could not be eternal and there is no possibility for anything. Under the view that the potency is eternal, there can be no need for anything in the shape of convention and the rest and comprehension of the meaning of the word would be there at all times. If a word has the potency of expressing other meanings also, as in the case of the words Kali, Mārya, it could not bring about the cognition of those other meanings, as the potency of the word is restricted. Then the question arises : Is the potency held to be indicative of the several meanings, one or diverse? If it is one and the same time, there should be comprehension of the several meanings of the one word all at once. As the potency indicative of the meaning remains there at all times, then the comprehension of the meaning brought about by it would be there at all times and for all men. If it is assumed that the potency is dependent upon convention, then it would be dependent upon a helper and being helped, it could be permanent, eternal. A single word may have the potency to express several meanings. If it is so, such things as the 'Agnihoṭra' and the like cannot be use of all men. Because it is possible to say that they may express things contrary to what is desired by a certain person. Hence the assumption of an eternal relationship between the word and its meaning is entirely futile.⁶³

The author again proceeds to point out the futility of the assumption by saying that in the matter of expressing the meaning, besides from convention, there is not found any operation of such a full-fledged entity as the relationship. And again, any functioning of the relationship has never been perceived in the absence of convention. If it be asserted that the relationship proceeds from the convention than there may be infinite regress.⁶⁴

Further, he says that all usages become explicable on the basis of mere convention proceeding from the whims of men. Therefore there is no reason for postulating the relationship. It is merely suspected that there can be no other explanation for usage. But that does not bring the proper cognition of the relationship which is beyond the senses. All such words like 'cow', 'horse' and so on cannot have any eternal relationships, as they are dependent upon convention, like words as 'gāvi' and such.⁶⁵

If it is argued that the word 'go' being there, if the idea of the cow arises from the use of the correct form 'gāvi', it is due to its resembling the correct word. Such use being due to the incapacity of the speaker. However, it cannot be right, because a question arises : How can any such cognition of the right meaning appear on account of the resemblance to the correct word among fishermen etc. who are ignorant of the Sanskrit language? Hence it cannot be admitted that there is an eternal relationship between the words and their meanings, it can be based upon convention, as that is possible in all classes.⁶⁶

If there is any kind of destruction, such destruction would be possible for the Veda also. Hence any subsequent ideas that might appear would be one whose basis has been destroyed and it might be assumed that they may all be false and wrong arising from delusion and such other sources. Hence the Veda now available would be only a mere semblance of the original.⁶⁷

Regarding the order of sequence the author argues that the order of sequence is not accepted by all men as fixed for all. Infact, people adopt the order of words, sentences and letters according to their own wish. If that is not so, like the Veda for you, there would be no book written by men; so that the

composing of all meaningless works is referred impossible at one stroke. Because there could be no certainty that this man is uttering words exactly as they had been used previously by others. Therefore like the relationship, they also could not be regarded as beginningless. In this way, the order of letters, as their shortness, length etc. are all adjuncts of the articulation and are not so many phases of time. Thus there is no property in words which is eternal. Hence it becomes established that the word is non-eternal. It has also been proved that the comprehension of the meanings of the words is possible only when the words are non-eternal.⁶⁸

If it be urged that the letters themselves, being eternal, would be expressive and those letters are eternal has been established by sense-perception and other means of cognition; the answer to this is as it having been established that expressiveness belongs non-eternal letters. The recognition and inference, however, put forward in proof of eternality become annulled.⁶⁹

Refutation by Prabhācandra - The Jaina thinker refutes the views of Mīmāṃsaka : 'Word is eternal, because the fact that it conveys the meaning is 'otherwise inexplicable'. This argument of the Mīmāṃsaka is not proper, because it is possible to ascertain the meaning of the word by the means of similarity, although the word is impermanent, like the smoke. There is no such rule that the word at the of making convention and that should convey the meaning lateron. For instance, the cognition of fire is cognised by the smoke on the hill which is similar to and not the same as the smoke in the kitchen. The smoke in the kitchen does not to make the fire known in other place, since we experience that the object having a similar effect makes the other object known. The relation between *sādhya* and *sādhana* is ascertained prominently because of the similarity of effects. It cannot be said that the fire is known on the basis of universal smokeness, because the universal smokeness is not possible independently of similarity amongst objects. One does not cognise that 'I cognise the fire from the smokeness', but he cognises the fire from the smoke. This cognition is tenable if the relation is known between

particular qualified by universals. 'This notion of particular qualified by universal' is equally applicable to signifier and to be signified.⁷⁰

The reply to the criticism of similarity as depicted in SV as follows - Is the similarity (between words) something different from individual themselves or is it not different from them? and is the similarity one or many? and lastly, is it eternal or non-eternal? If it be different one and eternal, then it is only another way of postulating a class. If it is held to be non-different, non-eternal and many, then it comes to the same theory as above. And again, if the similarity be held to be something non-different from the individuals (words) one and eternal, this just what we seek to establish.' While refuting this Mīmāṃsā criticism of similarity the author points out that if two objects have similar effects, then the objects are similar. Here the sameness of effect is not required. Similarity is both different and non-different from individuals, because it is experience like that. So it is not the same as universal (*jāti*) because the latter is accepted as eternal parvasive⁷¹ (by other).

Now, the Mīmāṃsaka may argue that particular will be cognised through the universal, because universal activity do not exist without particulars. According to Jaina, it is contrary to experience. There is no such sequence, when we hear a word we do not first cognise a universal and then a particular.⁷²

In this connection he sets forth a question : Is the particular is known through the universal by implication, then the question arises : Is that particular known in the specific form or general form? It would not be in the specific form, because while when a word is uttered, particular is not known in its specific form, because otherwise verbal knowledge will not be different from perception, of particular. And the second alternative is also not proper, because if it is known by the form of universal, it would not generate activity as it would have no practical efficiency.⁷³

Further, he asks : If the universal is to be known from the word, then what about the particular? How is the particular known from the universal? If you say that it can be known because of

the relation between them, then the question arises : When is the relation known? Is it that time or before? The relation between them cannot be known at that time, since the particular is known. It is accepted as only the universal is known at that time. Secondly, the relation cannot be known because without knowing the particular, the relation resides in both of them. If the relation is cognised earlier then let relation exists at the previous time. It does not follow that it continues to follows now.⁷⁴

It has been said by the Mīmāṃsaka that the word which is heard in certain different places is the same everywhere. The Jaina claims that the Mīmāṃsaka argument is fallacious, since the *pakṣa* (major term) is sublated by the means of inference. Here, the Jaina provides a counter inference, such as 'the word is different in different places, because a person experiences it at a given time as belong to many places. For instance, a pot. The Sun is one yet it is seen by many observers at different places. Devadatta is one, yet he is seen in different places at different times. But the word is experienced even by a single person at given time. So it must be manifold. If, however, the Mīmāṃsaka contends that the word is experienced in many places because of its all-pervading character, then let the pot also have all-pervading character.⁷⁵

Further, the Mīmāṃsaka says that the *udātta*, etc. are the only properties of manifestation of sounds and not of the letter 'a' etc., but they appear to the properties of letter 'a' etc. due to super imposition, like which appears in a crystal. This argument is unsound according to Jaina. He says that it would be sound if the letter 'a', etc. is found in without any properties, such as 'udātta' and the sound is found with the property. For instance, a crystal is found without the red colour. But we do not find the letter 'a' without its properties even in dream.⁷⁶

The Mīmāṃsaka further claims that the intensity of light effects a cognition of a pot, similarly the shortness of a sound affects the intensity of the cognition of the word. In this connection, the author sets forth a question : What is the intensity of a cognition? Does it mean (1) appearance of object as big (2)

appearance with vividness of the object as it is. On the first alternative the cognition may be illusory and the instance of cognition of pot is improper. Because the small pot will not be seen as big, even in the intensive light that will be appeared only in the vividly. On the second alternative, the letter 'a' etc. only cognised with vividness without the properties, like bigness etc. Thus the idea of increase or decrease the cognition depending upon the manifesting sound is not established.⁷⁷

Next, the author argues that if the palate etc. or sounds etc. are the manifesters of the word, then in such business, the word characterised by palate etc. may not be manifested invariably. Since it is the function of the cause but not of the manifesters by which it brings about the effect invariably. There is no such rule that where there is manifesters, i.e. light etc., there is manifestation of object, i.e. the pot. Otherwise, there is no difference between causation and manifestation of the object and also the activities of wheel etc. will be in vain.⁷⁸

Next, the author disapproves the all-pervadingness (*sarvagatatva*) of the word. He gives an inference, such as, word is not all-pervading, because it has a universal and specific property and because it is perceptible by single external sense-organ, for instance, a pot. Thus, there is no distinction between the pot and the word and hence both are effects and objects of manifestation.⁷⁹

Again, he sets forth a question : Are these sounds cognised by the ear or not? If they are perceived by the ear, then they are words by definition. The udātta etc. would be the real properties and hence it is meaningless to conceive of words as different from sound. If on the otherhand, the words are not perceptible by ear, then how can the properties of them, such as, udātta etc. be grasped.⁸⁰

It has been said in SV that 'your argument (as to increase of sounds proving their non-eternality) is not inconclusive, because even in ordinary life, we come across cases where such increase or decrease in accordance with the increase or decrease of the cause or manifesters is found to belong to the manifested object.

For instance, the face is found to increase or decrease in accordance with the increase or decrease of size of the mirror (reflecting the face). This is not proper according to Jainas. Because an illusory object cannot bring about the inconclusive of a non-illusory thing. The apprehension of extensiveness etc. in the word is not illusory, because there is no sublation. But the apprehension of extensiveness of the face is illusory. Because there is no sublation. However, everything does not become illusory, when one thing becomes illusory, like the dream cognition.⁸¹

Again, it has been said that the word to be cognised in a particular place, because its manifestation depends upon manifesting sound etc. then the question arises : How are the sounds cognised due to which the word is heard? Is it by the means of perception or by inference or by presumption? If they are cognised by perception, then the question arises : Whether they are cognised by ear or by skin? It is not cognised by ear, because we do not come across such type of experience and the sounds do not have appeared like words and also it is impossible to cognise by tactual perception. If the sounds are cognised by inference, for example, there may be inferred from the movement in the cotton placed before the mouth, then even the particles of cough which come out due to coughing or such a moment and the existence of word would be inferred from them.⁸²

And again, if sounds are cognised by the means of presumption, such as words are not produced, because they are eternal but they are manifested. If there are no sounds, then specific manifestation is not explicable.⁸³

Next, Prabhācandra sets forth many questions⁸⁴ : What is this specific *sanskāra* (modification). Is this modification in the word? or is the modification in the ear? or both? All these concepts have been accepted by the Mīmāṃsaka.

In the first alternative, he puts forth many alternatives, viz. what is this manifestation in the word? (2) or the some kind of excellence which is identical with it? (3) or the exclusion of non-excellence? (4) or the development of self-content? (5) or the

inherence of an individual word? (6) or the dependence of its knowledge on the knowledge of individual? (7) Or the nearness of manifest? (8) or the exclusion of cover?

Now, he starts rejecting all these alternatives⁸⁵ (1) if modification means a perception of the word, then, how does that which makes the sound known residing in the word? If it is due to some other reason, then there will be infinite regress.

(2) If there is an identical excellence, that is perceptible change in the word, then the word would be impermanent.

(3) If the exclusion of non-excellence, then it will amount to imperceptible nature and hence it will amount to perceptible change. So, again the word will be impermanent.

(4) Nor does the modification mean development of self-content, because self-nature of the eternal thing cannot be modified.

(5) Nor does the modification mean inherence with an individual, since there is no individual word. Otherwise the word will not be non-different in universal.

(6) Since there is no relation of universal and individual among words "dependence of its knowledge on the knowledge of individual words" is equally ruled out.

(7) Nor does the modification means, not the nearness of the manifest. Otherwise, people would always apprehend all alphabets everywhere.

(8) Nor does the modification of the word mean that the exclusion of cover, because if the existence of word is proved by some other means of cognition, then the cover of the word would be proved. For instance, if a pot is proved by the tactual perception, then the cover of darkness will be proved. Existence of the word itself is not word. So how can it cover be proved? Moreover, if the word is considered to be all-pervading, then it is not covered, because the word is found everywhere; inside, outside and besides the cover. How it can be covered then? On the contrary, the word itself will cover. If it be argued that the cover too is all-pervading, then it will not be cover at all. For example, *ākāśa* does not cover *ātman*.

Now, the author considers second alternative that the specific modification of the word really means the modification of the ear. It is said in SV, 'if the change be attributed to the organ of sense (the ear) even then, the change could apply to the organ through its substrate. And thus, the word would not be heard by that ear of which the tympanum has not been affected by the change (produced by the utterance). An utterance does not effect any change in the auditory organ, if it fails to reach the ear : Therefore the applicability of change (produced by utterance) is regulated by the diversity of the corporeal ear (which is different for each person). Even though it is one and all-pervading, yet, the change produced by utterance could belong only to the substrate of auditory *ākāśa* only. Therefore, the word would be cognised only by that ear which is affected by that change'. Here also the ear, once modified would hear all alphabets simultaneously. We do not observe any such rule that the ear modified by a medicinal oil hears only particular sounds, such as 'ga' and does not hear the sounds. Just as many things, like a cloth, are grasped by an eye qualified by a lamp. Similarly many words will be grasped simultaneously by an ear qualified by a sound.⁸⁶

The author then rejects the third alternative that the modification in the word means the word and the ear, because according to him the fault which is mentioned previously, would continue. Therefore, since there is absence of the relation of the manifested and manifest, the cognition of a word cannot be cognised due to manifesting sound and the cognition of a word in different places, times and self-nature and is not due to the manifesting sound but it is due to the self-nature itself.⁸⁷

Moreover, that the word varies from place to place is the object of inference. But perception proves the identity of a word and hence it sublates the inferential cognition. However, the inference does not sublates perception, then the perception of stability of Sun and Moon would not be sublated by inference : 'that the Sun moves because it changes its place etc.' If the perception of the stability of Moon etc. is not perceptual at all,

because it is sublated, then that is equal in the present case too. Here, an appearance of singularity is the subject of sublation, because it is sublated by the experience of similarity with respect of nails and hair which are cut and born again. Therefore, this is also not proper, that 'the idea is same (letter) does not savour of similarity, because there is no similarity in the absence of a similarity of constituent parts and there are no such parts of letters. Because the rule, that the things cannot be similar unless their constituent parts are not similar, because the constituent parts themselves can be similar to each other without their parts being similar. In the case of Devadatta, experience of the form is the same as yesterday's Devadatta. But in the case of a word we have the experience of the form this 'ga' is similar to that 'ga' and similarity does not lead to singularity. Otherwise, there may be singularity in both cow and gayal, even though they are different.⁸⁸

It has been asserted in SV that the travelling of word as proposed by the Jaina is an imperceptible fact etc. and various objections have been raised against the alleged travelling of the sound. The Jaina claims that these objections of the travelling of the word are equally applicable to travelling of the air which manifest of the word. All objections can be restated by placing the word 'word' by the word 'air'.⁸⁹

Again, the fault called '*adr̥ṣṭakalpanāgaurava*' applies to your position only. This is as follows :

(1) You imagine the existance of word which cannot be cognised in a particular place or everywhere.

(2) You imagine the airs which are not knowable through *pramāṇa* (means of cognition) as the covers of the word.

(3) you imagine the other airs which remove the covers.

(4) You have to imagine the diversity of their potencies. We do not have to imagine any of these things. Hence it is proved that the word is a product of the functions of palate etc., like a pot which is the production of the functions of wheel and so on.⁹⁰

Refutation by Ratnaprabhasūri : As the Jaina philosopher

says, the Yājñīkas (the believers in the Vedic sacrificial practices) are of the opinion that sound is eternal⁹¹. The reasons are as follows :

(1) Recognition shows that, this is the same 'ga' (constant) whenever we come across it.

(2) There is an inference, "sound is eternal; because it is audible, like the generality of sounds".

(3) Presumption would show that unless sound be supposed to be eternal, we cannot utter it in order that others may hear it.

The Jaina thinker criticises each of these, in the following way of attack.

According to him, recognition rather shows that sound is impermanent. Unless something is non-eternal at least in some respects that it is that something which was previously perceived. In the example, 'I am that self-same' does have any meaning only if the self which was previously perceived, be supposed to be impermanent in some respects. He urges that the *pratyabhijñā* is afterall a fallacious form as it is opposed to both perception and inference.⁹²

The alleged perception shows that a sound has its origin and its decompose and it cannot be falsified. Hence, you cannot say that this perception is illusory, alleging that there is no real origination nor real decompose of a sound and when it said to originate, it only becomes 'explicit' and that when it is said to perish, it only enters into the 'implicit' condition. Because a similar argument can be made in respect of all things e.g., a jar is eternal. Hence, the case of a jar cannot be distinguished by saying that there are visible causes (viz., the potter, his wheel etc.,) of the origination and of the decompose of the jar, where as in the case of sound we do not have such causes. Hence you cannot say that sound is eternal; that the palatal activity, and other factors do not generate it or destroy it, but only make it explicit or implicit. Here, it is to be noted that the fact of thing becoming explicit or implicit can not give rise to the idea that the thing originates or that it decomposes. For instance, when a jar becomes visible (explicit), if sunlight is being thrown over it, one cannot feel that

the jar is originated; nor can he say that the jar is non-existent where it remains invisible (implicit). Thus the fact that the perception of sound is originating and destroying shows that the sound has really an origin and destruction and that it is by no means eternal. Hence it is to be noted that the perception of the origin and decay of a thing are not due to the perceptions of its becoming 'explicit' or implicit. We feel that a jar (invisible in darkness) is existent because we can feel its existence by touching. If it be said that when a thing is not 'explicit' there must be some positive evidence of its existence. Even then, in order that it may be looked upon as existent and if there is not such evidence the thing must be held to be non-existent, then the question arises as to why is there absolutely no evidence of its existence, when a sound is said to be in a implicit state. If, again, it be argued that the sound persists in 'Om', then we say that there is no evidence for it and then the conclusion that is sound is non-existent. Thus perception of origin and destruction of sound is a real fact and cannot be said to be fallacy. In the case of a *pratyabhijñā* (recognition), we hear the same sound, after sometime we heard it for the first time. Therefore *pratyabhijñā* is clearly opposed to the yield of such perceptions and is fallacious itself".⁹³

Further, the Jaina philosopher shows the contradiction to recognition by inference as. Sound is non-eternal, because of its intensity, lowness etc., like pleasure, pain etc. If it be argued, by saying that those characteristics do not belong to *śabda* (word) but to *dhvani* (sound) which expresses 'explicit' the *śabda* (word). Then the question is : What is *dhvani* (sound). It may be answered that, *dhvani* consists of palatal air, then the question arises as to how can the characteristics of intensity, lowness etc. be heard which pertain to the *dhvani*. Because, *dhvani* is air and such is not audible and that is impossible for the characteristics of the *dhvani* also to be heard. If you say that *dhvani* which expresses, the *śabda* (word) is audible, has the characteristics intensity, lowness etc. and that it is non-eternal. Your contention is not proper. It is the *śabda* (word) which alone is qualified by audibility. *dhvani* is also audible, and is identical with *śabda*. It

is not as something different from it.⁹⁴

The author asks a question in this connection; What do you mean by *dhvani* (sound)? Is it *manifest*? i.e., which makes the *śabda* manifest? What is the function of the *dhvani*? What is modified by *dhvani*? the word or the ear (the organ of ear) or both? As a matter of fact, the modification (*saṅskāra*) may consist in giving rise to another form or in removing an obstacle. If you belong to first case, then the word or ear becomes impermanent, because the essential nature of the word or the ear may remain the same while there may arise a different kind and therefore *dhvani* remains unconnected with the word or the ear. What do these sound do and in what respect do they do that and therefore become manifest? If you say that they modify the word or the ear or the both; what is the modification here? Whether it is giving rise to another form, or removing an obstacle? If you say that it is the first, i.e., giving rise to another form, then how there would be the impermanence of the word and the ear? Because the word assumes a form different from its nature.⁹⁵

It cannot be said that the *dhvani* (sound) is the *vyañjaka* of a *śabda* i.e. it removes what envelopes a word. If it is so, once such obstacle is removed then all words should be audible at once. You cannot say that each sound (alphabet) has its own peculiar obstacle and its audibility means the removal of its own obstacle. However, all sounds have one and the same ear as their organ. This is to say that there cannot be different obstacles to different sounds and one and the same obstacle is obstacle to all sounds. If you say that there are different obstacles to different sounds, then also the question arises as in what way is the obstacle to one particular sound removed? Is it removed wholly? then all persons would hear the sound at once. If it is removed partially, how would a person hear the whole of a sound? It would lead, however, one to assume that the sound has parts. Therefore it is unreasonable to hold that a sound has its *vyañjakatva* and that the characteristics of intensity, lowness etc. pertain to this *vyañjakatva* ⁹⁶.

The Jaina commentator next takes up for consideration the

opposite contention based on an inference. According to the argument of the opponent, 'Sound is eternal; because it is audible, like the generality of all sounds' However, this inference is unsound, because there cannot be rule that whatever can be heard must necessarily be eternal. For instance, "One who would like to have a good reputation should desire his mother, should murder the *Brāhmīns* and should drink wine, if he would like to go to the heaven". This statement because of its being heard would be eternal, it must be held to be authoritative, because it lays down an injunction and to disobey or to consider it to be repulsive would clearly be a sin. And again, a sound is sometimes loud, sometimes low, sometimes intense, sometimes soft, sometimes harsh etc. If these characteristics be eternal we should have these characters associated with a sound which is never possible.⁹⁷

The argument based on presumption is as follows; 'A word (sound) is related to the object it signifies, when the word is used it must be understood to signify that object. If the word be held to be impermanent, its use for others becomes impossible, because the word with its relation to the object has already vanished when it is being used for others. According to the Jaina, however, this argument is unsound. A similar argument leads to the doctrine of the eternality and the oneness of the objects also. For instance, the word 'Go' (cow) is applied to a particular cow, such as *Bāhuleya* and is thereby related to it. It cannot be applied to *Śābaleya* cow. Hence, there is an unavoidable difficulty by saying that, a word means not a particular thing, but the 'generality' underlying the things of the same class. The Jaina philosopher urges that the object is always the *sāmānya-viśeṣātma*⁹⁸.

The Jainas ask: What is this generality in a word? Is this generality of sounds or, is this the generality of a limited-class (e.g. *go - śabdatva*) i.e., the generality of all 'Go' words? Or is this the generality of component letters (e.g., G-tva O-tva etc.,) constituting a particular word (e.g. *Go*). According to *Mīmāṃsaka*, among these alternative positions the first is not tenable, because generality of sounds is universal. A particular word possessing it, is not thereby enabled to signify the object signified by it. Nor

is the second position tenable. There cannot be anything like, the generality of a limited class of words. The word 'Go' (cow) is made up of two letter-sounds 'G' and 'O' If it is said that there is a generality underlying all the 'G' words, then there may be a problem of determining the generality.⁹⁹

The *Mīmāṃsaka* (*Yajñīkas*) lastly put forward that the so-called generality in a word cannot be said to consist in the generalities of component letter-sounds (e.g. G and O). constituting a particular word (*Go*). According to them, all letter-sounds, e.g. 'Ga', are identical. Therefore, it cannot be said that any generality underlying a number of 'Ga' sounds. The Jaina thinker criticises this theory by showing that the same letter-sounds are not identical but are different from each other and there is a generality of words, real in every sense of words and that will appear to be clear if we take the letter 'Ga' in the words '*Garga, Bharga, Svarga*' etc. The letter-sound 'Ga' is obviously different in all these words and it is not true that the 'Ga' sounds which we perceive have no difference in them, it is well known that some times the sound is intense, sometimes it is soft etc., If it be conceded that there is perceived no difference (*viśeṣa*) in the 'Ga' sounds, it is undeniable that a clear 'distinction' (*bheda*) is perceived there, a perception of 'distinction' is possible where there is no perception of 'difference' Grains of mustard-seed (*saṣapa*) in a mass may be perceived to be different from each other, although, there differences from each other in respect of weight etc. may not be perceived. Thus, it can be said that there is difference (in the sense of distinctness at least) among the various 'Ga' sounds.¹⁰⁰

And again, it cannot be said that there is not the unitary word 'Go', on the ground that it is made up of two letters namely 'G' and 'O'. The word 'Go' is not eternally self-existent and does not prove that it is not a unitary word and is unable to signify an object. The unitary character of the word 'Go' is due to its underlying material essence (called *bhāṣā*) which manifests the letter-sounds G and O which constitute the word 'Go'. The word 'Go' is thus embodied this generality in a particular manner and

it is thus similar to other kinds the generality, and it is thus enabled to signify its object, viz., a cow. In this way, the Mīmāṃsā theory of the eternal self-existence of words based on presumption is set aside.¹⁰¹

To conclude, Jayarāśi, the so called exponent of the Cārvāka system, does not agree the doctrine that the relation between the word and its meaning is natural, since that is not cognisable either by perception or by inference or by presumption. In the similar way, he does not agree the validity of Vedic sentences which speak of unseen matters.

The Buddhist exponent Bhāvaviveka puts forth Mīmāṃsā views in pūrvapakṣa and refutes the same in uttarapakṣa. According to him, the eternality of the word is unreal and perishable. The reasons, viz. repetition and recognition, shown by Mīmāṃsakas, lack positive concomitance with permanence since both are not seen in permanent objects. Even the wordness is not reason to prove the eternality of words.

Śāntarakṣita, the main opponent rejects the recognition as a part of perception. Recognition, according to him, is not found to be present in the same form in all cases. In regard to sounds like, slow, fast and soon recognition cannot be found. Regarding the relationship of the word and its meaning he says, the word is not one but the common man thinks that there is repeated use of one and the same word. The common man also thinks that the relationship of words with their meaning is one and universal. In reality, however, there can be no relationship between the word and its meaning. The relationship is imposed by people under an illusion. It is mere chaotic, since there is no invariable concomitance between them.

Further, as far as the relationship is concerned, there are two kinds of relationship among things, viz., the relation of identity and the relation of cause and effect can be found. None of these, however, is possible between them. He asserts that words and things are entirely different from one another, but are capable of providing the same ideas. It is not true that the words become expressive only when its relationship to its denotation

has been apprehended, since in reality the word by itself is not expressive at all. The relationship between word and its meaning is clearly that of cause and effect and it could be known except through convention.

According to Prabhācandra, a meaning of a word can be ascertained by means of similarity although the word is impermanent, like smoke. There is no such rule that a word at making convention and that should convey the meaning later on. He rejects the all pervadingness of the word through inference, like, word is not all-pervading, because it has a universal and specific property and because it is perceptible by single external sense-organ, like a pot. Ratnaprabhasūri, another Jaina philosopher, criticises the Mīmāṃsā views on recognition, inference and presumption as means to prove that the sound is eternal. According to him, recognition rather shows that sound is impermanent and fallacious form as it is opposed to both perception and inference. The inference 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible like the generality of all sounds' of the Mīmāṃsakas is not acceptable to him. He says that this inference is unsound, because there cannot be rule that whatever can be heard must necessarily be eternal. The properties of sound, viz., loud, low, intense, soft, harsh etc. otherwise be eternal since associated with sound which is never possible. Regarding the presumption he says, when a word is used, it must be understood to signify that object. If the word be held to be impermanent its use for others becomes impossible. Thus arguments of Mīmāṃsakas are unsound.

Foot Notes

- 1) औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धस्तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशोऽव्यतिरेकश्चार्थोऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं JS 1.1.5.
- 2) औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन प्रत्यक्षेण प्रत्ययेन विरुध्यमानो बाध्यते ISB on JS 1.1.5 MD Anandashrama ed. pp. 50-51.
- 3) यो ह्यत्र व्यपदेश्यः संज्ञिलक्षण इति । Ibid, p. 52.
- 4) पुरुषस्य सम्बन्धुरभावात् । केनचित् वेदाः प्रणीता इति । Ibid, pp 63-

- 66.
- 5) यद्यपि च विस्मरणमुपपद्येत शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्ध इति Ibid.
- 6) नन्वर्थापत्या सम्बन्धारं तस्मात् सम्बन्धुरभावः Ibid, pp. 66-67.
- 7) अव्यतिरेकश्च अतो नास्ति सम्बन्धस्य कर्ता । Ibid, pp. 67-68.
- 8) Jha G. N., Pūrvamīmāṃsā..... p. 149.
- 9) पुरुषाधीनविज्ञानस्तेभ्यः प्रागनिरूपितः । यः संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धः स चेष्टश्चेद् ध्रुवं कृतः ॥ SV, Samandhākṣepa, 45.
- 10) समयः प्रतिमर्त्यं या प्रत्युच्चारणमेव वा । क्रियते जगदादौ वा सकृदेकेन केनचित् ॥ SV Sambandhāksepaparihāra, 13.
- 11) प्रत्येकं वापि सम्बन्धो भिद्यतैकोऽथ वा भवेत् । एकत्वे कृतको न स्याद् भिन्नश्चेद् भेदधीर्भवेत् ॥ Ibid, 14.
- 12) भिन्नत्वे प्रतिसम्बन्धं शक्तिः कल्याभिधा प्रति । एकस्मिन् ज्ञातशक्तौ वा नान्येनार्थमतिर्भवेत् ॥ Ibid, 16.
- 13) सर्गादौ च क्रिया नास्ति, तादृक् कालो हि नेष्यते ॥ Ibid 42 cd. न च निस्साधनः कर्ता कश्चित्सृजति किञ्चन ॥ Ibid 50 cd.
- 14) तस्मात् प्रागपि सर्वेऽमी खण्डुरासन् पदादयः । Ibid 116 ab. शब्दार्थानादितां मुक्त्वा सम्बन्धानादिकारणम् । Ibid, 136 cd.
- 15) वृद्धानां दृश्यमाना च प्रतिपत्तिः पुनः पुनः । Ibid, 138 cd शब्दवृद्धाभिधेयांश्च प्रत्यक्षेणात्र पश्यति ॥ Ibid, 140 cd श्रोतुश्च प्रतिपन्नत्वमनुमानेन चेष्टया । अन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्या च बुध्येच्छक्तिं द्वयाश्रितम् । अर्थापत्यावबुध्यन्ते सम्बन्धं त्रिप्रमाणकम् ॥ Ibid, 141.
- 16) उक्तं नित्यः शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्ध अतः प्रयत्नानन्तर्यात्तेन क्रियत इति गम्यते । MD, Anandashrama ed. p. 87.
- 17) नो खल्वप्युच्चरितं कर्णच्छिद्रेऽप्यनुपलम्भनात् । Ibid, pp. 88-89.
- 18) अपि च शब्दं कुरु..... स एवायं शब्द इति । Ibid.
- 19) नानादेशेषु तस्मादप्यनित्यः । Ibid.
- 20) अपि च दध्यत्र प्रकृतिविकारभावो लक्ष्यते । Ibid, p. 90.
- 21) अपि च बहुभिरुच्चार महानुपलभ्यते Ibid.
- 22) तुशब्दात्यक्षाः तस्मादुभयोः पक्षयोः सममेतत् Ibid, p.
- 23) यदपरं कारणमुक्तमुच्चरित दूरादुपलभ्यते शब्दः । Ibid, pp. 91-95.

- 24) यदपरं कारणमुक्तं शब्दं कुरु गोमयान्कुर्विति संवाहे । Ibid, p. 96.
- 25) यत्वेकदेशस्य सतो तस्मादयमप्यदोषः । Ibid, p. 100.
- 26) न च दध्यत्रेत्यत्र तस्मादयमप्यदोषः । Ibid, p. 100.
- 27) यद्यैतद् बहुभिर्भेरी वृद्धिर्न शब्दस्येति । Ibid, p. 101.
- 28) नित्यः शब्दो भवितुमर्हति परार्थत्वान्नित्यः शब्दः । Ibid, pp. 101-102.
- 29) गोशब्द उच्चरिते तस्मान्नित्यः । Ibid, pp. 104-105.
- 30) इदं पदेभ्यः तस्मान्नित्यः । Ibid, pp. 101-102.
- 31) नापि स्वाभाविकः उक्तन्यायात् । TPS, Sanghavi and Parikh ed. p. 114.
- 32) Ibid.
- 33) Ibid.
- 34) नित्यशब्दो ध्वनिव्यंग्यः सम्बन्धोऽर्थेन नित्यतः । प्रतिपत्तुर्यतोऽर्थेषु प्रतिपत्तिः प्रजायते ॥ MTN, 6. Bhat S. Refutationp.102.
- 35) अद्विप्रवृत्तेरभ्यासात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानतस्तथा । शब्दत्वाच्छ्रावणत्वाद्धि नित्यशब्दोऽवसीयते ॥ MTN. 7., Ibid.
- 36) अद्विप्रवृत्तेरित्यत्र दीपेऽप्यद्विप्रवृत्तिता । व्यभिचारितया हेतोः शब्दनित्यत्वमप्यसत् ॥ MTN. 44, सत्त्वादन्नित्यशब्दोऽयं क्रियावत् किन्न गृहाते । अथवा देहचेष्टावद्भीहेतुत्वाद् विनाशयम् ॥ MTN. 45., Ibid. p. 109.
- 37) अभ्यासप्रत्यभिज्ञानहेत्वोरन्वयहीनता । नाभ्यासप्रत्यभिज्ञाने नित्ये दृष्टे कचिद्यतः ॥ MTN. 46, Ibid.
- 38) शब्दत्वनित्यतासिद्धेः शब्दत्वं न निदर्शनम् । अभिव्यक्तिनिषेधाच्च ध्वनिव्यंग्यो न चाप्ययम् ॥ MTN. 47. श्रावणो यदि शब्दस्ते ध्वनिव्यंग्यः कथं मतः । प्रतिपत्तिस्तु संकेतादसौ शब्दः प्रसज्यते ॥ MTN. 48. संकेतसम्भवादादौ प्रतिपत्तिर्न युज्यते । संसारवदनादित्वात् संकेतस्यानुवादतः ॥ MTN. 49., Ibid.
- 39) किञ्च शब्दस्य नित्यत्वं श्रोत्रजप्रत्यभिज्ञया । TS. 2116 ab. प्रत्यक्षप्रत्यभिज्ञा च प्रागेव विनिवारिता । भ्रान्तेः सकल्पनत्वाच्च नातो नित्यत्वनिश्चयः ॥ TS, 2447. व्यावर्तमानरूपश्च भूयसा प्रत्ययो ध्वनौ ।

- शुकस्य व्याहतं चेदं शारिकाया इतीक्षणात् ॥ TS. 2448
 सोऽयं व्यञ्जकभेदाश्चेद् वक्ष्यामो व्यक्तचपाक्रियाम् ।
 अस्मादेव च ते न्यायात् सर्वमेकमिदं भवेत् ॥ TS. 2449.
 ततो न व्यञ्जकं किञ्चिद् व्यंग्यं वा भवतां भवेत् ।
 एकस्मिन्विभक्ते हि व्याहता भेदकल्पना ॥ TS. 2450.
 पौरुषेया इमे शब्दा एते चानरकर्तृकाः ।
 व्यवस्थैषापि वो न स्यात् प्रत्यभिज्ञोपजीविनाम् ॥ TS. 2451.
 40) केचित् स्थितक्रमा एव व्यञ्जकक्रमसंस्थितेः ।
 इष्टा अपौरुषेयास्ते नियतक्रमयोगिमः । TS. 2452.
 नन्वयं पौरुषो धर्मस्तात्त्वदिव्यञ्जकक्रमः ।
 तस्येच्छापरतन्त्रत्वात् सम्भाव्येत विपर्ययः ॥ TS. 2453.
 41) ज्वालादेः क्षणिकत्वेऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञेति चेन्न तत् ।
 तत्र हि प्रत्यभिज्ञेयं सामान्यं नित्यमेव नः ॥ TS. 2118.
 वर्णेषु च तेष्वेव प्रतिक्षणविनाशिषु ।
 सामान्यं प्रत्यभिज्ञेयं गत्वाद्येव विशेषतः ॥ TS. 2455.
 भेदबुद्धिस्तु यत्रांशे द्रुतमन्दादिके भवेत् ।
 तत्र न प्रत्यभिज्ञाने भेदबुध्यवधारितम् ॥ TS. 2456.
 42) शब्दैकत्वप्रसिध्यर्थं प्रयुक्तेषु तु हेतुषु ।
 विजातीयविरोधित्वात् प्रतिबन्धो न सिध्याति ॥ TS. 2457.
 43) घटादेरेकतापत्तौ जात्येष्टं सिद्धसाधनम् ।
 व्यक्तीनामेकतापत्तिं कुर्याच्चेदनया दिशा ॥ TS. 2130.
 गादेरप्येकतापत्तौ जात्येष्टं सिद्धसाधनम् ।
 अतद्रूपपरावृत्तिरभिन्ना कल्पितैव हि ॥ TS. 2159.
 व्यक्तीनामेकतापत्तौ बुद्धेः सर्वप्रमाणकम् ।
 प्रतिप्रयोगमाक्षद्यैर्वर्णभेदविनिश्चयात् ॥ TS. 2160.
 यन्मनोज्ञानमज्ञादिभेदः प्रत्यक्षतो गतः ।
 बुद्धीनां क्रमभावित्वाद् भेदः सिद्धोऽङ्कुरादिवत् ॥ TS. 2161.
 देशकालादिभिन्ना हि गोशब्दव्यक्तिबुद्ध्यः ।
 नैकार्था भिन्ननिर्भासाद् रसरूपादि वृद्धिवत् ॥ TS. 2162.
 44) ह्यस्तनाद्यतनाः सर्वे गोशब्दप्रत्यया इमे ।
 नैकार्थाः क्रमसम्भूते रूपगन्धादिबुद्धिवत् ॥ TS. 2164.
 45) हेतोः प्रत्ययमर्शाच्च शब्दैकत्वादयोऽपि न ।

- लोकःप्रयोगभूयस्त्वं शब्दस्यैकस्य मन्यते ॥ TS. 2467.
 अनेकव्यक्तिनिष्ठत्वात् सम्बन्ध उपपद्यते ।
 तस्मात्सार्वत्रिको लोके व्यक्तीनां ह्येकतां गतः ॥ TS. 2468.
 वस्तुतस्तु न सम्बन्ध शब्दस्यार्थेन विद्यते ।
 भेदात्तस्मादनुत्पत्तेर्भ्रान्तेरारोपिततस्ततः ॥ TS. 2469.
 शब्दार्थसंस्थितिः सर्वा विप्लुताव्याप्त्यसम्भवात् ॥ TS. 2470. cd.
 46) तस्मादकृत्रिमः शब्दो न कदाचिद् विनश्यति ।
 नित्येन नित्यसम्बन्धादाकाशपरमाणुवत् ॥ TS. 2134 cd.
 बहुभिः श्रवणैरेषः प्राणत्वादीनि वर्जयेत् ॥ TS. 2136 ab.
 47) निकृष्टगोत्ववाचित्वं चिरेण प्रतिपद्यताम् ।
 एकरूपतया भ्रान्तैर्जनैरध्यवसायतः ॥ TS. 2472.
 भावतः क्षणिकत्वात् तावत्कालमपि स्थिरः । TS. 2473 ab.
 48) नादेन संस्कृताच्छ्रोत्राद् यदा शब्दः प्रतीयते ।
 तदुपश्लेषतस्तस्य बोधं केचित् प्रचक्षते ॥ TS. 2147.
 संस्कारानुकृतेश्चापि महत्त्वाद्यवबुध्यते । TS. 2148 cd.
 49) शब्दोपलम्भवेलायां कर्णपयन्तवर्तिनः ।
 न वायवोऽवगम्यन्ते श्रोत्रसंस्कारकारिणः ॥ TS. 2485.
 नादेन संस्कृताच्छ्रोत्राद् यदा शब्दः प्रतीयते ।
 तदुपश्लेषतस्तस्य बोधोऽध्यक्षेण बाध्यते ॥ TS. 2486.
 50) द्रुतमध्यदिभेदाद्धि नान्यः शब्दोऽवभासते ।
 अतद्रूपे च तादृष्यज्ञानं नाविषयं कथम् । TS. 2488.
 51) न च व्यञ्जकसद्भावो युक्तो नित्ये विशेषतः ।
 तत्संस्कारानुकारेण नातो भिन्ना धियो ध्वनौ ॥ TS. 2493.
 घटादिग्रहणार्थं हि यथाशक्ति नियच्छति ।
 न प्रदीपस्तथा श्रोत्रे ध्वनिः शब्दोपलब्धये ॥ TS. 2494.
 श्रोत्रोपलब्धो योग्यश्चेच्छब्दः प्रकृतिसंस्थितः ।
 असंस्कृतेऽपि तच्छ्रोत्रे किमर्थं नोपलभ्यते ॥ TS. 2495.
 नोपलब्धौ स योग्यश्चेत् पश्चादपि कथं भवेत् । TS. 2497. ab.
 52) को वा ज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धः शब्देन यत इष्यते ।
 तच्छब्दबोधरूपं हि न तादात्म्यं विभेदतः ॥ TS. 2506.
 न तस्य तदुत्पत्तिः शब्दस्याजनकत्वतः ।
 तदुत्पत्तौ तु नियमात् सा सदाभाविनी भवेत् ॥ TS. 2507.

- एवं तद्विषयं ज्ञानं सदोत्पद्येत वा न वा ।
 इत्येकान्ते स्थिता व्यर्था श्रोत्रसंस्कारकल्पना ॥ TS, 2508.
 कादचित्के हि संस्कारे सत्येव ज्ञानसम्भवः ।
 कदाचिदिति शोभेत संस्कारपरिकल्पना ॥ TS, 2509.
 ज्ञानकार्यावसेयश्च संस्कारः शक्तिलक्षणः ।
 तद्य ज्ञानं सदाभावि यदि वा भावि सर्वदा ॥ TS, 2510.
 कादचित्कं कथं नाम संस्कारं तस्य सूचयेत् ।
 उत्तरं श्रोत्रसंस्कारान्नातः साधु प्रकाशितम् ॥ TS, 2511.
 तस्मान्नित्येष्वभिव्यक्तिः सर्वथापि निरास्पदा । TS, 2516 cd.
 ततश्च व्यक्तिसाधित्य दीर्घह्रस्वक्रमादयः ।
 ये केचित् प्रविभज्यन्ते तेऽपि सर्वे निरास्पदाः ॥ TS, 2517.
- 53) अतोऽभिव्यक्त्ययोगेन शब्दज्ञानमिदम्फलम् ।
 ग्राह्योत्पादविनाभावविघटादिव्यक्तिबुद्धिवत् ॥ TS, 2558.
 तस्मादुत्पत्त्यभिव्यक्त्योः कार्यार्थापत्तितः समः ।
 सामर्थ्यभेदः सर्वत्र स्यात् प्रत्यक्षविवक्षयोः ॥ TS, 2559.
- 54) अत्सूर्यदर्शनां नित्यं द्वेधा चक्षुः प्रवर्तते ।
 एकमूर्ध्वमधस्ताश्च तत्रोर्ध्वाशुप्रकाशितम् ॥ TS, 2220.
 अधिष्ठानानुजुस्थत्वान्नात्मा सूर्यं प्रपद्यते ।
 पारम्पर्यार्पितं सन्तमवागवृत्त्यावबुध्यते ॥ TS, 2221.
 ऊर्ध्ववृत्तिं तदेकत्वादवागिव च मन्यते ।
 अधस्तादेव तेनार्कः सान्तरालः प्रतीयते ॥ TS, 2222.
- 55) पारम्पर्यार्पितं सन्तमवागवृत्त्यावबुध्यताम् ।
 किमूर्ध्ववृत्तिमेकत्वेऽप्यवागेवानुमन्यते ॥ TS, 2583.
 यथैवावस्थितो ह्यर्कस्तथैवेक्ष्येत यद्यसौ ।
 अवबुद्धः प्रकल्प्येत नान्यथेत्युपपादितम् ॥ TS, 2584.
 नैवं प्राङ्मनया वृत्त्या प्रत्यग्वृत्तिसमर्पितम् ।
 बुध्यमाने मुखं भ्रान्त्या प्रत्यगित्यवगच्छति ॥ TS, 2585.
 प्रतिबिम्बकविज्ञानं स्वास्त्याद्यालम्बनं न तत् ।
 तद्विलक्षणनिर्भासाद् रसशब्दादिवित्तवत् ॥ TS, 2586.
- 56) अल्पीयस्यामल्पीयो दर्पणे प्रतिभाति हि ।
 विपर्यस्तश्च वृक्षादिर्जलमग्नः प्रतीयते ॥ TS, 2587.
 दर्पणाभिमुखं बिम्बं नैवं तु प्रतिबिम्बकम् ।

- जलाद्यन्तर्गतं चेदं बिम्बं त्वारादवस्थितम् ॥ TS, 2588.
 आश्रयानुविधानेन स्थूलसूक्ष्मादिभेदि च ।
 प्रतिबिम्बं न बिम्बं तु नातो हेतोरसिद्धता ॥ TS, 2589.
- 57) SB on JS, 1.1.15, MD, Anandashrama ed. pp 97-99.
- 58) पुंसामध्यवसायश्च योऽयमेवं प्रवर्तते ।
 प्रमोपरि स्थितो भानुरिति भ्रान्तः स निश्चितः ॥ TS, 2594.
 सर्वे प्राणभृतो यस्मादेकमेव दिवाकरम् ।
 पश्यन्ति यौगपद्येन न द्वितीयं कदाचन ॥ TS, 2595.
 एवं न मण्डलं यस्माद् द्वितीयादीह विद्यते ।
 दृश्यादृष्टेरतश्चार्क एक एव विनिश्चितः ॥ TS, 2596.
 न त्वेवं निश्चितः शब्द एकत्वेन कथञ्चन ।
 क्रमेण युगपद्यापि तन्नानात्वोपलक्षणात् ॥ TS, 2597.
 यदाहि गादिकं वर्णं वक्तारो बहवः सकृत् ।
 प्रयुज्यते तदा भेदो विस्पष्टमुपलभ्यते ॥ TS, 2598.
- 59) पर्यायेण यथा चैको भिन्नदेशान् व्रजन्नपि ।
 देवदत्तो न भिद्येत तथा शब्दो न भिद्येत ॥ TS, 2226.
 पर्यायेण च यः कश्चिद् भिन्नाद् देशाद् व्रजत्यसौ ।
 भिद्यते क्षणभाङ्गित्वान्नान्यथा गतिमान् भवेत् ॥ TS, 2605
 पूर्वदेशावियुक्तस्य स्वभावस्यानुवर्तनात् ।
 न हि देशान्तरप्राप्तिः स्थैर्यं तस्योपपद्यते ॥ TS, 2607.
- 60) न चाहष्टार्थसम्बन्धः शब्दो भवति वाचकः ।
 तथा चेत् स्यादपूर्वोऽपि सर्वः स्वार्थं प्रबोधयेत् ॥ TS, 2233.
- 61) अत्यन्तभेदिनोऽप्येते तुल्यप्रत्ययवर्शने ।
 शक्ताः शब्दास्तदर्थान्श्रोत्यसकृच्चर्चितं पुरा ॥ TS, 2611.
 नातो दृष्टार्थसम्बन्धः शब्दो भवति वाचकः ।
 संवृत्त्या वस्तुतस्त्वेव वाचको नेति साधितम् ॥ TS, 2612.
 मिथ्यावभासिनो ह्येते प्रत्ययाः शब्दनिर्मिताः ।
 जातिस्वलक्षणादीनां वाच्यवाचकता स्थितेः ॥ TS, 2613.
 तद्भ्रान्त्या व्यवहर्तारो वैलक्षण्येऽपि वस्तुतः ।
 गोशब्द एक एवेति मन्यन्ते समबुद्धयः ॥ TS, 2614.
 तस्माद् द्विजातिना प्रोक्तं बह्वसम्बद्धभाषिणा ।
 शब्दभेदं पुरस्कृत्य तत्तत् सर्वमनास्पदम् ॥ TS, 2615.

- 62) साक्षाच्छब्दा न बाह्यार्थप्रतिबन्धविवेकतः ।
 गमयन्तीति च प्रोक्तं विवक्षासूचकास्त्वमी ॥ TS, 2618.
 तस्याः कार्यतया ते हि प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भतः ।
 निश्चिता इति तेनात्र कार्यकारणता स्फुटा ॥ TS, 2619.
 विवक्षावर्तिनार्थेन कार्यकारणतात्मकः ।
 शब्दानामेव सम्बन्धः समये सति जायते ॥ TS, 2621.
 तेन सामयिकः प्रोक्तस्तेन च द्योतनादतः ।
 समयोऽप्युच्यते तेषां सम्बन्धो न तु मुख्यतः ॥ TS, 2622.
 समयो हि न सम्बन्धो न रधर्मतया तयोः ।
 द्योतकः स तु तस्येति सम्बन्धः स्यान्न मुख्यतः ॥ TS, 2627.
 प्रत्युच्चारणमेनं च न परे प्रतिजानते ।
 ईशादेः प्रतिषिद्धत्वात् सर्गादौ न च तत्कृतम् ॥ TS, 2628.
 प्रत्येकं यश्च सम्बन्धः सम्भिन्नः क्षणभङ्गतः ।
 तुल्यप्रत्ययमर्शश्च भेदेऽपि न विरुध्यते ॥ TS, 2629.
- 63) शक्तिरेव च सम्बन्धो भेदश्चास्या न चेन्मतः ।
 शब्दार्थानां भवेदैक्यं शक्तेरव्यतिरेकतः ॥ TS, 2639.
 व्यतिरेकोऽपि सम्बन्धस्तस्यास्ताभ्यां न कश्चन ।
 तदुत्पत्तौ न नित्यत्वं न चान्या वस्तुनो गतिः ॥ TS, 2640.
 शक्तिनित्यत्वपक्षे तु संकेतादि व्यपेक्षते ।
 न किञ्चिदिति शब्दार्थप्रतिपत्तिः सदा भवेत् ॥ TS, 2652.
 समयान्तरभावे च कलिमार्यादि शब्दवत् ।
 नान्यार्थबोधकत्वं स्याद् ध्वनेर्नियतशक्तितः ॥ TS, 2653.
 नानार्थद्योतनायैव शक्तिरेका यदीष्यते ।
 भिन्ना वा शब्द एकस्मिन् सकृन्नानार्थविद्भवेत् ॥ TS, 2654.
 अर्थद्योतनशक्तेश्च सर्वदैव व्यवस्थितः ।
 तद्धेतुरर्थबोधोऽपि सर्वेषां सर्वदा भवेत् ॥ TS, 2655.
 तस्मिन् संकेतसापेक्षा शक्तिश्चेत् परिकल्प्यते ।
 ननूपकार्यपेक्षेत नोपकार्या च साऽचला ॥ TS, 2656.
 नानार्थद्योतने शक्तिर्भवत्वेकस्य हि ध्वनेः ।
 नाग्निहोत्रादयस्त्वर्थाः सर्वे सर्वोपयोगिनः ॥ TS, 2658.
 तदिष्टविपरीतार्थद्योतनस्यापि सम्भवात् ।
 नित्यशब्दार्थसम्बन्धकल्पना वो निरर्थका ॥ TS, 2659.

- 64) सिद्धोपस्थायिनस्तस्य न हि कश्चित्समीक्ष्यते ।
 संकेते व्यतिरेकेण व्यापारोऽर्थावबोधने ॥ TS, 2661.
 तथा हि व्यवहारोऽयं न दृष्टः समयं विना ।
 तस्मात्सम्बन्धसिद्धिश्चेत्यनर्थेयं परम्परा ॥ TS, 2662.
- 65) नरेच्छामात्रसम्भूतसंकेतादपि केवलात् ।
 युज्यते व्यवहारश्च ततो योगो न सिध्यति ॥ TS, 2663.
 अन्यथाऽनुपपत्तिस्तद्व्यवहारस्य शङ्क्यते ।
 अतीन्द्रियश्च योगोऽतो न नरैरवगम्यते ॥ TS, 2664.
 तद्गवादयः शब्दा नित्यसम्बन्धयोगिनः ।
 सङ्केतसव्यपेक्षत्वानैव गाव्यादिशब्दवत् ॥ TS, 2666.
- 66) गोशब्देऽवस्थिते योग्ये तदशक्तिजकारितात् ।
 गाव्यादेरपि गोबुद्धिर्मूलशब्दानुसारिणी ॥ TS, 2667.
 तन्नेवं शनकादीनां संस्कृतानवबोधनात् ।
 मूलशब्दानुसारेण कथमर्थगतिर्भवेत् ॥ TS, 2668.
 तस्माच्छब्दार्थसम्बन्धो नित्यो नाभ्युपगम्यते ।
 स तु सामयिको युक्तः सर्वथा तस्य सम्भवात् ॥ TS, 2669.
- 67) तस्मिन् सम्भाव्यते वेदे ध्वस्तमूला मतिः परा ।
 मिथ्यामोहमदादिभ्यो विपरीता च कल्पना ॥ TS, 2670.
 अन्य एव भवेद् वेदः प्रतिकञ्चुकातां गतः ।
 इत्यप्याशङ्क्यते यावद् बाधकं न प्रकाशयते ॥ TS, 2671.
- 68) न च सर्वैः क्रमः पुम्भिः पूर्वसिद्धः प्रगृह्याते ।
 स्वान्त्येणापि कुर्वन्ति पदवाक्याक्षरक्रमम् ॥ TS, 2675.
 अन्यथा कृतकः कश्चित् स्याद्ग्रन्थो वेदवन्न ते ।
 अनर्थग्रन्थमात्रेऽपि ध्वस्ताकृतिरतस्तथा ॥ TS, 2676.
 यथैवास्य परैरुक्तस्तथैवेनं विवक्षति ।
 इत्येषाऽनियतिस्तन्ना सम्बन्धवदनादिता ॥ TS, 2677.
 तदानुपूर्वी वर्णानां ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुताश्च ये ।
 कालस्य प्रविभागास्ते न युक्ता ध्वन्युपादयः ॥ TS, 2695.
 तस्मान्न पक्षधर्मोऽस्ति नित्यस्ते कश्चिदीदृशः ।
 तेनानित्यं पदं सिद्धं वर्णानित्यत्ववादिनाम् ॥ TS, 2696.
 अर्थप्रतीतिरूपत्वमनित्येषु हि साधितम् । TS, 2698 cd.
- 69) अनित्येष्वेव वर्णेषु वाचकत्वे प्रसाधिते ।

- प्रत्यभिज्ञानुमाने च निरस्ते नित्यसाधने ॥ TS, 2733.
- 70) नित्यः शब्दोऽर्थप्रतिपादक
न्यायस्य समानत्वात् । PKM of Prabhācandra, Mahendrakumar Shastri ed. pp. 409-10.
- 71) यच्च सादृश्ये दूषणमुक्तम्
सामान्यमात्रस्य प्रतिपत्तिरभ्युपगन्तव्या । Ibid, p. 411.
- 72) ननु सामान्यस्य पश्चाद्विशेषप्रतिभास इत्यनुभवोस्ति । Ibid.
- 73) किञ्च, सामान्याद्विशेषः
साधारणरूपतायाः सामान्यस्वभावत्वात् । Ibid, pp. 411-412.
- 74) किञ्च, यदि नाम शब्दाज्जातिः प्रतिपन्ना
तत्कथं व्यक्त्यविनाभावोऽस्याः? Ibid p. 412.
- 75) यद्योक्तम् - यो यो गृहीतः
विभिन्नः स्याद् घटादिवत् । Ibid, pp. 412-14.
- 76) ननु व्यञ्जकध्वनिधर्मा एवोदात्तादयो न चासौ स्वप्नेऽपि तथोपलभ्यते
Ibid, pp. 414.
- 77) किञ्चेदं बुद्धेस्तीव्रत्वं नाम धर्मानुविधायित्वं स्यात् । Ibid, pp. 414.
- 78) यदि च तात्वादयो ध्वनयो
चक्रादिव्यापारवैयर्थ्यानुषङ्गाच्च । Ibid, p. 415.
- 79) अथ घटादेरसर्वगतत्वान्न
कार्यत्वं व्यङ्ग्यत्वं चाभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । Ibid.
- 80) किञ्च, एते ध्वनयः उदात्तादयोऽपि तु शब्दधर्माः । Ibid.
- 81) व्यंग्यानां चैतदस्तीति भ्रान्ततापत्तेः । Ibid, pp. 416-17.
- 82) यत्पुनरुक्तम् - व्यञ्जकध्वन्यधीनत्वात्तद्देशे
तन्न प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेन वा प्रतिपत्तिः । Ibid, p. 418.
- 83) अथार्थापत्त्या तेषां प्रतिपत्तिः युज्यते तीव्रवर्तिना ॥ Ibid.
- 84) तत्र केयं विशिष्टा संस्कृतिर्नाम संस्कारोऽस्यभवन्भवेत् । Ibid, pp. 418-19.
- 85) तत्राद्ये पक्षो न तर्हि सर्वगतं घटादिवत् । Ibid, 419-421.
- 86) अथेन्द्रियसंस्कारोऽसौ तन्न श्रोत्रसंस्कारोऽप्यभिव्यक्तिर्घटते । Ibid. p. 424.
- 87) अस्तु तर्ह्युभयसंस्कारः तत्त्वभावभेदनिबन्धनः । Ibid, pp. 424-25.
- 88) यच्चान्यदुक्तम् - 'देशभेदे भिन्नत्वम्' इत्यादि

- गोगतयोरपि तत्प्रसङ्गात् । Ibid, p. 425.
- 89) शब्दस्यागमनं पूर्वं गमनं दिक्षु युज्यते । Ibid, pp. 426-27.
- 90) किञ्च अदृष्टकल्पनागौरवदोषो
तात्वादिव्यापारकार्यत्वमिति साधूक्तम् । Ibid, p. 427.
- 91) अत्र याज्ञिकाः प्रज्ञापयन्ति नित्यत्वमेव द्योतयन्ति । RKT of Ratnaprabhasūri, Dalsukha Malvania ed. vol. p. 104.
- 92) तदवयवम् । यतः प्रत्यभिज्ञानं
प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां बाध्यमानत्वात् । Ibid.
- 93) प्रत्यक्षं हि तावत् तस्मादनन्यथासिद्धं प्रत्यक्षप्रतिबद्ध एवेति निश्चीयते ।
Ibid, pp. 104-05.
- 94) अनित्यः शब्दः तवोऽर्थान्तरमयुक्तम् । Ibid, pp. 107-08
- 95) किञ्च कस्य किं कुर्वन्तोऽमी
धर्मिणोऽपि कथञ्चिदुत्पत्तिरनिवार्या । Ibid, pp. 108-109.
- 96) आवरणापगमः संस्कारः इति नासिद्धो हेतुः । Ibid, pp. 109-10.
- 97) यदपि श्रावणत्वादित्यनुमानम्
परस्परविरुद्धानामेकत्र समवेशासम्भवात् । Ibid, p. 111.
- 98) याप्यर्थापत्तिः ततः सामान्यविशेषात्मैव शब्दार्थः । Ibid, p. 113.
- 99) अथ शब्दत्वम् वहवोऽमी गकाराः इति प्रतीतेः । Ibid, pp. 114-15.
- 100) भवति च विशेषावभासं विना इति सिद्धो गकारभेदः । Ibid,.
- 101) तथा च तदादिवर्ण क्षीणार्थापत्तिः । Ibid.

CHAPTER V

REFUTATION OF PRAMĀṆAS

Position of Mīmāṃsā - Valid cognition has been classified by the Mīmāṃsakas into six - viz.,

- i) *pratyakṣa*
- ii) *anumāna*.
- iii) *śabda*.
- iv) *upamāna*.
- v) *arthāpatti*.
- vi) *abhāva*.

As regards the sense-perception, Jaimini defines sense-perception as follows :

"Sense-perception (is) that cognition (which takes place) when there is a contact of the sense-organs (with their respective objects)¹.

After having defined sense-perception Jaimini, in the latter part of the same sūtra points out its limitations as far as the knowledge of *Dharma* is concerned. He says : " (It is) not a means (of knowing *Dharma*) it apprehends only whatever, is present" ².

On this, Śābara says : "That cognition by a person which appears when there is a contact of the sense-organs is sense-perception".

"Sense-perception is not the means (of knowing *Dharma*), because it is that cognition which arises when his sense organs are in contact with the object cognised. *Dharma*, however, is something that is yet to come and it does not exist at the time of cognition. The perception is the apprehending of an object that actually present and not one what is not present at the time of cognition. Therefore sense-perception is not a means of

(knowing *Dharma*)" ³.

SV of Kumārila provides the following explanation regarding the sense-perception : The use of '*satsamprayoge*' in the sūtra would lie in excluding 'dream cognition'. Hence it cannot be said to be either directly mentioned or supplementarily implied. Since the definition is not mentioned by name in the sūtra. The form of the direct declaration of the definition would be - 'That which is sense-perception has this character' and the form of the definition, as a 'supplementary explanation would be - "That which has such a character is sense-perception' and so long as definition has not been mentioned by name, it cannot be either the one or the other ⁴.

Further, Kumārila asserts that the fact of being a perception is the reason for proving the rest of the arguments and this, is too well-known, in case of sense-perception. It is explained only with a view to the 'perception of yogin' ⁵. However, the sense-perception of yogins too cannot be any other than ordinarily known, because the very fact of its being sense-perception would prove it to have two characteristics ⁶, viz., (1) the premissing the fact of sense-perception consisting of the comprehension of objects existing in the present time' becomes in-applicable in reference to such yogins.

2) The reasoning based upon the future character of duty would be contradicted by the fact of future objects being perceptible to yogins. In order to avoid these two contingencies the sūtrakāra has used the word 'sat' in the sense of 'what is well-known' ⁶.

Again he says that if there is a sensuous cognition for ever, produced by contact with objects not existing at present time, then alone could it apply to Duty which is yet to come. For this reason, Jaimini added the term 'sat' in the sūtra. And also, Duty is not perceptible prior to its performance and even when it has been performed, it is not perceptible. Like our sense-perception, the sense-perception of yogins as consisting of the comprehension of objects existing at the present time and as having the character of sense-perception cannot be accepted as

applying to Duty. The signification of 'sat' could be got at through the locative (*samprayoge*), yet the assumptions of others have to be rejected hence Jaimini added 'sat' in the sūtra⁷.

Next, he explains the significance of 'sam' used in the sūtra as in the sense of 'proper' and it serves to preclude all faulty 'prayoga' (functions). In the case of perception of silver in the conch-shell, the functioning of the sense-organ is faulty. Therefore such perceptions become precluded⁸. Again, he explains the words 'person' and 'sense-organs' which have been construed by means of transposition in the bhāṣya. The 'person' here meant to be either the ordinary person or the person whose existence is to be proved. By the word 'buddhi-janma' is meant that cognition becomes authoritative as soon as it is produced. In the case of all cases, their operation is something apart from their birth. In order to exclude such character from the means of right cognition, the word 'production' (birth) has been added in the sūtra. Hence the only operation of cognition with regard to the objects, consists in its being produced, that alone is 'right cognition' and the cognition itself as accompanied by this right notion is the 'means of right cognition'. The word 'being produced' has been explained by Śabara, as identical with the cognition itself and it has also been made the qualification of cognition sensuous, in order to differentiate it from all past and future cognitions⁹.

Next, SV provides the sense-perception is of two kinds. viz., 1) *nirvikalpaka*, the non-determinate 2) *savikalpaka*, the determinate. He explains the 'non-determinate cognition, as follows, - first of all, there is a cognition in the shape of mere observation in the abstract, which is undefined, similar to the cognition of the infant or the dumb, arising purely out of the object by itself and at that time neither any specialisation nor a generalisation is recognised; what is cognised is only the object, the substratum. The determinate cognition is such, if non-determinate cognition is followed by fuller perception of the thing as having certain qualifications, such as; belonging to a certain community or universal bearing a certain name and so forth¹⁰.

Jaimini does not define the means of cognitions except sense-perception and probably verbal testimony because, the other means are based upon sense-perception in the first instance; secondly they cannot be the means of knowing *Dharma*.

As far as the inference is concerned, Śabara says "When the perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship leads to the cognition of other factor of that relationship, the latter is not in contact with the person's sense-organs; this second cognition is what is called '*anumāna*'. This is of two kinds, viz., (1) that based upon a directly perceived relationship and (2) that based upon a generalised relationship.

Among these, an example of the former is that the cognition of fire follows from the cognition of smoke, - this is based upon the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire, directly perceived in kitchen. Next, an example of the latter kind of inferential cognition is that when the Sun changes its position, we infer on the ground of our experience, that 'the Sun is moving' in the case of Devadatta, it is only after the moves that he changes his position. This experience has led us to the generalised premiss that 'whenever an object changes its position, it moves' and it is on this generalised premiss that the inference of the Sun's movement is based¹¹.

As regards the 'verbal cognition', Śabara defines as *Śāstra* is that means cognising the object not in contact with the senses, which follows from the verbal cognition¹².

Kumārila says that the bhāṣya does not think to supply a definition of word or verbal cognition in general, it defines only the particular form of word or injunction which bears upon the subject matter of Mīmāṃsā i.e. *Dharma* and *Adharma*. Therefore, here in the definition, śabda stands for the Vedic or Scriptural word and 'artha' for *Dharma* and *Adharma* which forms the subject matter of 'scripture'¹³.

Kumārila does not restrict verbal cognition to Vedic injunction only. He divides this into two classes viz. (1) *pauruṣeya* (2) *apauruṣeya*. Under the first category, words are included all words uttered by trustworthy persons while in the second category.

words are included of the Veda. Both of them are valid, since the only ground of the invalidity of a word lies in the fact of its emanating from an untrustworthy source and this ground is as absent in the words of the trustworthy persons as well as in that of the words of the Veda.

Next, Kumāṛila asserts that it is a distinct means of cognition, because Bauddhas and Vaiśeṣikas have included the verbal cognition under inference. He deliberately says that it is only when verbal authority, in the Veda as well as in human utterances, has its validity apart from the character of inference and for the same reason the word as a means of valid cognition cannot be defined as 'the teaching of a trustworthy person', since there is no such person in the case of the Vedic word. Therefore it is the conclusion that the cognition brought about by words verbal cognition and it is self-sufficient in its validity ¹⁴.

Kumāṛila has proved the difference between inference and word as means of cognition with long explanation and concludes that verbal cognition does not fulfill three conditions which are essential in inferential process and hence it is a distinct from inference as sense-perception ¹⁵. However, Kumāṛila is of an opinion that the knowledge derived from individual words might be included under inference and next he goes on to point out that the cognition provided by the sentence can never come under inference ¹⁶.

As regards the analogy, Śabara defines as such, *upamāna* also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses. For instance, the sight of the gayal brings about the remembrance of the cow as being similar to the gayal ¹⁷.

Kumāṛila explains this analogy as, 'being asked by the town people', 'like what is gayal? if the forester answers that a 'gayal' is just like a cow', then it is commonly known as 'analogy' ¹⁸.

This is to say that the observer already knows a certain object (the cow), then on going to the forest he sees another animal already known to him, and afterwards there is a recall of formerly perceived cow which he cognises now as similar to the

before his eyes. Then, it forms the objective of analogical cognition is the similarity as qualified by the previously known animal. It is true that similarity is perceived, while the cow is remembered, yet the two together, i.e. the cow, similar to the seen animal are not cognised either by perception or by remembrance. Therefore, for the cognition of the two together there is a need of analogy as distinct means of cognition, like inference. The mountain is perceived by the concomitant with smoke, and yet since the object to be cognised is a qualified one, i.e. the mountain as containing the fire. Therefore a distinct means of right knowledge is established to inference ¹⁹.

As Śabara defines '*arthāpatti*' consists in the presuming of something not seen on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard would not be possible without that presumption. For instance, it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house and this non-existence in the house leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house, as without this, the fact of he is being alive and not in the house could not be explained ²⁰.

Kumāṛila supplies the following definition of presumption, such as, in a case, where in order to avoid the contradiction or irrelevancy of any object ascertained by means of any of the six means of cognition, an unseen object is assumed is known to be one of '*arthāpatti*'. Here, 'unseen' means 'not cognised by any of the five means of right cognition', because that produced by 'verbal authority' has been declared to be apart from 'seen', In as much as the verbal authority comprehends also the means of cognition and in this lies its difference from the other five ²¹.

Further, he classifies this presumption into six. They are as follows :

(1) Presumption based on perception, e.g. burning capacity in fire, which is based upon the perceived fact that it burns.

(2) Presumption based upon inference, e.g. we have in the presuming of the moving capacity in the Sun, which is based upon an inferred fact that the Sun moves from place to place.

(3) Presumption based on the analogy, e.g. we have in the

presuming of the cognisability of the cow by the cognition born of the similarity between the cow and the gyal.

(4) Presumption based on the presumption, it is found in the cognition of the denotative potency of the word through presumption the well-known fact that it denotes certain things and on the basis of said presumed denotative potency which cannot be otherwise explained, we presume the eternality of word.

(5) Presumption based on non-apprehension. In the case where the non-apprehension of Devadatta leads to the presumption of his being outside.

(6) Presumption based on the verbal cognition, e.g. when one hears the assertion, 'Devadatta is fat and yet he eats not during the day', he is led to the presumption that the man eats at night.

In regard to the last kind of presumption, there is a difference of opinions. Some people hold that the presumption is of the fact of the man eating at night, while the others, it is of the verbal assertion that 'he eats at night', and all are agreed regarding the last kind of presumption as not entirely different from *āgama* (verbal cognition). And the reason for this view lies in the fact that all cognitions derived from the Vedic text belong to this category and all these would be 'non-Vedic', 'non-scriptural', if this presumption is entirely different from verbal cognition²³.

Although the presumption has the character of verbal cognition, 'he eats at night', yet what we have consider is sanction behind this verbal assertion. This sanction cannot be held to be provided by perception, since the presumed assertion is not actually heard. Nor by inference, because no connection of the two has been observed. Nor can be derived from another verbal assertion nor from analogical cognition. Thus, this is the only sanction or proof cognition derived from the heard words 'he eats not during the day' lies in presumption only²⁴.

According to Śabara '*abhāva*' stands for the non-existence (non-operation) of the five means of the cognition and it is what brings about the cognition that 'it does not exist' in regard to the

things not in contact with the senses'²⁵. This is as explained by Kumārila that in the case of an object where the other means of cognition do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object we have the notion of non-existence of certain thing. The ascertainment of the non-existence of an object is got at is called '*abhāva*'²⁶.

This non-apprehension is of four kinds²⁷ viz. (1) The previous absence, e.g. the absence of the curd in the milk.

(2) Absence after destruction, e.g. the absence of milk in the curd.

(3) Mutual absence, e.g. the absence of the cow in the horse.

(4) Absolute absence e.g. the absence of horns on the head of hare.

Next, he asserts that if non-apprehension is not accepted as a distinct means of cognition, then there might be cognition of curd in milk, of milk in curd, of the pot in a piece of cloth, of horn in the hare, of intelligence in the earth, of shape in the soul, of odour in water, of taste in fire, of form together with those two in the air, and of tangibility and there three in the *ākāśa*. Nor again, any usage with regard to the differentiation of causes and effects, if non-apprehension is not classified into those of different kinds. Hence it must be an entity, like the cow, because it is capable of forming the object of the notions of collective affirmation and differentiation and also because it is an object of cognition. The notion that a certain thing 'it does not exist' is not possible, without a notion of the object itself²⁸.

By means of the word '*pramāṇābhāva*' (in the *Bhāṣya*) is meant the non-appearance of sense-perception and the rest and this is either a particular modification of the soul or the cognition of another object. Sense-perception and the rest apply to such cases where there is a comprehension of the positive form of an object, where, however, the object of comprehension is the non-existent form, the only actions of these consists in their non-appearance. The idea 'this is not' is never brought about by means of the sense-organs, because they are capable of having contact

with positive forms only ²⁹.

Further, he states that if you assert that 'non-existence' is not different from 'existence', hence the sense-organs could have contact even with 'non-existence', then the answer is that we do not of an absolute identity between the two. Even when there is an identity of the object, we admit of a certain difference among its properties like colour, taste etc. and the comprehension of these existence and non-existence depends upon the appearance of the one and disappearance of other ³⁰.

Further, it does not have the character of inference, because there is no middle term. If it be urged that 'we have for such term, the positive form', then the answer is that this cannot be, because the positive form does not form an object of cognition at that time. Nor can this be the predicate of the minor premiss as in the case of the word. And again no positivity is held to be concomitant with all non-apprehensions ³¹.

Thus it is a distinct means of cognition by which the non-existence is cognised.

Refutation of Perception by Jayarāṣi - According to Jayarāṣi, the sūtra defining perception is sometimes explained as one having the purpose of definition of perception, sometimes as that having the purpose of communicating the number of casual factors of perception and sometimes that having the purpose of repetition ³².

If it belongs to the first alternative, i.e., as one having the purpose of definition of perception, then the faultlessness of a cognition cannot be known neither by its being produced by faultless causes nor by the efficiency of activity nor its being free from sublation nor otherwise ³³.

A person who does not have superior faculties does not apprehend that a cognition arises from a contact between sense and object, for the dependence of a cognition upon that contact is not apprehended, as the contact is beyond the reach of the senses ³⁴.

If it be urged that the contact is assumed, because, otherwise the apprehension would be impossible, then the answer is that it

is not true. If the sūtra has the purpose of communicating the number of causal factors, then the question is what is the purpose of this enumeration? Since light etc. are casual factors, they should have encremerated ³⁵.

If it is belong the third alternative, i.e., the sūtra has the purpose of repetition, then this may be a fault, because one repeats what is well known, and is not what is unknown. If it be argued that it is known among people, then the answer is that it is not known, because it is apprehended as faultless. Nor is it known as the perception is produced by a contact with an existent thing and therefore perception is not apprehended and when it is not apprehended, its repetition is impossible. Because there is no motive for it. By repeating of only one affirms or negates something in respect of something ³⁶.

If it be urged that this has been stated by us (Mīmāṃsakas), "Perception is not a means for the apprehension of Dharma (duty) because it apprehends an existing object and because it arises from a contact between sense and object", then the question arises : What do you mean by this statement that a perception which arises containing the appearance of an object other than *dharma*, is negated as a means for the apprehension of *dharma*? or the perception which arises containing the apperance of *dharma*, is negated as the means for its apprehension. or it does not arise? If a perception which arises containing the appearance of an object other than *dharma* is excluded from the means for apprehension of *dharma*, then it should be informed to you that we should not disagree. And again, if the preception which arises as making *dharma* known is excluded, then you should be confronted with a contradiction, i.e., on the one hand, the perception, arises as making *dharma* known and on the other, it is not a means for the apprehension of *dharma*. Otherwise, a cognition arisen from a Vedic injunction, which has arisen as making *dharma* known would also be a means for the apprehension of *dharma*. Further, if it be argued that whatever has not yet arisen does not make *dharma* known, then who says that what has not arisen makes *dharma* known? It does not even

make a lotus leaf known, for it itself does not exist ³⁷.

Next, he argues; what has been said, "because it arises from a contact with the existent one", is not proper; because it has already been pointed how it does arise from a contact with the existent one. And again, it has been said, "perpetual cognition makes an existing thing known, since it apprehends an existing thing", if so, then not only perception, but cognitions which are produced by all means of valid cognition make an existing thing known ³⁸.

It is asserted that the perception is the arising of cognition. However, there is no means of valid cognition for the apprehension of cognition. It (i.e. cognition) cannot be ascertained by perception, since it is not admitted. Nor can it be apprehended by inference, because there is no apprehension of an indicator which is connected by it ³⁹. If it is claimed that the cognition is apprehended by presumption, for instance, a pot, then the apprehension of a pot would be impossible, because obtaining and avoiding of the object would be impossible. If you claim that the cognition must exist, because otherwise the object pot would be impossible, then this is not correct, because the pot is not the effect of the cognition, but the cognition is its effect. If it is assumed that a cognition because, otherwise obtaining and avoiding the pot would be impossible, then it may be false, because the cognition itself cannot subsist for several intervals of time. A person who is impelled by someone who prevails over him strives to obtain the pot even without a prior cognition of that pot or he may strive to get rid of the pot, because it has been destroyed. Hence, the presumption is doubtful. And the apprehension of a determined cognition is impossible without the apprehension of the relation between cognition and object. But when this apprehension of the cognition is not established by implication the assumption of senses is also impossible ⁴⁰.

And again, if you assume a cognition because otherwise the apprehension of an object would be impossible, then this is also not proper, because there is no relation to a cognition. Then a question arises that how could presumption make known the

cognition? When an apprehension is apprehended, i.e., a cognition is apprehended by perception, not it is apprehended by an apprehension. Because the words *avabodha*, *buddhi* and *vijñāna* are synonyms. 'Is apprehended', and 'is cognised' have the same meaning ⁴¹.

Refutation by Diñnāga - Diñnāga, the author of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, refutes the first half as the definition of perception given by Jaimini. According to him, the Mīmāṃsakas says : "When a man's senses are in contact with something existent (*sat*) there is the rise of cognition, that is perception" ⁴².

Here, in this connection, he argues that the term '*sat*' is mentioned in order to exclude '*asa*' is not right because of the rule *vyāpti* is only possible when there is existence of '*sat*' ⁴³.

And again, if the Mīmāṃsakas assert that the term '*sat*' is used in the sūtra in order to indicate the counterparts (*pratiyogin*) of the senses, then the reply is that even if that should be the case, it is by mentioning those objects which are specified by the senses that one should indicate the counterparts. Those objects of the senses which are specified (by the corresponding senses) i.e. *rūpa*, *rasa* etc., are properly called the counterparts of senses ⁴⁴.

Mīmāṃsakas argue that here in the sūtra not only the contact of senses with objects, but also is implied the contact of the soul with the mind although a mention of 'senses' alone made. Here the word, 'senses' must be taken as *upalakṣaṇa*. Diñnāga replies that this is also untenable, because the capacity of soul and others factors of cognition for contact is only for contact '*sat*' ⁴⁵.

It may be argued that in the case of a traveller in the desert sees a mirage of water that really does not exist. This example seems to show that a sense is able to come in contact with something unreal. The answer for this is that nothing is in contact with such objects as a mirage and the like which appear as objects of perception but do not exist, when a certain spot comes in contact with the faculty of sight, in a peculiar condition at a certain time., there arises an illusive mental cognition, in sequence although there is no real object. Therefore the term '*sat*' which

has been used for the purpose of excluding this kind of contact with an unreal object is not appropriate ⁴⁶.

Further, if it be urged that a sense is said to be bound to a given object, since it does not operate on any other object. Therefore, the *samprayoga* that is implied by the expression '*sat-samprayoga*'. When a sense has a special aptitude for a given object, that is called *samyak* because its *yogyatā* with the sense. It is contact with such an object that is meant by the expression '*satsamprayoga*'. If it is so, then the answer is that in this matter, other things also are bound, such as the atoms are bound to the sense, is held to indicate a special attitude of the sense. It would follow therefore that perception would arise from a contact with such objects ⁴⁷.

Again, if it be urged by the Mīmāṃsakas that this conclusion does not follow for the following reason. For instance, it is called a cow, because it goes (*gacchatīti gauḥ*) it does not follow that other things which go are also cows. In the same way, it is only the object of a sense that is called '*sat*' because of being bound to the sense. If such an argument is made, then the reply is that the reference is dissimilar, because the reason in this manner, by virtue of the commonly known usage. However it is not commonly accepted that the word '*sat*' is applied to the object of a sense by reason of its being bound to the sense. Therefore, even if it is argued, it is not proper to use the word '*sat*' in the definition ⁴⁸.

Next, the position of Mīmāṃsā holds the view that the result (*phala*) is different from the means of cognition and states that since there is no result other than the rise of a cognition, that from which a cognition arises is perception. On this matter, there is no cause of cognition which could be called perception apart from the contact of the soul and other factors which is accompanied by impression. This view is also untenable. If merely the assemblage of the causes are to be called perception, then, what would be the use of the words the rise of a cognition in the definition? And again, in case the contact of object, sense, mind and soul as accompanied by impression are to be held to produce

a cognition, then, why should the expression '*pratyakṣa*' (which singles out the sense (*akṣa*) alone) be applied to the assemblage of all those factors? Therefore the contact of sense and object can properly be called '*pratyakṣa*' for the reason that the sense alone is the specific cause of perception ⁴⁹.

Further, the statement, perception is that by means of which an ascertainment in the form of 'this is a cow' or 'this is a horse' arises in regard to this perceived object is also not proper, because one cognises an object as a cow or the like when that is associated with cow-ness or other such characters. But sense-cognition has no ability to bring about the association of the qualifier with the perceived thing. Hence, sense-cognition cannot result in the ascertainment of an object ⁵⁰.

Moreover, the object of the sense (*indriya-gocara*) is the form (*rūpa*) which is to be cognised as it is (*svasaṃvedya*) and which is inexpressible (*anirdeśya*) although object of the sense is the possessor of many properties. Therefore the object is a cause of the rise of a cognition which possesses the form of that particular object. This is the cognition itself and therefore is self-cognisable. It is impossible to describe this as having such and such a nature because what is expressible is that which possesses a universal for its object. Furthermore, if the sense-cognition is established as a cognition of a thing in all aspects, then it could not be called as *pratyakṣa-buddhi* ⁵¹.

Next, the word *pratyakṣa* may be applied to three concepts viz., *pramāṇā*, *jñāna* and *viśaya*. Among these applications the application to a means of cognition is primary and others are secondary and among these secondary applications, an object is called *pratyakṣa*. Cognition is figuratively called '*pratyakṣa*' because it occurs in dependence upon the sense and therefore it is equivalent to a means of cognition. Hence the sphere within which sense operates is limited by nature to specific objects. Thus, in any case, 'that from which cognition arises is perception' is not proper ⁵².

If it be argued that it is our doctrine that perception is nothing but the rise of cognition of something, then the answer

is that, a result is different could not be found. Since as much as the cognition itself has arisen, there would be no result other than that cognition. Again, if the rise is different from the cognition, there would be inherence of a cognition in its own cause (i.e. the soul) Even, if this (inherence) is admitted to be a means of cognition, what (result) could come from that (inherence which is eternal)? If the rise is not different from the cognition, the cognition itself would be perception. Then, it would be useless to mention the term rise ⁵³.

Moreover, if it is maintained that at the moment of the rise of a cognition the soul changes its previous state and becomes cogniser then he must be considered as *anitya* and if the soul is unchangeable, (being a non-cogniser) at the moment of the rise of a cognition, then he could not be a cogniser ⁵⁴.

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - The Buddhist philosopher, Śāntarakṣita proceeds to present the view of Kumārila on sense-perception, such as, 'At first there is only a pre-cognition *ālocanajñāna* which is indeterminate, like the cognition of the infant, the dumb and the like. It is born purely of the thing cognised, at the moment when neither the universal nor the particular character is apprehended; all that is apprehended is only a certain individual which is the substratum of both those characters. Subsequently, the things becomes apprehended along with the properties of the 'class-character' i.e. determinate and the rest. Thus the cognition which is apprehended is regarded as 'sense-perception'.

Further, again and again, as more and more conceptual contents come in, there follow further apprehensions in the same connection. When a person moves from light into the inner room, things do not manifest themselves, but that does not mean that later on he does not perceive all those things by his sense-organs. At first, he perceives a mere semblance of the object and subsequently he perceives those objects in their true form with the properties of class-character and the rest. If after having pre-cognised the object, the person closes his eyes and then imposes conceptual contacts, the latter would not be "sense-perception"

because there is no contact of the sense with the object ⁵⁵.

The author proceeds to refute all the arguments of Kumārila. According to him, if the cognition appertains to the specific individuality of the thing, then even on the apprehension of the universal and other properties should remain free from verbal expression. Because specific individuality of things cannot be denoted by words. Therefore, the cognition that rests upon that must be free from conceptual content and association with words.

He emphasises that if the universal alone is apprehended, then the qualification would be something different. If it be urged that the subsequent cognition envisages the universal and the particular in as much as what they apprehend is the particular as characterised by the universal, and they cannot be said to apprehend the specific individuality only, then that one and the same cognition cannot comprehend both the specific individuality and the universal. Because, if such cognition is conceptual, there would be no comprehension of the former. On the otherhand, there could be no comprehension of the latter. If the universal and other properties have become already apprehended by the initial cognition, then the subsequent cognition would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended, and it would thus be like remembrance ⁵⁶.

Refutation of inference by Jayarāśi - According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the inference of the self does not work, because, means of cognitions have for their objects which are not determined by other means of valid cognitions. Inference does not operate an object to be determined by perception and perception does not operate on an object to be determined by inference. Thus, both have objects which are mutually exclusive. What has been said that in the case of special object there is no concomitance special is an object which can be apprehended by its means of valid cognition. When such an object is adopted, inference lacks concomitance. Concomitance is a relation, the apprehension of this is impossible ⁵⁷.

Next he argues that if inference operates an object, even

it is determined by perception etc., the object would be common in perception and inference. In the case of commonness, what has to be proved is already proved, because it has been proved by perception. Thus, the qualification '*anadhigatārhtagantr*' (agent of apprehension of an unapprehended object) is useless ⁵⁸.

Again, he shows the different meaning. If the generality is established inference would be a means of proof, as it is asserted the *Mīmāṃsakas*, that the relation between what makes known and what has to be made known obtains between two universals. But the universal does not exist. Thus proving what is established means proving something existing. But the universal fire does not exist. When it does not exist, what does this make a thing known? ⁵⁹

Or, another meaning; a means of proof which is established an existing means of proof. But universal smoke does not exist. How can this universal in as much as be a means of proof for another universal? or a means of proof is established means that inference becomes a means of proof in as much as it is cognised. But smoke is not cognised, because it does not exist itself ⁶⁰.

Again, he continues that it is not apprehended, because there is no means of apprehending it. The universal has a recurrent form and this is not recurrent in itself nor in a single individual. However, many individuals are not apprehended at the time of inference, but only one individual smoke is apprehended. And in respect to single individual there is no cognition of the universal as having a recurrent nature and the universal does not have another form ⁶¹.

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - As regards the inference, the author of *TS Śāntarakṣita* puts forth the views of Kumārila by saying that some people hold that inference is of two kinds ⁶² viz. (a) that based upon perceived particulars (b) that based upon generalised relationship.

(a) In the case of two particular things, such as the fire produced by burning dried cowdung and the smoke proceeding from that fire, the observer has the cognition of the things and later on while moving to another place, the observer happens

again and again to recognise in other places the presence of the same fire through the indication of the same smoke seen before. It becomes recognised as a means of cognition distinct from perception. Because it brings about the cognition of a thing i.e. fire, the existence of which had been in doubt. This has been described by Vindhyavāsin as inference based upon the perceived relationship of particulars.

(b) Though, this inference is based upon generalised relationship, could be exemplified on the basis of another fire and another smoke. The inference cited is that of the 'Sun moving', as this is based absolutely upon generalised relationship.

Next, he proceeds to refute the views of Kumārila by arguing that in as much as it has been proved that 'perpetual flux' is all embracing, there can be no inference by itself. If it be argued that 'the sameness is assumed on the basis of the sameness of the chain', then the answer is that no such, sameness can have any real existence and what is merely assumed cannot be an entity. A cognition devoid of objects is not admitted and if the inference has an assumed object, it would clearly be devoid of an object.

If it is meant that 'even on the destruction of the individual, the universal persists, that cannot be, because if the universal persisted that also would certainly be covered by 'perpetual flux'. Further, on what grounds, have you asserted the restriction that these two particulars whose relationship has been cognised by sense-perception etc.? Then again, having once cognised a thing by means of inference, if the something is cognised again by means of inference, why is not this later regarded as valid? What is the peculiarity in previous one? If it be urged that the later one is not regarded as valid, like remembrance, because it apprehends what has been already apprehended, then, why is it not the previous inference also regarded as the same? Again, if it be argued that in the former inference, there is this additional peculiarity that it sets aside the doubt that has set in during the interval, then, why is not the same in the later also? Therefore, the later itself that sets aside the doubt as to something being

present or not present. Hence, the generalised perception is really independent ⁶³.

Refutation of Verbal cognition by Bhāvaviveka - In his MHK, while refuting the Mīmāṃsakas, Bhāvaviveka argues in the pūrvapakṣa that the verbal testimony is an independent means of knowledge. According to him, verbal testimony is different from the perception and inference, since it is another means of knowledge. The direct perception produces an understanding about one object at one time and so does the inference too. But verbal testimony produces an understanding of many objects in aggregation and again, it cognises invisible objects like *svarga*, *apūrva* i.e. new knowledge etc ⁶⁴.

In refutation of this argument he includes verbal cognition in inference. He states that the reason used for establishing *āgama* as an independent means of knowledge namely *pramāṇa* is inconclusive, because cognitionhood exists in inference and word is not different from inference. Again, the reason that it is the cause of emergence of cognitions of a different object will be unproved, because that the verbal testimony is different is not proved. Hence it is not different cognition. Again, he says that unseen matters like *svarga* etc. can be cognised by *parārthānumāna*. It depends on the memory cognition about the relation. What has been said that it gives a new knowledge etc. in that case thus, the knowledge given by the verbal testimony will be impermanent ⁶⁵.

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - Śāntarakṣita proceeds to show that there are only two means of cognition. He says that there cannot be any form of cognition except the two i.e. sense-perception and inference, because all others that have been postulated, either do not possess character of the 'form of right' cognition or are included in these two ⁶⁶.

Regarding the verbal cognition, he states the view of the Mīmāṃsakas. He says : other people have declared verbal cognition to that knowledge of imperceptible things which is derived from words and that cognition is derived from (a) the eternal sentence (b) the sentence uttered by trustworthy person.

This cannot be the sense-perception, because of object apprehended by it is beyond the reach of the senses. Nor is it inference, because it is devoid of the characteristic features of inference. Until the subject (minor term) is definitely known to be possessed of the probandum and also of the probans, it cannot be regarded as a case of inference of that subject. In as much as the words speaking of the *Agnihotra* and other things bring about unshakeable cognitions, the character of being right cognition cannot be denied to them ⁶⁷.

Now, he proceeds to show that the definition of verbal cognition is open to change of being impossible. He says that as regards the "eternal sentence", its possibility and expressiveness are both improbable. Hence, the first definition of the verbal cognition is an impossible one. The sentence may be capable or incapable, the cognition resulting therefrom would always come about or it would not come about at all ⁶⁸.

If it be urged that a certain meaning is actually comprehended from words, they cannot be inexpressive or useless, then the answer is that such comprehension can only be derived from explanations provided and in such cases it is found that the expounder is free to explain things according to his own wish. If it be argued that the word, by its very nature has the potency to denote well established things, in that case its meaning would be comprehended also by one who has no knowledge of the convention bearing upon the word and its denotation. Further, the lamp which is illuminative by its very nature does not need a convention in illumining things. If there is another convention bearing upon the same word there could be no comprehension of that otherthing from the same word. Even there may be a convention, the lamp cannot manifest taste and other things. Nor can any such potency of words be recognised. In this connection he asks a question : If there can be no cognition of the meaning of the Veda, how can there be any unshakeability in that cognition? Further, he asserts that it could be possible only on the basis of conventions and in this it would not be different from the words of human beings. In fact, persons well-versed in the science of

reasoning do not recognise any difference between these two. However, it can be unshakeable only for the Śrotṛiyas (Mīmāṃsakas) who are ignorant of the ways of reasoning ⁶⁹.

If it be argued that a person is regarded as trustworthy in regard to imperceptible things, whose assertions are found to be true in most cases, then the answer is that the mere fact of one's assertion being not true in same individual case, cannot prove that his assertions are never true. Nor can the fact of its being true, in one case prove that all his assertions are true ⁷⁰.

Next, he proceeds to show in what way the verbal cognition is meant to be included under inference. He says that from all verbal statements there follows inference of the 'desire to speak' (i.e. intention on the part of the speaker). This is definitely known to be the cause (source) of the words through direct perception and non-apprehension. If it be urged that in the case of a man under illusion, his assertion is found quite different from what he desires to say. If the verbal statement cannot function towards bringing about the cognition, then the answer is that there is a clear distinction between the words used by the one who is not under illusion and those of the one who is under illusion. Clever men discern this difference through the context ⁷¹.

Further, he argues that in the case of those words also, there is no incongruity in the inference of the simple 'desire to speak'. Because it is always there, for the purpose of establishing the fact of its being produced by the speaker's breath and so on. When the desire to speak is the thing to be inferred, there would be three features; the man is the (*dharmin*) the presence of the desire is the probandum which is proved by its effect in the shape of verbal statement which is the reason. For instance, the form of inference would be - "This man is cognised as having the 'desire to speak' of the tree, because he has uttered the word tree, just as I had done it in previous circumstances". In such cases, where the other party has denied the presence of three features, we do not regard the verbal statement to be a means of cognition. In such cases, however, where the presence of the three features is admitted by the other party, the fact of its being

three featured is quite clear and where the 'desire to speak' is to be proved, it shows that the three features are present there. Such being the case, the word is as good a means of inference as the smoke. Because it is equipped with the three features and because its objective is of the same kind ⁷².

Refutation of Analogy by Jayarāśi - Jayarāśi refutes the views on analogy of the Mīmāṃsakas. He says that having seen the *gayal* (*gavaya*) in the forest, the similarity of a household cow has been found, the apprehension of this, is the result of analogy, is not proper, because this analogy is based on perception. If the perception is not apprehended, then analogy cannot be apprehended ⁷³.

Further, he sets forth a number of alternatives ⁷⁴. Such as - What is this similarity between cow and gayal which has not been apprehended while the apprehension of the cow? and what is to be understood by this analogy?

- i) is it the association of organs? or
- ii) of the organs like horn etc., ? or
- iii) the generality ? or
- iv) any other object?

i) If you say that it is the similarity of association of organs, then the question arises : Is this association of organs acquainted *upalabdhilakṣaṇa* or not? If it be pertained to the first among these, then, what is understood before the acquisition of the feature of perception? Having seen the gayal, it would not go beyond remembrance. Again, if it be said that it would not be gained even having features of perception, then we cannot find that in gayal too and further, there may be an apprehension, like, 'my cow is similar to this' and again it may be a subject of horse also. Further, if you say it is *anupalabdhilakṣaṇa* then, there may be an upsetting apprehension, like, having seen buffello or horse, the apprehension would be 'my cow is similar to this'.

ii) The organs like *viśāṇa* etc., said for the similarity, are previously understood and therefore the cognition arises that would go beyond the remembrance.

iii) If the generality of both cow and gayal is said for

similarity, then this apprehension would not arise.

iv) If it belongs to any other object, then a question arises : Is that belong to senses or super-senses? If it pertains to senses, then the cognition being cognised is to be cognised and it would not leave the remembrance.

It this is not acquainted as the features of perception, then, a person should not say that 'cow is similar to this' even having seen or unseen *gayal*.

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - With regard to analogical cognition, Śāntarakṣita states from the side of Mīmāṃsā, by saying that having seen the cow, when the man goes to the forest and sees the *gayal* bearing a manifold similarity. In this, the first cognition on that he has of the *gayal* is one, that apprehends only its shape and this cognition is purely perceptual. The cognition that follows is in the more determinate form - the shape of this animal is similar to that of the cow; and this also comes only when the operation of the senses is there. This also is regarded to be perceptual. Though it is true that the said cognition apprehending the similarity follows after the remembrance of the cow, yet because as residing in the *gayal*, it would be in proximity to the senses, the similarity would be within the reach of senses. Under these circumstances, the cognition that appears in the form, the cow is similar to this animal, is what is called analogical cognition ⁷⁵.

This analogical cognition cannot be regarded as sense-perception, because it is entirely devoid of the functioning of the senses. It cannot be regarded as inference, because there are no three features. For example, there is no proban and the similarity of the cow has not been previously cognised as subsisting in the subject. The similarity which is perceived in the *gayal* cannot bring about the inference of the cow. However, it cannot be regarded as not a form of right cognition. Because it makes known what is not already known, such as, before the perception of *gayal*, its similarity in the cow has not been apprehended at all ⁷⁶.

Further, he proceeds to refute the view of analogical

cognition by arguing that there is no object that could be cognised by this cognition. Hence it cannot be regarded as a means of cognition. The reason here put forward is not admissible for those who declare that anything cognisable in the form of commonality or universal which falls under the category of the non-existent and in the case of the former of the two probandum the premiss becomes part of the proposition itself ⁷⁷.

Next, he argues that as being the nature of remembrance, analogical cognition cannot be a valid form of cognition. He says that there are some parts in the *gayal*'s body which bring about cognitions similar to those brought about by the parts of cow's body. Therefore when the *gayal* is seen, there follows the remembrance of the parts of the cow's body that have been seen before repeatedly. For this reason, there does not arise any idea of the Horse and other animal through that similarity. However, it does arise when the *gayal* is seen ⁷⁸.

It might be urged that the similarity seen previously was merely as existing, it was not seen in the form that 'this is the similarity between this *gayal* and the cow; while this is the form in which the similarity apprehended by analogical cognition. Hence it cannot be regarded as being the nature of remembrance. The author gives an answer to this is that even the similarity had not been previously apprehended under that name, it was apprehended all the same in its own form. Actually, the name does not form the 'essence' of things. When it has not been apprehended, the things could be regarded as not known by people who know the true nature of the self. If there is a slight element of valid cognition found in analogical cognition, it is to be regarded as an independent form of cognition, then there could be no limit to the number of such independent forms of cognition, as there are many ways in which small elements of cognition could be found ⁷⁹.

Next the author proceeds to show the incongruities, giving an example that when a line of trees and such things are seen what is actually perceived is only one tree and yet some idea of the second tree being there, there follows the definite cognition

in regard to the former tree that this is the first. This will have to be regarded as a distinct form of cognition, as it does not depend upon any element of similarity or other conditions. If it is denied in this case on the ground that it apprehends only what has been already apprehended, then the same might be said in regard to analogical cognition also. And again, when one sees the gayal, there appears the notion of its dissimilarity to the horse and other animals, then, why cannot this be a distinct form of cognition? If it be urged that it cannot be so regarded because it is included under non-apprehension, then the same might be urged in regard to the notions of 'similarity which also are included under 'mutual non-apprehension'. Just as distinction from similarity is cognised in that case, so also is distinction from all common parts cognised in the other case also. In support of the same idea, an argument is put forward by the author is that because that cognition which apprehends the presence of 'several similar parts' would also falls under 'mutual non-apprehension, otherwise if it is the presence of all similar parts that is cognised, then there would be identity⁸⁰.

Refutation by Ratnaprabhasūri - The Mīmāṃsā account of upamāna is such; A certain man comes to know that what a cow is but not a gayal is. Moreover, he has not the information, 'A gayal is like a cow', while he was roaming in a forest, he saw for the first time a gayal. At this sight, there arises in him a knowledge of similarity with regard to the cow which is not present at the time of the form; This is similar to cow, such knowledge is upamāna which consists in a cognition of the fact of similarity attributed to that object. Hence this cognition, i.e. upamāna comes under pratyabhijñā a mode of parokṣa⁸¹.

Further, he goes on to open a criticism on Mīmāṃsā theory of analogy, like, - you confine analogy to an apprehension of similarity only. Hence another cognition should be found out for such forms of knowledge as 'that cow is dissimilar to that which consists in a cognition of dissimilarity. As he holds, according to Mīmāṃsā, dissimilarity is non-existence i.e. want of similarity, and therefore cognition of dissimilarity comes under the abhāva

which is different from upamāna. The Jaina commentator criticises this contention by showing a similar line of argument which would show that similarity is the non-existence or want of dissimilarity and that cognitions of similarity are thus modes of the cognition called abhāva. However, it might be urged by Mīmāṃsakas that the similarity cannot be said to consist in non-existence as judgements incorporating similarity are positive assertions. The Jaina thinker exposes this contention by saying that the judgements incorporating dissimilarity are also found to be positive assertions, so that there is no point in stating dissimilarity as only the non-existence of similarity and bringing the cognitions of dissimilarity under the cognition of non-existence⁸².

'He is the same Jinadatta' is an instance where ūrdhvatā-sāmānya is the subject matter of the pratyabhijñā. Here, it should be noted that there must be an element of recognition in all cases of conception but the second element in it need not always be a direct perception. Later on in the judgement 'that very first is inferred by me', here 'that' refers to the element of recollection; but the other element accompanying recollection here is not perception but a matter of inference. Similarly in the judgement 'that very object is hereby expressed' 'that' refers to the element recognition. But the other element is neither perception nor inference⁸³.

Refutation of presumption by Śāntarakṣita - The presumption which has been regarded as an independent means of cognition by Mīmāṃsakas. The Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita proceeds to examine the presumption, by quoting the verses from the original sources. The definition of the presumption is quoted from the Ślokavārttika, i.e. when a certain fact cognised through the six means of cognition, is found to be otherwise inexplicable and hence leads to the assumption of some other fact, this is called arthāpatti⁸⁴.

This presumption is based upon six means of cognition as Mīmāṃsakas assert⁸⁵. Such as,

(1) The assumption of the burning fire, based upon the

perceived fact of its having burnt a certain things.

(2) The assumption of the mobility of the Sun based upon the inferred fact of its moving from place to place.

The potencies of all things are presumed on the basis of the inexplicability of effects produced by them. All such potencies that become cognised have not been known already and these are cognised without any idea of the relation of concomitance.

(3) 'He is corpulent and does not eat during the day' on hearing such words, one concludes that the man eats at night and this is presumption based upon what is heard.

(4) When the object cow is likened to the Gayal, there is in the cow the capacity to be apprehended by the analogical cognition, and this capacity is derived from the strength. i.e. based upon the analogical cognition.

(5) The denotation could not be done by words, could not be defined except through expressive potency. There is no other way of explaining such a potency without recognising the eternality of words. So that this cognition of the eternality of words is also obtained by means of another presumption.

(6) The absence of Caitra from the house has been cognised through absence (non-apprehension) of perception, the cognition of the presence of Caitra outside the house which is marked by his absence has been cited. This is to be regarded as another kind of presumption based upon non-apprehension.

Next, the author points out the defect that is common to all these.

Apart from the potent object, there is no such thing as potency which could be cognised by means of presumption and as far the potent object, it is cognised through perception itself. If the potency is something different, then the question is as to what that potency would be which brings about the effect, the object itself would not be an active agent at all. If the object does bring about the effect, then the potency would not be anything different, because the characteristic feature of the object is that which should be capable of effective action and that the object is learnt from perception itself ⁸⁶.

If it be urged that "the potency is not something absolutely different from the thing as it is a dual character, being both different and non-different", then the answer is that it cannot be so, because of self-contradiction. And further, it is non-different from the thing would be cognised by perception. As other party asserted regarding its not being cognisable by inference, does not affect us, because in this case, we do not regard the cognition to be of the nature of inference ⁸⁷.

It has been argued that "from the inferred mobility of the Sun, the potency is cognised by presumption" The answer to this is that when the Sun reaches another place what happens is that it is born again in a place different from its original place, as it is found in the case of fire-flame. A thing that remains permanent is of a totally different kind, otherwise such reaching of another place would not be possible. As regards potency, that is nothing apart from the thing ⁸⁸.

The author next points out the objections against the example of "fat Devadatta not eating during the day" as illustrating presumption from what has been heard. He says that no certain cognition can result from the assertion that : the fat man eats not during the day", as the speaker might be asserting this through enmity or delusion and such other causes. If it be said that the indication is through what is expressed by the first sentence, then the objection urged before remains in force ⁸⁹.

Next, he shows how the said cognition becomes included under 'inference'. He says that what is cognised is the man spoken of as related to eating at night, on the ground of his being fat while going without food during the day, like, other person. This is to say that the example is a corroborative instance and is a proban in the form of effect. He shows the relation of cause and effect between fatness and eating by saying that there is fatness when there is eating is known with certainty through positive and negative concomitance and therefore the cognition of one thing follows from the other which is thus related to it. Further he shows the incongruity by asking a question : 'How can a sentence be cognised which is devoid of all relationship? Otherwise all

things would be cognised through a single word'. For instance, in the shape of a jar, all jars would become cognised. This, however, does not happen. The idea really is that there is a relationship between the two sentences ⁹⁰.

It has been asserted that the presumption is based on analogical cognition, the author refutes this, by saying that the validity of analogical cognition is being refuted, the validity of presumption arising out of it becomes refuted as a matter of course. The cow has been held to be the objective basis of analogical cognition and it has been held that the objective basis brings about its own cognition by its mere presence. Under this circumstances, a question arises as to what would be the use of potency for the apprehension, where of the presumption based upon analogical cognition is required as a distinct means of cognition? ⁹¹

It has been argued that the absence of Caitra having been cognised through non-existence etc., the answer is given in the following way it cannot be right to deduce the fact of Caitra being outside the house from the fact of his absence in the house, because there being a chance of his having died, the latter fact is capable of another explanation also. If it is being the absence of the living man in the house that is meant to be the basis of presumption, bringing about the idea of his being outside, this also cannot be right. Because the element of certainty would be lacking. When a man with ordinary powers of vision does not see Caitra in the house, he has no certain cognition regarding his being alive. Even the absence in the house is cognised from the fact of his not being seen through the eye, it shows that it is cognised through an inferential indicative. One who is not in the house is always outside of it. For example, the man standing in the courtyard seen by men at the gate. The man inside the house provides the term where the probandum is known to be absent. From all this, it concludes that presumption does not differ from inference ⁹².

Refutation by Prabhācandra - Prabhācandra includes presumption in inference. In this context, he asks a question,

such as : Is the object gives rise to presumption not cognised or cognised as otherwise inexplicable? The first alternative, i.e., it remains uncognised is not acceptable, because it goes beyond the limits of its own-reason. If on the otherhand, second alternative is considered, i.e. the object of presumption is cognised, then there will be no distinction between presumption and inference ⁹³.

Further, he states that the presumption means whole structure of inference only and thus it strikes against the number of means of cognitions ⁹⁴.

Next, he examines the presumption which is based on non-apprehension. Such as; Caitra who is alive is somewhere else, Since he is absent in the house. Here he sets forth a question : How do you know the Caitra is alive? Is he alive in the house or outside the house? If he is alive in the house, then his non-existence in the house will be contradictory. If he is supposed to be a live outside the house, then there is no evidence proving this. If presumption itself is the means, then there will be a fault viz., mutual dependence ⁹⁵.

Next, if it be urged that his life which characterises his absence in the house is doubtful, how do you say that the presumption is valid? What is valid, that is inference. In this connection he shows an inference ⁹⁶, such as -

1) Living Devadatta's absence in the house is based on his existence outside the house.

2) because, there is absence of living Devadatta in the house.

3) like the absence of a living person who stands in the outskirts of the house, etc.

or

1) Devadatta is outside.

2) because, he is the locus of his life not associated with the house.

3) like his own self.

Refutation by Ratnaprabhasūri - According to Ratnaprabhasūri, the cognition called *arthāpatti* to be included

in inference. Here, the author asks; Does the fact raising 'the necessary presumption' i.e., the fact of Devadatta's fatness coupled with the fact of his not eating during the day (time), imply 'the fact presumed' (*adr̥ṣṭārtha*, i.e., the fact of Devadatta's eating at night) by being determined as 'otherwise inexplicable' i.e., without the presumption of Devadatta's fatness or does it do so without being so determined? The latter can be rejected, for if the former fact (i.e. Devadatta's fatness) be not determined 'otherwise inexplicable' (i.e., without the fact of Devadatta's eating at night), the necessary presumption does not arise. Whether the former fact be known to be as 'otherwise inexplicable' then the question is; how is this 'inexplicability - otherwise' determined? Whether it be argued that by *arthāpatti* this inexplicability - otherwise is known then there arises the fallacy of *parasparāśraya*. On the other side, if it be said that this "inexplicability - otherwise" known by other sources. i.e. *bhūyodarśana* gives the knowledge, then the question arises, like what is the matter of actual observation? If you say that 'in the abode of the proven' (*sādhyaadharmī* i.e. Devadatta himself), you had the experience of this, 'inexplicability- otherwise' then, *arthāpatti* becomes useless, because the actual experience had already the matter of presumption as its matter. On the contrary if it be held, that one has this experience of 'the inexplicability otherwise' in the instances (*dr̥ṣṭāntadharmī*) then, the question may be asked : is the repeated observation of these instances competent to establish 'the explicability - otherwise'? If it is not so, then such 'repeated observation' becomes useless. If it so, then it is clear that then there is no difference between the fact, raising 'the presumption and the reason in an inference. If it be urged that not 'the repeated observation' but *vipakṣānupalambha* gives the knowledge of the inexplicability otherwise then, the author examines by asking a question : Does this negative experience (i.e. no eating at night and so fatness for a person who does not eat at the day-time) necessarily give rise to the knowledge of 'the inexplicability - otherwise'? If it is not so, then *arthāpatti* is not a reliable source of valid knowledge. If it is so, then, *arthāpatti*

becomes a mode of inference which is based on a sure knowledge of the '*anyathānupapatti*'. It cannot be said that the difference between an inference and presumption lies in the fact that whereas in an inference e.g. 'The hill is fiery, because it smokes', there is a reason (i.e. smoke) which abides in 'the abode' (*pakṣa*, hill), presumption is devoid of such 'a reason'. Here, it may be noted that there is an inference in which the reason is not abide in the abode'. This admitted by Kumārila himself when he says; the inference about the Brāhmaṇahood of a son from the Brāhmaṇahood of his father is admitted to be valid by all, although it does not depend on 'reason' abiding in 'an abode' ⁹⁷.

Refutation of abhāva by Jayarāśi - Jayarāśi at first, quotes Kumārila's opinion to refute the cognition of *abhāva*. He says that other people (Mīmāṃsakas) argue - "In the case of an object where the five means of knowledge do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object we have a notion of non-apprehension as the sole means of cognition" ⁹⁸.

Now, he sets forth many questions ⁹⁹ : Is it understood or not? If it is understood, then by which? by dispurse of apprehension? or by dispurse of a means of cognition? or by the comprehension of existence? If you belong to first alternative, i.e, by dispurse of apprehension then, how does it go? If you say, by dispurse of means of cognition, then there is a fault of mutual dependence. if it is to be understood by equal dispurse, then, it may be the condition as to what is started to know becomes that which makes known. But this is not the situation that one is to be known while the other is one making known, because of the dispurse of the means of cognitions is desired to make known. Next, the cognition should be understood by the apprehension of existence then, non-apprehension should be dispursed.

Further, if you say that an unknown thing can be known even in the absence of apprehension, then, Devadatta's absence is in another country would be an ascertainment of absence of Devadatta, although he is not alive ¹⁰⁰.

Refutation by Śāntarakṣita - In regard to 'non-apprehension' Śāntarakṣita sets forth the Mīmāṃsā view by

quoting several verses from Ślokaṡārttika, For instance, "In the case of an object where the five means of cognition do not function for the comprehension of the existence of that object, 'non-apprehension' is the only means of cognition'. Then the form of the cognition is the non-functioning of perception and other means of cognition. This may consist either in the non-modification of the soul or in the cognition of another object ¹⁰¹. This cognition is divided under four heads ¹⁰², i.e., *prāgabhāva* (previous-absence) and the rest. They are - (1) 'that the curd is not in the milk'. is the example of previous absence 2) 'that the milk is not in the curd' is the instance of *pradhvaṡsābhāva* 3) 'The non-existence of the horse in the cow' is a case of '*anyonyābhāva*' 4) 'The flat portion of the hare's head, being devoid of hardness and height, and therefore there being no horns in the hare. This is a case of *atyantābhāva*. If there is no such entity as non-apprehension, classed under these four heads, then, there could be no usage, based upon the differentiation of causes and effects.

It must be an entity, like the cow etc., because it is apprehended by exclusive and inclusive notions and also because it is cognisable. It must be different from perception and the rest. Because it is spoken of by the name of non-apprehension, or the absence of things must be cognised through a means which is of the same nature as itself. Because something cognisable, like the positive entity. For these reasons, this means of cognition must be a nature of one different from the positive ¹⁰³.

The above arguments in support of non-apprehension as a distinct means of cognition are answered by the author in the following way. At first he shows the impossibility of the definition as 'the non-modification of the soul', Sine the existence of the contrary of such a modification cannot be occassional. If it is meant that non-modification is only the absence of modification, then, as the entity concerned is eternal, it should be understood to be there at all times, as it never ceases ¹⁰⁴.

Next, he points out the defect in the definition of non-apprehension. the 'cognition of some other thing' would come about. there would be non-apprehension of everything else, even

of that what is not perceptible. The non-existence should be said to be of only that perception which envisages the perceptible object and not of others (inference and the rest) as that would be false. In this connection, he asks questions; How is it known that the cognition of the otherthing has come about, when cognitions themselves are not perceptible? If it is known through presumption, how then is it itself cognised? If another presumption is suggested, then there is an infinite regress. If the 'non-apprehension of cognition' is an entity, the 'non-apprehension of the cognised object' also should be same. Under these circumstances, it should be included under 'perception' itself ¹⁰⁵.

He continues his argument by asking what is capable of effective action is said to be 'existent' other than what is said to be 'non-existent' because the two cannot exist together in the same substratum as they are mutually contradictory. But the something may be capable of that effective action which it can itself accomplish but incapable of another effective action. It is for this reason, that the dual character can never subsist in any single thing. If it is something else that is regarded as incapable of the other action. Then there are two things and the dual character does not belong to one and the same thing ¹⁰⁶.

Further, the featureless object being devoid of the form of cognition, cannot be a means of cognition, as this is always of the nature of cognition. If it is urged that 'non-apprehension is a means of cognition', because it serves as the cause of cognition, like the eye etc., then the answer is that, what is entirely featureless can never serve as the cause of anything ¹⁰⁷.

Again, being devoid of the form of cognition, how would the 'non-apprehension' be apprehended? If it is held to be apprehended by the absence of the cognition relating to it, then there would be no end to the assumption of such non-apprehensions. And again, if the non-existence of the cognition is apprehended through the absence of the cognised thing and the non-existence of the cognised thing is apprehended through the absence of cognition, then there would be *anyonyāśraya*. Therefore the fact is that what is the perception of one thing is

called the non-perception of another and said perception comes about by itself, because by its very nature it is not dark i.e. self-luminous. As a matter of fact, the apprehension of cognition through something else is not possible, either

- (a) through inferential indicative, or
- (b) through another cognition (perception) or
- (c) through presumption.

There may be possibility of objections being raised against all these, then there would be several infinite regresses. Therefore it must be admitted that as among things equally capable of being apprehended, the apprehension of one leads to the definite cognition that the others are non-existent ¹⁰⁸.

As regards the assertion that "non-apprehension must be cognised, by a means which is of the same nature as itself", this is entirely superfluous, as what we assert there is that sameness of nature ¹⁰⁹.

Refutation by Prabhācandra - Prabhācandra says that it has been said, there are three characters of non-apprehension, viz., *pramāṇapañcakābhāva*, *tadanyajñānam*, *ātmā vā jñānanirmukto bhāvapramāṇam*, this is the nature of non-apprehension. But this is not proper, since the non-existence of all five means of cognitions is harmless, then how does it ascertain the absence of the object? because the ascertainment is the property of a cognition. If it be urged that the non-existence of five means of cognitions giving rise the cognition of absence is deliberately called as a means of non-apprehension, then the answer is that it is not so, because the absence being a non-object cannot produce any cognition. The only an object produces knowledge and not a non-object. Since it is devoid of all capacities, like the horn of donkey. Moreover, we cannot ascertain that wherever there is non-existence of five means of cognitions, there would be the knowledge of absence, because something will be applicable to the specific functions of other minds ¹¹⁰ (there is absence of the five means of cognitions with respect to the functions of other minds. So this will lead to the knowledge of absence of these functions).

Further, in the case of second category, viz., *tadanyajñānam* (cognition of another object), he says that such a cognition is perception only, because from the *paryudāsa*, it can be known that the cognition of *bhūtala* (a spot) which is different from the *ghaṭa* (a jar) called as non-apprehension is agreed to us ¹¹¹.

Further, in the case of third alternative, viz., soul which does not have the cognition, Prabhācandra sets forth many questions as follows : Is soul entirely relieved from the cognition or somehow? If entirely he is relieved from the cognition, then there may be self contradiction, like an assertion, 'my mother is childless'. And how does he become the one who ascertains the absence? since, ascertainment is the property of the cognition. If he is one who ascertains of the absence, then how is he supposed to be relieved from cognitions? On the second alternative, such as, soul has an apprehension of the object which is absent, then that apprehension of absence may be means of cognition but not the soul. In that case, that is nothing but perception since it is caused by sense-organs ¹¹².

Next, he refutes the four kinds of non-apprehension viz., prior absence, absence after destruction, mutual absence and absolute absence. Prabhācandra says that it is merely saying. Because pots are made with their distinct self-nature due to their own causes, such as, wheel, potter and so on and they cannot mix up with other objects, because they may convert themselves into other objects ¹¹³.

The distinctness of an object does not lead to the category of absence, because in that case the absence will again be distinct, this distinctness will lead to another absence and this will lead to infinite regress ¹¹⁴.

Next, he refutes *itaretarābhāva*, such as, if due to mutual absence a pot is excluded from cloth etc., then the question arises; Is the mutual absence excluded from existence and non-existence, such as previous absence, by itself or due to some other factor? If that is excluded by itself, then the pot also would be excluded by itself from others. If the mutual absence is excluded due to some other factor, then the question is : Is the

mutual absence excluded by any unique property or by another mutual absence? On the first alternative i.e., mutual absence is excluded by a unique property, then it could be proper that etc. also have a unique property. If that is excluded by another mutual absence, then there may be an infinite regress ¹¹⁵.

Further, he argues that there is no existence of prior-absence, since it cannot be apprehended as another object. It may be urged that there is an inference regarding the prior-absence, such as, a experience of the form, there was no pot before its production" refers to the non-existence, since it is different from the experience of existence. The experience which refers to existence is not from the experience of existence. For e.g. the experience of the existence of substance and this experience is different from the experience of existence. Hence it refers to non-existence. Through this inference, there is apprehension of the prior-absence which is different object. This view is not correct, because the cognition like, 'the absence after destruction' etc. are in the prior-absence. This inference is inconclusive, because the probans also applicable to experience of forms. Prior-absence is not the same as destruction. If this experience also refers to absence, then there will be infinite regress ¹¹⁶.

Pradhvaṃsābhāva is also of the nature of existence. It may be urged that existence of which regulates the disaster of a thing is called destruction. If it is unreal by its nature then the application of a stick etc. will be futile. On this, the author asks : Is the destruction which is produced by the application of stick etc. different from the pot or the some? If it is different, then the pot etc. will remain as it is and will not be cognised as destroyed. If it is supposed to be cognised as destroyed because of its relation with destruction, then the relation between the destroyed and destruction to be stated. Is it be the nature of identity or the causation or the character and characterised. However, none of these is told ¹¹⁷.

Moreover, what has been said in SV, viz., the non-existence of curd in milk' etc. would be tenable only and absence is a

nature of existence because the prior-absence of curd etc. in the form of milk, decided by perception. Therefore non-apprehension is not a distinct means of cognition ¹¹⁸.

Lastly, he declares that there are only two kinds of cognitions viz. perception and inference i.e. direct and indirect ¹¹⁹.

Refutation by Ratnaprabhasūri - According to Ratnaprabhasūri the cognition *abhāva* is not an independent source of knowledge, but it is included in the cognition *pratyakṣa*.

As the author says, it is found that when we have the positive apprehension of thing (e.g. spot of land) and we recollect another thing (e.g. a pitcher) which is not there but was connected with it some time ago, there arises in us a cognition of non-existence, a cognition which is internal and independent of the senses. In this connection, he asks : When we have the positive perception of the spot of land, is it perceived as related to the pitcher or as unrelated to it in order that a cognition of non-existence may arise? The former cannot be, because if the spot is perceived as something related to the pitcher, the cognition which has for its object the non-existence of the pitcher and thus opposed to the positive perception cannot have any tendency to arise. Even if it be supposed to have a tendency to arise, it is not cognition, because at the time there is positive idea of the pitcher and the cognition *abhāva* instead of representing it ¹²⁰.

The second option also be rejected, such as, if it be supposed that when we have the positive perception of the spot of land, it is for the purposes of the cognition *abhāva*, perceived as unrelated to the pitcher, then so called cognition *abhāva* is useless, as the perception itself shows that there is no pitcher. If it may be contended that perception gives the cognition of non-existence, because its object is only the thing itself; hence for the purpose of cognising the non-existence of a thing the cognition *abhāva* is necessary. Then the Jaina author says that if we perceive a thing, we must perceive it as related or unrelated thing to it. He maintains that a thing is existent (in some respects) and non-existent (in other respects) and that perception grasps it in both

its aspects. So, that non-existence is within the scope of perception. Hence there is no need to admit the cognition *abhāva* as an independent source of knowledge ¹²¹.

Further, he says that the *smaraṇa* which sometimes gives the cognition of non-existence of the form 'that spot of land had no pitcher in it' and again, this is that spot of land which had no pitcher in it'. This assertion is based on a cognition of non-existence by *pratyabhijñā*. The statement 'whatever has no fire in it, has no smoke in it', is based on a cognition of non-existence by reasoning. An example of the cognition of non-existence by inference is the reasoning, 'here there is no smoke, because there is no fire here'. The realisation of non-existence is due to an authoritative instruction when one is told 'Garga is not at home'. It is thus a recognised source of valid knowledge which variously yields the cognition of non-existence and the cognition called *abhāva* need not be admitted as an independent source of knowledge ¹²².

To summarise, according to Jayarai, the sūtra of perception has 3 factors viz., having the purpose of definition, having the purpose of communicating the number of casual factors and having the purpose of repetition. He refutes all these one by one with certain reasoning.

Diṇnāga, while refuting the sūtra of Jaimini, gives stress on the term '*sat*' at first and says, because of the rule, *vyāpti* is possible since there is existence of *sat*. Further, he does not agree the use of the term *satsamprayoga*, since atoms are also bound to the senses. According to him, sense alone is the cause of perception. The *pratyakṣa* can be applied to three factors viz., *pramāṇa*, *jñāna* and *viśaya*. Among these *pramāṇa* is predominant and others are secondary, an object is called *pratyakṣa*. Śāntarakṣita finds the Mīmāṃsā concept of *pratyakṣa* like remembrance.

Jayarāśi, while refuting inference, does not find any difference in the object of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* and therefore he accepts *pratyakṣa* only. Śāntarakṣita refutes inference which is based on generalised relationship. He finds perpetual flux in

the view of Mīmāṃsakas. Bhāvaviveka admits verbal cognition in inference, because according to him, cognitionhood of verbal testimony is not proved. Śāntarakṣita criticizes the definition of the verbal cognition, since the possibility of eternity and expressiveness are improbable. He says, meaning of the sentence comprehended by a person who has no knowledge of convention bearing upon the word and its denotation. There is no distinction between the vedic and non-vedic sentences. In fact, scholars of the science of reasoning do not recognise any difference between these two.

According to Jayarāśi, analogy is based upon perception. He says, if the features of perception are not properly apprehended then analogy cannot be apprehended. Śāntarakṣita rejects the Mīmāṃsā view of analogy by saying that there is no object which could be cognised by means of this cognition. Therefore it cannot be regarded as valid means of cognition. Ratnaprabhasūri admits analogy in inference.

Regarding the presumption, Śāntarakṣita includes in inference. He shows the relation of cause and effect between fatness and eating and positive and negative concomitance in the same example. Jaina exponents Prabhācandra and Ratnaprabhasūri also include the presumption under inference.

As far as the *abhāva* is concerned, Jayarāśi does not agree the Mīmāṃsā contention *abhāva*. Śāntarakṣita points out the defect in the definition of *abhāva*, asserted by Mīmāṃsakas. According to him, non-existence should be said to be of only that perception which envisages the perceptible object but not the others. Therefore, it should be included under perception itself. Prabhācandra analyses the definition and criticizes all the three characters of it. Ratnaprabhasūri includes in perception.

Foot Notes

- 1) सत्सम्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षम्..... । JS 1.1.4.
- 2)अनिमित्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात् । JS 1.1.4.
- 3) MD, Anandashrama ed, Vol. I, pp 25-27.

- 4) स्वप्नादीनां निवृत्तिर्वा फलं तस्य भविष्यति ।
तस्माद् विध्यनुवादित्वं नानुक्ते लक्षणे भवेत् ॥ SV, 4.16.
- 5) प्रत्यक्षत्वमदो हेतुः शेषं हेतुप्रसिद्धये ।
अस्मदादौ प्रसिद्धत्वाद् योग्यर्थमभिधीयते ॥ SV, 4.21.
- 6) अतीतानागतेऽप्यर्थे सूक्ष्मे व्यवहितेऽपि च ।
प्रत्यक्षं योगिनामिष्टं कैश्चिन्मुक्तात्मनामपि ॥ SV, 4.26.
विद्यमानोपलम्भत्वमसिद्धं तत्र तान् प्रति ।
भविष्यत्त्वस्य वा हेतोस्तद्ग्राह्यैर्व्यभिचारिता ॥ SV, 4.27.
- 7) अविद्यमानसंयोगात् स्याच्चेत् प्रत्यक्षधीः क्वचित् ।
भविष्यत्यपि धर्मे स्याच्छक्तेत्याह सदित्ययम् ॥ SV, 4.33.
प्रत्यक्षः प्रागनुष्ठानान्न धर्मोऽनुष्ठितोऽपि वा ।
फलसाधनरूपेण तदानीं येन नास्त्यसौ ॥ SV, 4.34.
अस्मत्प्रत्यक्षवद्वापि विद्यमानोपलम्भनम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं ध्यायिनां धर्मे प्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च नेष्यते ॥ SV, 4.35.
सप्तम्यापि तु लभ्येत सदर्थः कल्पना पुनः ।
वरेषां वारणीयेति यत्नो जैमिनिना कृतः ॥ SV, 4.37.
- 8) सम्यगर्थे च संशब्दो दुष्प्रयोगनिवारणः ।
प्रयोग इन्द्रियाणां च व्यापारोऽर्थेषु कथ्यते ॥ SV, 4.38.
दुष्टत्वाच्छुक्तिकायोगो वार्यते रजतेक्षणात् । SV, 4.39ab.
- 9) पुरुषेन्द्रियशब्दौ च व्यवधानेन कल्पितौ ।
पुरुषो लौकिको वा स्याद् यो वास्मिन् साधयिष्यते ॥ SV, 4.52.
विक्रिया ज्ञानरूपाय न नित्यत्वे विरोत्स्यते ।
बुद्धिजन्मेति चाप्याह जायमानप्रमाणताम् ॥ SV, 4.53.
व्यापारः कारकाणां हि दृष्टो जन्मातिरेकतः ।
प्रमाणेऽपि तथा मा भूदिति जन्म विवक्ष्यते ॥ SV, 4.54.
तेन जन्मैव विषये बुद्धेर्यापार इष्यते ।
तदेव च प्रमारूपं तद्वतीकरणं च धीः ॥ SV, 4.56.
जन्म चाव्यतिरेकेण भाष्यकारेण वर्णितम् ।
तच्च भूतभविष्यत्वात् कृतं बुद्धेर्विशेषणम् ॥ SV, 4.57. Ibid.
- 10) अस्ति ह्यालोचनं ज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ॥ SV, 4.112.
न विशेषो न सामान्यं तदानीमनुभूयते ।

- तयोराधारभूता तु व्यक्तिरेवावसीयते ॥ SV, 4.113.
ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मेजात्यादिभिर्यया ।
बुद्ध्यावसीयते सापि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्मता ॥ SV, 4.120. Ibid.
- 11) अनुमानं ज्ञातसम्बन्धस्यैकदेशदर्शनादेकदेशान्तरेऽसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे बुद्धिः ।
तत्तु द्विविधम् - प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं सामान्यतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं च ।
प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं यथा - धूमाकृतिदर्शनादग्न्याकृतिविज्ञानम् ।
सामान्यतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं यथा देवदत्तस्य गतिपूर्विकां देशान्तरप्राप्तिमुपलभ्याऽदित्यगति
स्मरणम् । MD, Anandarsharma ed. p. 43-44.
- 12) शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानादसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे विज्ञानम् ।
MD, Anandarsharma ed. Vol I, p. 44.
- 13) सामान्यरूपमप्येतदधिकाराद् विशिष्यते ।
चोदना चोपदेशश्च शास्त्रमेवेत्युदाहृतम् । SV, Śabda 12.
यथा च चोदनाशब्दो वैदिक्यामेव वर्तते ।
शब्दज्ञानार्थविज्ञानशब्दौ शास्त्रे तथा स्थितौ ॥ SV, Śabda 13.
- 14) तस्माद्व्यक्षणेभेदेन यदि शब्दप्रमाणता ।
समा लोके च वेदे च सिद्धा वेदप्रमाणता । SV, Śabda 51.
पुरस्ताद् वर्णितं ह्येतत्, तस्माच्छब्देन या मतिः ।
तस्याः स्वतः प्रमाणत्वं न चेत् स्याद् दोषदर्शनम् ॥ SV, Śabda 53.
- 15) तस्मादननुमानत्वं शब्दे प्रत्यक्षवद् भवेत् ।
त्रैरूप्यरहितत्वेन तादृग्विषयवर्जनात् ॥ SV, Śabda 98.
- 16) प्रमाणमनुमानं वा यद्यपि स्यात्प्रदानमतिः ।
वाक्यार्थस्यागमार्थत्वाद् दोषो नागमवादिनाम् ॥ SV Śabda 108.
वाक्यार्थे तु पदार्थेभ्यः सम्बन्धानुभवाद् ऋते ।
बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तेन भिन्नाऽसावक्षदुद्धिवत् ॥ SV, Śabda 109.
- 17) उपमानमपि सादृश्यसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे बुद्धिं जनयति ।
MD, Anandarsharma ed. Vol. I p. 44.
- 18) 'कीदृग्गवयः' इत्येवं दृष्टो नागरिकैर्यदि ।
ब्रवीत्यारण्यको वाक्यं यथा गौर्गवयस्तथा' ॥ SV, Upamāna 1.
- 19) प्रत्यक्षो गवयस्तावत् सादृश्यस्मृतिरत्र तु ।
ननु सादृश्ययुक्तेऽर्थे न स्मृतिर्नेन्द्रियाद् गतिः ॥ SV, upa, 7.
तस्माद्यत् स्मर्यते तत्स्यात् सादृश्येन विशेषितम् ।
प्रमेयमुपमानस्य सादृश्यं वा तदन्वितम् ॥ SV, upa, 37.

- प्रत्यक्षेणावबुद्धेऽपि सादृश्ये गवि च स्मृते ।
विशिष्टस्यान्यतोऽसिद्धेरुपमानप्रमाणता ॥ SV, upa, 38.
प्रत्यक्षेऽपि यथा देशे स्मर्यमाणे च पावके ।
विशिष्टविषयत्वेन नानुमानप्रमाणता ॥ SV, upa, 39.
- 20) अर्थापत्तिरपि दृष्टः श्रुतो वार्थोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यत इत्यर्थकल्पना ।
यथा - जीवति देवदत्ते गृहाभाव दर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पना ।
MD, Anandashrama ed, Vol. I. p. 46.
- 21) प्रमाणषट्कविज्ञातो यत्रार्थो नान्यथा भवेत् ।
अदृष्टं कल्पयेदन्यं सार्थापत्तिरुदाहृता ॥ SV, Arthāpatti, 1.
दृष्टः पञ्चभिरप्यिदं भेदेनोक्ता श्रुतोद्भवा ।
प्रमाणग्राहिणीत्वेन यस्मात् पूर्वविलक्षणा ॥ SV, Arthā. 2.
- 22) तत्र प्रत्यक्षतो ज्ञानाद् दाहाद् दहनशक्तता ।
वह्नेरनुमितात्सूर्ये यानात् तच्छक्तियोग्यता ॥ SV, Arthā. 3.
श्रुतार्थापत्तिरत्रैव परस्तादभिधास्यते ।
गवयोपमिता या गौस्तज्ज्ञानग्राह्यता मता ॥ SV, Arthā. 4.
अभिधानप्रसिध्यर्थम् अर्थापत्यावबोधितात् ।
शब्दे बोधकसामर्थ्यात् तन्नित्यत्वप्रकल्पनम् ॥ SV, Arthā. 5.
प्रमाणाभावनिर्णीतचैत्राभावविशेषितात् ।
गेहाद्यैर्बहिर्भावसिद्धिर्या त्विह दर्शिता ॥ SV, Arthā. 8.
तामभावोत्थितामन्याम् अर्थापत्तिमुदाहरेत् ॥ SV, Arthā. 9^{ab}.
- 23) तामर्थगोचरां केचिद् अपरेशब्दगोचराम् ।
कल्पयन्ति, आगमच्चैनामभिन्नां प्रतिजानते ॥ SV, Arthā. 52.
प्रायश्चानया वेदे व्यवहारो व्यवस्थितः ।
सोऽवैदिकः प्रसज्येत यद्येषा भिद्यते ततः ॥ SV, Arthā. 53.
- 24) न ह्यनुद्यरिते वाक्ये प्रत्यक्षं तावदिष्यते ।
नानुमानं न चेदं हि दृष्टं तेन सह क्वचित् ॥ SV, Arthā. 60.
अथैतद् वाचि कल्प्येत वाक्यमन्यत् तथैव च । SV, Arthā. 71^{cd}.
श्रुतवाक्येन सादृश्यं नाश्रुतस्यास्ति किञ्चन ।
तस्मादनुपमानत्वम्, अर्थस्याप्यनया दिशा ॥ SV, Arthā. 74.
अतः श्रुतस्य वाक्यस्य यदर्थप्रतिपादनम् ।
तदात्मलाभ एव स्याद् विना नेत्येतदिष्यते ॥ SV, Arthā. 76.
- 25) अभावोऽपि प्रमाणाभावो नास्तीत्यस्यार्थस्यासन्निकृष्टस्य ।

- MD, Anandashrama ed. Vol. I p. 47.
- 26) प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपे न जायते ।
वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणता ॥ SV, Abhāva, 1.
- 27) क्षीरे दध्यादि यन्नास्ति प्रागभावः स उच्यते । SV, Abhāva 2^{cd}.
नास्तिता पयसे दधि प्रध्वंसाभाव इष्यते ।
गवि योऽथाद्यभावस्तु सोऽन्योन्याभाव उच्यते ॥ SV, Abhāva 3.
शिरसोऽवयवा निम्ना वृद्धिकाठिन्यवर्जिताः ।
शशशृङ्गादि रूपेण सोऽत्यन्ताभाव उच्यते ॥ SV, Abhāva 4.
- 28) क्षीरे दधि भवेदेवं दधि क्षीरं घटे पटः ।
शशे शृङ्गं पृथिव्यादौ चैतन्यं मूर्तिरात्मनि ॥ SV, Abhāva 5.
अप्सु गन्धो रसश्चाग्नौ वायौ रूपेण तौ सह ।
व्योम्नि संस्पर्शिता ते च न चेदस्य प्रमाणता ॥ SV, Abhāva 6.
न च स्याद् व्यवहारोऽयं कारणादि विभागतः ।
प्रागभावादभेदेन नाभावो विद्यते यदि ॥ SV, Abhāva 7.
न चावस्तुन एते स्युर्भेदास्तेनास्य वस्तुता ।
कार्यादीनामभावः को योऽभावः कारणादितः ॥ SV, Abhāva 8.
यदानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिबुद्धिग्राह्यो यतस्त्वयम् ।
तस्माद् गवादिबद् वस्तु प्रमेयत्वाच्च गम्यते ॥ SV, Abhāva 9.
- 29) प्रत्यक्षादेरनुत्पत्तिः प्रमाणाभाव उच्यते ।
सात्मनः परिणामो वा विज्ञानं वान्यवस्तुनि ॥ SV, Abhāva 11.
स्वरूपपररूपाभ्यां नित्यं सदसदात्मके ।
वस्तुनि ज्ञायते कैश्चिद् रूपं किञ्चित् कदाचन ॥ SV, Abhāva 12.
- 30) ननु भावदभिन्नत्वात् सम्प्रयोगोऽस्ति तेन च ।
नह्यतन्तमभेदोऽस्ति रूपादिबहिर्भावा नः ॥ SV, Abhāva 19.
धर्मयोर्भेद इष्टो हि धर्म्यभेदेऽपि नः स्थिते ।
उद्भवाभिभवात्मत्वाद् ग्रहणं चावतिष्ठते ॥ SV, Abhāva 20.
- 31) न चाप्यत्रानुमानत्वं लिङ्गाभावात् प्रतीयते ।
भावांशो ननु लिङ्गं स्यात्, तदानीं नाजिघृक्षणात् ॥ SV, Abhāva 29.
- 32) एतत्सूत्रं कदाचिच्चानुवादपरम् ।
TPS Sanghavi and Parikh ed. p. 58; Eli Franco, Perception
p. 275.
- 33) तद्यदि लक्षणपरम्..... नान्यथा वा,

- Ibid, Ibid.
- 34) नापि इन्द्रियार्थसम्प्रयोगजत्वं
Ibid, Ibid.
- 35) अथ कारक परिसंख्येयानि भवन्ति ।
Ibid, Ibid, p. 277
- 36) अथ अनुवादपरता प्रतिषिध्यते वा ।
Ibid, pp. 58-59.
- 37) Ibid, pp. 59-60, Ibid pp. 277-279.
- 38) Ibid p. 60, Ibid, p. 279.
- 39) Ibid, Ibid.
- 40) Ibid, pp 60-61, Ibid, p. 283.
- 40) Ibid, Ibid.
- 42) सीमांसका आहुः प्रत्यक्षमिति ।
PS of Diṇṇāga, Iyengar ed. p. 89. M. Hattori, Diṇṇāga..... 63.
- 43) सता एव सदिति न युज्यते ।
Ibid, p. 90, Hittori, Diṇṇāga..... p. 63.
- 44) Hattori M, Diṇṇāga..... p. 64
- 45) सतः सता वा यदात्मविषयकज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदपि प्रत्यक्षं भवति ।
इन्द्रियाणामुपलक्षणार्थम् ।
PS of Diṇṇāga, Iyengar ed. p. 91-95. Hattori, M. Diṇṇāga.....p. 64.
- 46) योऽयं मरीचिका तत्सन्निहितप्रत्ययविशेषेणैवोत्पत्तेः ।
PS of Diṇṇāga, Iyengar ed. pp 95-98. Hattori M., Diṇṇāga.....p. 64.
- 47) यदपीन्द्रियमन्यत्राप्रवृत्तेः प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गः ।
PS of Diṇṇāga, Iyengar ed. pp 99-100.
Hattori M., Diṇṇāga..... pp 64-65.
- 48) यथा गोशब्दो न भवति ।
PS of Diṇṇāga, Iyengar ed. p. 100.
Hattori M., Diṇṇāga..... p. 65.
- 49) बुद्धिकारणसामग्र्यां न शक्योद्बोधवुद्धितः ॥
PS of Diṇṇāga, Iyengar ed. P. 104.
Hattori M., Diṇṇāga..... p. 67.

- 50) Hattori M., Diṇṇāga p. 67
- 51) स्वसंवेद्यमनिर्देश्यं स्थितं प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिषु ।
PS of Diṇṇāga, Iyengar ed. p. 105,
Hattori M., Diṇṇāga..... p. 68.
- 52) प्रमाणज्ञानविषयेषु प्रत्यक्षशब्दवाच्यो न भवतीत्यर्थः ।
PS of Diṇṇāga, Iyengar ed. p. 106.
Hattori M., Diṇṇāga..... p. 68.
- 53) बुद्धिजन्यैव रुतं वृथा
PS of Diṇṇāga, Iyengar ed. p. 107.
Hattori M., Diṇṇāga..... p 68-69.
- 54) बुद्धिजन्यमिति प्रमातेति न युज्यते ।
PS of Diṇṇāga, Iyengar ed. p. 109.
Hattori M. Diṇṇāga..... 69.
- 55) अस्ति ह्यालोचनाज्ञानमाद्यं चेन्निर्विकल्पकम् ।
बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ॥ TS 1285.
न विशेषो न सामान्यं तदानीमनुभूयते ।
तयोराधारभूता तु व्यक्तिरेवावसीयते ॥ TS 1286.
ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यया ।
बुद्ध्यावसीयते सापि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्प्रता ॥ TS 1287.
पुनः पुनर्विकल्पेऽपि यावानधिगमो भवेत् ।
तत्सम्बन्धानुसारेण सर्वं प्रत्यक्षमिष्यते ॥ TS 1288.
न हि प्रविष्टमात्राणामुष्णाद् गर्भगृहादिषु ।
अर्था न प्रतिभान्तीति गम्यन्ते नेन्द्रियैः पुनः ॥ TS 1289.
यथा त्वाभासमात्रेण पूर्वं ज्ञात्वा स्वरूपतः ।
पश्चात् तत्र विबुध्यन्ते तथा जात्यादिधर्मतः ॥ TS 1290.
यदि त्वालोच्य सम्मील्य नेत्रे कश्चिद् विकल्पयेत् ।
न स्यात् प्रत्यक्षता तस्य सम्बन्धानुसारतः ॥ TS 1291.
- 56) तदयुक्तं यदि ज्ञानं तत् प्रवृत्तं स्वलक्षणे ।
अनविष्टाभिलाषं तज्जात्यादिग्रहणेऽपि हि ॥ TS 1292.
तथा चावाच्यमेवेदं साधितं प्राक्स्वलक्षणम् ।
तस्मिन् वृत्तं च विज्ञानं नियतं निर्विकल्पकम् ॥ TS 1293.
जातिमात्रग्रहे तु स्यादेकान्तेन विभिन्नता ।

- विशेषणस्य नैतच्च परैरिष्टं यथोदितम् ॥ TS 1294.
 यदि ह्येकान्ततो भिन्नं विशेष्यात् स्याद्विशेषणम् ।
 स्वानुरूपां तदा बुद्धिं विशेष्ये जनयेत् कथम् ॥ TS 1295.
 स्वसामान्यात्मनोर्युक्तं ज्ञानं चैकं न वेदकम् ।
 सविकल्पान्यथाभावे प्राक्तनापरविन् हि ॥ TS, 1296.
 एकान्तेनान्यताभावाज्जात्याद्याद्येन चेद्गतम् ।
 विज्ञानार्थाधिगन्तृत्वात् स्मार्तज्ञानसमं परम् ॥ TS, 1297, Ibid.
 57) तथा मीमांसकमतेनापि तद्ग्रहणानुपपत्तिः ।
 TPS of Jayarāji, Sanghavi & Parikh ed. p. 82,
 Eli Franco, Perception p. 400.
 58) अर्थे च अपार्थक्यम् । Ibid, Ibid.
 59) अथवा, सामान्ये सिद्धे कस्येदं ज्ञापकम् ? Ibid, Ibid. pp. 400-401.
 60) अथवा, सिद्धं साधनं तत्त्वविद्यमानं सामान्यम् । Ibid; , Ibid. p. 401.
 61) अथवा, सिद्धसाधनम् न चाकारान्तरसामान्यम् । Ibid, P. 83, Ibid.
 p. 401.
 62) द्वैविध्यमनुमानस्य केचिदेवं प्रचक्षते ।
 विशेषदृष्टसामान्यपरिदृष्टत्वभेदतः ॥ TS 1441.
 प्रत्यक्षदृष्टसम्बन्धं ययोरेव विशेषयोः ।
 गोमयेनतददेशविशेषादिमतिः कृता ॥ TS 1442.
 तद्देशस्येन तेनैव गत्वा कालान्तरेऽपि तम् ।
 यदग्निं बुध्यते तस्य पूर्वबोधात्पुनः पुनः ॥ TS, 1443.
 सन्दिह्यमानसद्भाववस्तुबोधात्प्रमाणता ।
 विशेषदृष्टमेतच्च लिखितं विन्ध्यवासिना ॥ TS 1444.
 अग्निधूमान्तरत्वे तु वाच्ये सामान्यतो मितौ ।
 सामान्यदृष्टमेकान्ताद् गन्तेत्यादित्य उच्यते ॥ TS 1445.
 63) तदत्र क्षणभङ्गस्य व्यापिनः प्रतिपादनात् ।
 प्राक्तनस्यैव तेनैव नानुमानस्य सम्भवः ॥ TS 1446.
 कल्पितं चेत् तदेकत्वं प्रबन्धैक्याविवक्षया ।
 न तस्यावस्थितिः काचिद् वस्तुत्वं न च भाविकम् ॥ TS 1447.
 न च निर्विषयं ज्ञानं युष्माभिरनुमन्यते ।
 विकल्पितार्थतायां च व्यक्तं निर्विषयं भवेत् ॥ TS 1448.
 व्यक्तिरूपस्य नाशेऽपि तिष्ठत्येवाकृतिस्तयोः ।

- यदि न क्षणभङ्गाप्तेभवि तस्या अपि ध्रुवम् ॥ TS 1449.
 प्रत्यक्षदृष्टः सम्बन्धो ययोरेव विशेषयोः ।
 इत्ययं नियमश्चोक्तो युष्माभिः केन हेतुना ॥ TS 1450.
 दृष्टवैकदानुमानेन तस्यैव हानुमा पुनः ।
 प्रमाणं नेष्यते कस्मात् को विशेषो हि पूर्वके ॥ TS 1451.
 विज्ञातार्थाधिगन्तृत्वान्न प्रमाणमिदं यदि ।
 स्मार्तवत्प्राक्तनोऽप्येतत् समानं किं न वीक्ष्यते ॥ TS 1452.
 अन्तरालप्रवृत्तस्य सन्देहस्य निवर्तनात् ।
 आधिक्यं तत्र चेदेतदत्रापि सदृशं न किम् ॥ TS 1453.
 तस्मात् किमस्ति नास्तीति सन्देहविनिवृत्तिकृत् ।
 स एवेति निराकाङ्क्षमेतत् सामान्यदर्शनम् ॥ TS 1454. Ibid.
 64) अनुमानात्पृथक् चासौ प्रमाणत्वात्तदन्यवत् ।
 एकानेकार्थविषयप्रतिपत्तिर्यथापि वा ॥ MTN. 8.
 अदृष्टलिङ्गसम्बन्धपदार्थमतिहेतुतः ।
 भिन्नगोचरधीजन्मकारणत्वादथापि वा ॥ MTN 9.
 अपूर्वोऽपि क्रियाव्यंग्यः क्रियामोक्षेऽपि साधनम् IMTN, 10a, Bhat S.,
 Refutation..... p. 102.
 65) अनुमाने प्रमाणत्वं भिन्नं च न तदात्मनः ।
 अतोऽनैकान्तिको हेतुः प्रमाणत्वादिति रितः ॥ MTN, 50.
 भिन्नगोचरतासिद्धेर्हेतोश्च स्यादसिद्धता ।
 भिन्नगोचरधीजन्मकारणत्वस्य नेतरः ॥ MTN 51.
 अनेकार्थाविनाभावादनुमानमपीष्यते ।
 नैकार्थप्रतिपद्वेतुरस्माच्छब्दान् भिद्यते ॥ MTN 52.
 अदृष्टलिङ्गसम्बन्धे परार्थादनुमानतः ।
 प्रतिपत्तिर्यतोबोध्ये तस्मादर्थान्तरं न सः ॥ MTN 53.
 नानुमानात्पृथक्छब्दः परोक्षमतिहेतुतः ।
 सम्बन्धस्मृत्यपेक्षत्वादनुमानं यथा स्वतः ॥ MTN 54.
 नापूर्वोऽपि क्रियाव्यंग्यः शब्दव्यक्तिनिषेधवत् ।
 घटवद् वाप्यभिव्यक्तेरपूर्वोऽनित्य इष्यताम् ॥ MTN 55. Ibid, p. 110.
 66) उच्यते; न ह्यादन्यत् प्रमाणमुपपद्यते ।
 प्रमाणलक्षणायोगाद् योगे चान्तर्गमादिह ॥ TS, 1487.
 शब्दज्ञानात्परोक्षार्थज्ञानं शाब्दं परे जगुः ।

- तद्याकर्तुक्तो वाक्याद् यद्वा प्रत्ययितोदितात् ॥ TS 1488.
- 67) इदं च किल नाध्यक्षं परोक्षविषयत्वतः ।
नानुमानं च घटते तल्लक्षणवियोगतः ॥ TS 1489.
धर्मी धर्मविशिष्टो हि लिंगीत्येतत्सुनिश्चितम् ।
न तावदनुमानं च यावत् तद्विषयं न तत् ॥ TS 1490.
यश्चात्र कल्प्यते धर्मी प्रमेयोऽस्य स एव च ।
न चानवधृते तस्मिंस्तद्धर्मत्वावधारणा ॥ TS 1491.
अग्निहोत्रादिवचनादकम्पज्ञानजन्मतः ।
तत्प्रमाणत्वमप्यस्य निराकर्तुं न पार्यते ॥ TS 1498.
- 68) तत्राकर्तुकवाक्यस्य सम्भवार्थासङ्गतौ ।
तस्मादसम्भवि प्रोक्तं प्रथमं शाब्दलक्षणम् ॥ TS, 1499.
शक्ताशक्तस्वभावस्य सर्वदाह्यनुवर्तनात् ।
तदा तद्भाविविज्ञानं भवेन्नो वा कदाचन ॥ TS 1500.
- 69) अर्थप्रतीतितो नो चेदेषा व्याख्यानतो भवेत् ।
स्वतन्त्रो हि पुमान् दृष्टो व्याचक्षाणोऽर्थमिच्छया ॥ TS 1503.
भूतार्थद्योतने शक्तिः प्रकृत्यैव स्थिताऽस्य चेत् ।
अज्ञातसमयस्यापि भवेदर्थगतिस्ततः ॥ TS 1504.
प्रकृत्या दीपको दीपो न संकेतमपेक्षते ।
समयान्तरभावे च न स्यादर्थान्तरे गतिः ॥ TS 1505.
न हि संकेतभावेऽपि दीपो गन्धरसादिकम् ।
प्रकाशयति विज्ञातुं सा शक्तिर्न च शक्यते ॥ TS 1506.
अतोऽर्थप्रत्यययोगात् तस्य निष्कम्पता कुतः ?
स तु सामयिको युक्तः पुंवाग्भूतान् गृह्यते ॥ TS 1507.
न्यायज्ञैर्न तयोः कश्चिद् विशेषः प्रतिपद्यते ।
श्रोत्रियाणां त्वकम्पोऽयमज्ञातन्यायवर्त्मनाम् ॥ TS 1508.
- 70) प्रायः सम्प्रत्ययो दृष्टो यद्वाक्यात् तस्य गृह्यते ।
परोक्षप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं वाक्यं प्रत्ययतः स चेत् ॥ TS 1510.
नान्यत्र प्रत्ययाभावात् पूर्वसम्प्रत्ययेऽपि हि ।
एकत्रास्त्रलिते तत्र सर्वत्र नियमो न हि ॥ TS 1511.
- 71) वचेभ्यो निखिलेभ्योऽपि विवक्षैषानुमीयते ।
प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भाभ्यां तद्धेतुः सा हि निश्चिता ॥ TS 1514.
भ्रान्तस्यान्यविवक्षायां वाक्यं चेदन्यदीक्षते ।

- यथाविवक्षमप्येतत् तस्मान्नैव प्रवर्तते ॥ TS 1515.
भ्रान्ताभ्रान्तप्रयुक्तानां वैलक्षण्यं परिस्फुटम् ।
विदग्धाः प्रकृतादिभ्यो निश्चिन्वन्ति गिरामलम् ॥ TS 1516.
- 72) विवक्षायां च गम्यायां विस्पष्टैव त्रिरूपता ।
पुंसि धर्मिणि सा साध्या कार्येण वचसा यतः ॥ TS 1520.
पादपार्थविवक्षवान् पुरुषोऽयं प्रतीयते ।
वृक्षशब्दप्रयोक्तृत्वात् पूर्वावस्थास्वहं यथा ॥ TS 1521.
अतो यत्र परैर्बाह्ये त्रैरूप्यादि निराकृतम् ।
शब्दानामिष्यते तत्र नैवास्माभिः प्रमाणता ॥ TS 1522.
यत्र त्वेषामभीष्टेयं व्यक्तं तत्र त्रिरूपता ।
विवक्षायां तु साध्यायां त्रैलक्षण्यं प्रकाशितम् ॥ TS 1523.
एवं स्थितेऽनुमानत्वं शब्दे धूमादिवद् भवेत् ।
त्रैरूप्यसहितत्वेन तादृग्विषयसत्त्वतः ॥ TS 1524.
- 73) तथा, उपमानमपि तस्याप्यपगमात् ।
TPS, Sanghavi and Parikh ed. P. 110.
- 74) Ibid, Pp. 110-111.
- 75) गां दृष्ट्वाऽयमरण्यान्यं गवयं वीक्षते यदा ।
भूयोऽवयवसामान्यभाजं वर्तुलकण्डकम् । TS, 1527.
तदाऽस्य गवये ज्ञानं रूपमात्रावबोधकम् ।
प्रत्यक्षमेव यद्यापि विशेषेण विकल्पकम् ॥ TS 1528.
गवा सदृशरूपोऽयं पशुरित्येतदीदृशम् ।
अक्षव्यापारसद्भावे जातेः प्रत्यक्षमिष्यते ॥ TS, 1529.
तत्र यद्यपि गां स्मृत्वा तज्ज्ञानमुपजायते ।
सन्निधेर्गवयस्थत्वाद् भवेदिन्द्रियगोचरम् ॥ TS 1530.
तस्यामेव त्ववस्थायां यद्विज्ञानं प्रवर्तते ।
पशुनैतेव तुल्योऽसौ गोपिण्ड इति सोपमा । TS 1533.
- 76) न हि प्रत्यक्षता तस्य विज्ञानस्योपपद्यते ।
इन्द्रियार्थाभिसम्बन्धव्यापारविरहात् तदा ॥ TS 1537.
त्रैरूप्यानुपपत्तेश्च न च तस्यानुमानता ।
पक्षधर्मादि नैवात्र कथञ्चिदवकल्पते ॥ TS 1538.
प्राक् प्रमेयस्य सादृश्यं न धर्मत्वेन गृह्यते ।
गवये गृह्यमाणं च न गवामनुमापकम् ॥ TS 1539.

- न चाप्रामाणं तज्ज्ञानमज्ञानार्थप्रकाशनात् ।
 गवयादर्शनात्पूर्वं तत्सादृश्यानवग्रहात् ॥ TS 1541.
- 77) प्रमेयवस्त्वभावेन नाभिप्रेताऽस्य मानता ।
 भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोगः सादृश्यमस्ति चेत् । TS 1542.
 अभावपक्षे निक्षिप्त सामान्यार्थप्रवादिनाम् ।
 असिद्धिराद्यसाध्ये च प्रतिज्ञार्थैकदेशता ॥ TS 1545. Ibid.
- 78) एवं तु युज्यते तत्र गोरूपावयवैस्सह ।
 गवयावयवाः केचित् तुल्यप्रत्ययहेतवः ॥ TS 1546.
 तत्रास्य गवये दृष्टे समुपजायते ।
 असकृद् दृष्टपूर्वेषु गोरूपावयवेष्वियम् ॥ TS, 1547.
 अत एव तुरङ्गादौ तत्सादृश्येन गोमतिः ।
 वर्तते गवये दृष्टे को विशेषोऽन्यथा पुनः ॥ TS, 1548.
- 79) सत्तामात्रेण विज्ञानं सादृश्यं च गवात्मनि । TS 1551cd.
 गवयेन तु सादृश्यमित्येवं न विनिश्चितम् ।
 प्रमिणोत्पुपमा त्वेवं वैलक्षण्यं ततः स्मृतेः ॥ TS, 1552.
 यदि नाम गृहीतं नो नाम्ना तेनैव तत्पुरा ।
 गृहीतं तु स्वरूपेण यदस्यात्माऽभिधीयते ॥ TS, 1553.
 न नाम रूपं वस्तूनां यत् तस्याग्रहणे सति ।
 परिज्ञातात्मतत्त्वानामप्यविज्ञानता भवेत् ॥ TS, 1554.
 एतावता च लेशेन प्रमाणत्वव्यवस्थितौ ।
 नेयता स्यात् प्रमाणानामन्यथापि प्रमाणतः ॥ TS, 1555.
- 80) तरुपंक्त्यादिसन्द्वावेकपादपदर्शनात् ।
 द्वितीयशाखिविज्ञानादाद्योऽसाविति निश्चयः ॥ TS, 1556.
 प्रमाणान्तरमासक्तं सादृश्याद्यनपेक्षणात् ।
 गृहीतग्रहणान्नो चेत् समानमुपमास्वपि ॥ TS, 1557.
 गवयस्योपलम्भे च तुरङ्गादौ प्रवर्तते ।
 तद्वैसादृश्यविज्ञानं यत्तदन्या प्रमा न किम् ॥ TS, 1558.
 अभावान्तर्गतं नो चेन्नैवं भावावलम्बनात् ।
 अन्योन्यभावतायां वा समं सादृश्यबुद्धिषु ॥ TS, 1559.
 सादृशस्य विवेको हि यथा तत्र प्रमीयते ।
 सर्वावयवसामान्यवियोगो गम्यते तथा ॥ TS, 1560.
 भूयोवयवसामान्ययोगो येनाधिगम्यते ।

- सर्वावयवसामान्ययोगे तत्त्वं प्रसज्यते ॥ TS, 1561.
- 81) मीमांसकमते तु प्रत्यभिज्ञायामेवान्तर्भावयिष्यते ।
 RKT of Ratnaprabhasūri, Dalsukh Malvania ed. Vol. I, p. 126.
- 82) मीमांसकोऽपि तदितरत्रापि तुल्यम् ।
 RKT, Dalsukh Malvania, ed. Vol. II, pp. 12-13.
- 83) स एवायं जिनदत्तः मन्तव्यम् । Ibid, p. 13.
- 84) प्रमाणषट्कविज्ञातो यत्रार्थो नान्यथा भवन् ।
 अदृष्टं कल्पयत्यन्यं सार्थापत्तिरुदाहृता ॥ TS 1586.
- 85) तत्र प्रत्यक्षतो ज्ञाताद् दाहाद् दहनशक्तता ।
 बह्वेनुमितात्सूर्यं यानात् तच्छक्तियोगिता ॥ TS, 1587.
 शक्तयः सर्वभावानां कार्यार्थापत्तिसाधनाः ।
 अपूर्वास्ताश्च गम्यन्ते सम्बन्धग्रहणादते ॥ TS 1588.
 पीनो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते चेत्येवमादिवचः श्रुतौ ।
 रात्रिभोजनविज्ञानं श्रुतार्थापत्तिरुच्यते ॥ TS 1591.
 गवयोपमिता या गौस्तज्ज्ञानग्राह्यशक्तता ।
 उपमाबलसम्भूतसामर्थ्येन प्रतीयते ॥ TS, 1598.
 अभिधा नान्यथा सिध्येदिति वाचकशक्तताम् ।
 अर्थापत्यावगम्यैव तदनन्यगतेः पुनः ॥ TS 1599.
 अर्थापत्यन्तरेणैव शब्दनित्यत्वनिश्चयः ।
 अनित्यो हि न संकेतव्यवहारानुवृत्तिमान् ॥ TS 1600.
 प्रमाणाभावनिर्णीतचैत्राभावविशेषितात् ।
 गेहाद्यैवबहिर्भावसिद्धिर्या त्विह वर्णिता ॥ TS 1601.
- 86) तत्र शक्तातिरेकेण न शक्तिर्नाम काचन ।
 याऽर्थापत्यावगम्येत शक्तश्चाध्यक्ष एव हि ॥ TS 1606.
 दाहादीनां तु यो हेतुः पावकादिः समीक्ष्यते ।
 असंशयाविपर्यासं शक्तिः कान्या भवेत्ततः ॥ TS 1607.
 व्यतिरिक्ते तु कार्येषु तस्या एवोपयोगतः ।
 भावोऽकारण एवस्यादुपयोगे न भेदिनी ॥ TS 1608.
 अर्थक्रियासमर्थ हि स्वरूपं शक्तिलक्षणम् ।
 एवमात्मा च भावोऽयं प्रत्यक्षाद् व्यवसीयते ॥ TS, 1609.
- 87) नैकान्तेन विभिन्ना चेच्छक्तिः साऽप्युभयात्मिका ।
 न विरोधाद् भवेत्सा च प्रत्यक्षानन्यतापि यत् ॥ TS 1613.

- प्रत्यक्षत्वे स्थिते चास्यानुमेयत्ववारणम् ।
क्षतये नैव येनास्मिन् विषये नानुमेयते ॥ TS 1614.
- 88) उपादानासमाने च देशे जातिर्निरन्तरम् ।
स्वेदेशान्तरप्राप्त्या ज्वालादेरिवगम्यते ॥ TS 1617.
स्थिरात्मनो विशेषत्वान्नान्यथेयं प्रसज्यते ।
तस्य देशान्तरप्राप्तिः शक्तिस्त्वन्या निराकृता ॥ TS 1618.
- 89) पीनो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते चेत्यस्मिन्नर्थे न निश्चयः ।
द्वेषमोहादिभिर्योगादन्यथापि वदेत् पुमान् ॥ TS 1619.
अर्थगत्यनपेक्षेण यदि वाक्यान्तरं पुनः ।
सार्धमाक्षिप्यते तेन स्यादाक्षेपो वचोन्तरे ॥ TS 1620.
- 90) क्षपाभोजनसम्बन्धी पुमानिष्टः प्रतीयते ।
दिवाभोजनवैकल्यपीनत्वेन तदन्यवत् ॥ TS 1622.
भोजने सति पीनत्वमन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।
निश्चितं तेन सम्बद्धाद् वस्तुनो वस्तुनो गतिः ॥ TS 1623.
सर्वसम्बन्धशून्यं हि कथं वाक्यं प्रतीयते ।
एकस्मात् वाक्यतः सर्वं प्रतीयेतान्यथा पुनः ॥ TS 1624.
तथा ह्यसति सम्बन्धे सति चानवधारिते ।
गन्यमानमिदं वाक्यं प्रसज्येताप्रमाणकम् ॥ TS 1625.
- 91) उपमायाः प्रमाणत्वे विस्तरेण निराकृते ।
अर्थापत्तेस्तदुत्थाया वारितैव प्रमाणता ॥ TS 1631.
उपमानप्रमाणस्य गौस्त्वालम्बनमिष्यते ।
स्वसत्तथैव चालम्ब्यं स्वज्ञानजनकं मतम् ॥ TS 1632.
तत् किमत्रान्यथा शक्त्या यद्गत्यर्थमपेक्ष्यते ।
अर्थापत्तेः प्रमाणत्वमुपमानसमाश्रयम् ॥ TS 1633.
- 92) गेहाभावात्तु चैत्रस्य बहिर्भावो न युज्यते ।
मरणाशङ्कया यस्मादन्यथाप्युपपद्यते ॥ TS 1640.
जीवतश्चेद् गृहाभावो बहिर्भावप्रसिद्धये ।
अर्थापत्ताविहोच्येत नैव तत्राप्यनिश्चयात् ॥ TS 1641.
वेश्मन्यपश्यतश्चैव न ह्यर्वाग्दर्शिनः प्रमा ।
तस्य जीवनसम्बन्धि कथञ्चिदपि वर्तते ॥ TS, 1642.
अथ शब्दादिना तस्य जीवत्तानिश्चये सति ।
सदूपन्यभावेऽभावाच्च निश्चितेऽस्याः प्रमाणता ॥ TS, 1643.

- तदापि गेहायुक्तत्वं दृश्यादृष्टेर्विनिश्चितम् ।
अतस्तत्रबहिर्भावो लिङ्गादेवावसीयते ॥ TS 1644.
सदूचना यो ह्यसंसृष्टो नियतं बहिरस्त्यसौ ।
गेहाङ्गणस्थितो दृष्टः पुमान् द्वारि स्थितैरिव ॥ TS 1645.
विपक्षोऽपि भवत्यत्र सदनान्तर्गतो नरः ।
अर्थापत्तिरियं तस्मादनुमानान्न भिद्यते ॥ TS 1646.
- 93) अर्थापत्तेस्त्वनुमानेऽन्तर्भावः तथाहि द्वितीयप्रतीतेरुभयत्राविशेषात् ।
PKM of Prabhācandra, MahendraKumar Shastri ed. P. 193.
- 94) तथा चार्थापत्ति संख्याव्याघातः Ibid, P. 194.
- 95) याप्यभावावार्थापत्तिः ततश्च तत्सिद्धिरिति । Ibid, Pp. 202-203.
- 96) अथ न निश्चितं सज्जीवनं गृहासंसृष्टजीवनाधारत्वात्स्वात्मवत् ।
Ibid, p. 203.
- 97) अर्थापत्त्युत्थापकोऽर्थो नच पक्षधर्मत्ववदनुमानमेव नास्तीति वाच्यम् ।
RKT Dalsukh Malvania ed. Vol. I, Pp. 127-28.
- 98) अपरे तु अभावाख्यं प्रमाणं अभावविषयम् ।
TPS, Sanghavi and Parikh ed. P. 112.
- 99) तत्किमवगतम् मेयाभावावगमेऽपि तदेवास्तु । Ibid, Pp. 112-13.
- 100) अथ अनवगतमेव देवदत्ताभावनिश्चयः स्यात् । Ibid, P. 113.
- 101) प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपे न जायते ।
वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणता ॥ TS, 1647.
प्रत्यक्षदेरनुत्पत्तिः प्रमाणाभाव इष्यते ।
सात्मनोऽपरिणामो वा विज्ञानं वान्यवस्तुनि ॥ TS 1648.
- 102) प्रमाभावाच्च वस्तूनामभावः सम्प्रतीयते ।
चतुर्था च विभिन्नोऽसौ प्रागभावादि भेदतः ॥ TS 1649.
क्षीरे दध्यादि यन्नास्ति प्रागभावः स कथ्यते ।
नास्तिता पयसो दध्नि प्रध्वंसाभावलक्षणम् ॥ TS 1650.
गावि योऽश्वाद्यभावश्च सोऽन्योन्याभाव उच्यते ।
पररूपं च न तस्यास्ति नास्ति तेनात्मना सतः । TS 1651.
शिरसोऽवयवा निम्ना वृद्धिकाटिन्यवर्जिताः ।
शशश्रृंगादिरूपेण साऽत्यन्ताभाव इष्यते ॥ TS 1652.
न च स्याद्व्यवहारोऽयं करणादि विभागशः ।
प्रागभावादि भेदेन नाभावो विद्यते यदि ॥ TS 1653.

- 103) यद्वानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिबुध्योर्ग्राह्यो यतस्त्वयम् ।
तस्माद् गवादिबुद्धवस्तु प्रमेयत्वाच्च गम्यताम् ॥ TS 1655.
अभावशब्दवाच्यत्वात् प्रत्यक्षादेश्च विद्यते ।
प्रमाणानामभावो हि प्रमेयानामभाववत् ॥ TS 1657.
अभावो वा प्रमाणेन स्वानुरूपेण मीयते ।
प्रमेयत्वाद्यथा भावस्तस्माद् भावात्मकात् पृथक् ॥ TS, 1658.
- 104) तदत्र नित्यसत्त्वस्य परिणामो निराकृतः ।
तद्विपर्ययसद्भावः कादाचित्को न युज्यते ॥ TS 1659.
तत्प्रतिक्षेपमात्रात्मा स चेदत्र विवक्षितः ।
सर्वदा वस्तुतास्तित्वं गम्येतास्यानिवर्तनात् ॥ TS 1660. Ibid.
- 105) अन्यवस्तुनि विज्ञाने वृत्ते सर्वस्य नास्तिता ।
अदृश्यस्यापि गम्येत द्वितीयाभावसंश्रये ॥ TS, 1661.
शक्यदर्शनवत्त्वाभ्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव नास्तिता ।
एवं सति समाख्येया नान्येषां व्यभिचारिणी ॥ TS, 1666.
अन्यवस्तुनि विज्ञानं जातं वा जायते कथम् ।
अप्रत्यक्षमता बुद्धिर्येनार्थपत्तितो यदि ॥ TS, 1667.
सापि ज्ञानात्मिकैवेति तस्या अपि कुतो गतिः ।
अर्थापत्यन्तरप्रोक्तावनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥ TS, 1668.
यदि वस्तु प्रमाभावो मेयाभावस्तथैव च ।
प्रत्यक्षेन्तर्गतो भावस्तथा सति कथं न ते ॥ TS, 1669.
- 106) अर्थक्रियासमर्थं च सदसदन्यदुच्यते ।
समावेशो न चैकत्र तयोर्युक्तो विरोधतः ॥ TS, 1674.
स्वसाध्यायां समर्थं चेदन्यस्यामक्षमं ननु ।
तदेतद्वि द्विरूपत्वं नैवेकत्रास्ति वस्तुनि ॥ TS, 1675.
अन्यदेवासमर्थं तु यदन्यस्यामितीष्यते ।
द्वे तदा वस्तुनी प्राप्ते तन्नैकस्य द्विरूपता ॥ TS, 1676.
- 107) नीरूपस्य हि विज्ञानरूपहानौ प्रमाणता ।
न युज्यते प्रमेयस्य सा हि संवित्तिक्षण ॥ TS, 1678.
तद्वेतुत्वात् प्रमाणं चेद्याक्षुरादिवदुच्यते ।
न नीरूपस्य हेतुत्वसम्भवोऽस्ति कदाचन ॥ TS, 1679. Ibid.
- 108) ज्ञानरूपविविक्तश्च सोऽभावो गम्यते कथम् ?
तद्गोचरप्रमाभावादेवं न त्वनवस्थितिः ॥ TS, 1680.

- वस्तुभावात् प्रमाणस्य प्रमाभावाच्च वस्तुनः ।
नास्तिता यदि गम्येत भवेदन्योन्यसंश्रयः ॥ TS, 1681.
तस्मादेकस्य या दृष्टिः सैवान्यादृष्टिरुच्यते ।
सा च स्वतन्त्रसंसिद्धा स्वरूपेणाजडत्वतः ॥ TS, 1682.
बुद्धेस्तु परतः सिद्धिर्लिङ्गाद् बुध्यन्तरादपि ।
अन्यथानुपपत्तेर्वा सर्वथापि न सम्भवः ॥ TS, 1683.
त्रयपर्यनुयोगस्य प्रत्येकं सति सम्भवे ।
अनवस्थितयो बहुव्यो विसर्पिण्यः स्युरत्र ते ॥ TS, 1684.
तुल्ययोग्यात्मनस्तस्मादेकस्यैवोपलम्भनात् ।
असन्निधययोग्यत्वमन्येषां सम्प्रतीयते ॥ TS, 1685. Ibid.
- 109) अभावो वा प्रमाणेन स्वानुरूपेण मीयते ।
इत्यत्र सिद्धसाध्यत्वं तादृशस्त्यनुरूपता ॥ TS, 1690. Ibid.
- 110) यच्च प्रमाणपञ्चकाभावः परचेतोवृत्तिविशेषैरनैकान्तिकत्वात् ।
PKM of Prabhācandra, Mahendrakumar Shastri ed. Pp. 205-206.
- 111) द्वितीयपक्षे तु यत्तदन्यज्ञानं परिच्छेदकमिष्टमेव । Ibid, p. 206.
- 112) तृतीयपक्षे तु किमसौ सर्वथा ज्ञाननिर्मुक्तः प्रत्यक्षमेव Ibid,
Pp. 206=207.
- 113) यदप्यभिहितम् तस्यापरत्वप्रसङ्गात् । Ibid.
- 114) न चान्यतो परिकल्पनयानवस्था । Ibid.
- 115) यदि चेतरेतराभाववशाद् बहुत्वमितरेतराभावस्यानवस्थाकारि स्यात् । Ibid.
- 116) नापि प्रागभावः मुख्याभावकल्पनानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । Ibid. p. 211.
- 117) प्रध्वंसाभावोऽपि भावस्वभाव एव प्रागेवोत्पन्नत्वात् । Ibid,
Pp. 214-15.
- 118) क्षीरे दध्यादि यन्नास्ति प्रागभावादिप्रमाणतयाध्यक्षादि प्रमाणतोऽध्यवसायात् ।
Ibid, P. 216.
- 119) स्थितमेतत्प्रत्यक्षेतरभेदादेव द्वैधैव च प्रमाणमिति । Ibid.
- 120) प्रत्यक्षादेरनुपपत्तिः प्रतियोगिनः सत्त्वेऽपि तत्प्रवृत्तेः ।
RKT of Ratnaprabhasūri, Dalsukh Malvania ed. Vol. I, p.129.
- 121) द्वितीयपक्षे तु प्रत्यक्षेणैवाऽयं वेद्यते । Ibid, p. 129-30.
- 122) केचित्तु, तद्घटं भूतलम् इति स्मरणेन.... काभावप्रमाणं प्रवर्तताम् ?
Ibid, p. 130.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the development of Indian philosophy, the controversy between the orthodox and the heterodox systems plays an important role. Of course, criticism of Brāhmanic schools can be found right from the Vedic period. As far as the present study is concerned, Jaimini does not refer to any type of controversy, but Śabara clearly indicates the refutation of the *nirālambana* and *śūnya* theories of Buddhism, but, Kumārila is intent upon the refutation of the opponents. He has a two-fold aim. He wants to protect the Mīmāṃsā school from the severe attacks of Buddhisms and secondly he wishes that Mīmāṃsā should be brought back to the orthodox way from the Lokāyata system. Dinnāga refutes Mīmāṃsā theories, Bhavya refutes probably Śabara, and Jayarāśi, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Prabhācandra, Ratnaprabhasūri, and others criticise Kumārila on the major issues.

Here, in the present work, the main Mīmāṃsā principles, like *vedāpauruṣeyatva*, *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*, *śabdanityatva* and lastly, six means of valid cognitions have been discussed in the light of their refutation by the scholars of the heterodox systems.

In the first chapter of the thesis, the origin of controversy between the Mīmāṃsakas and the heterodox systems, is discussed. A brief survey of major works of the opponents has been presented.

The second chapter deals with the refutation of the main Mīmāṃsā theory, '*vedāpauruṣeyatva*'.

In the third chapter, the refutation of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* of

all means of valid cognitions has been discussed according to the refutation made by Buddhism and Jainism.

The fourth chapter deals with the refutation of eternality of word, its denotation and the relation of both the word and its denotation.

The fifth chapter consists of the refutation of six means of valid cognitions, made by Cārvāka system, Buddhism and Jainism.

The refutation of self-validity of all valid means of cognition cannot be found in the Cārvāka system of Indian philosophy.

As far as the refutation of *vedāpauruṣeyatva* is concerned, Jayarāśi clearly refers to the followers of Kumārila. As regard the verse quoted from TS of Śāntarakṣita, Eli Franco opines that the verse seems to have come from some unknown commentary on the Bṛhaṭṭikā of Kumārila. As he says, Jayarāśi, refers to Kumārila's positions as they appear in the Bṛhaṭṭikā and not in the Ślokavārttika¹. Next, he admits that some passages of this argument against the Veda have been assembled in NKC of Prabhācandra².

Jayarāśi attacks the Veda on the reason, 'unremembrance of an author' and secondly, on the assertion that 'the cognition derived from the Vedic injunction is faultless and does not have sublative. According to Jayarāśi, by employing artificial character, i.e. unremembrance of an author, this would go to the contrary instance. He says that the followers of Kaṇāda remember the author and people use to say in their daily conversation very often that the Vedas are composed by Brahmā etc.

However, he does not go to take support from the means of cognitions to attack on the Veda as Jainas do, although he puts forth many alternatives in his argument. It can easily be said from the point of view of the Cārvāka system, that the author of the Veda is not perceived, since he is not the subject of perception. This system accepts sense-perception only as a means of valid cognition. If he is not the subject of perception, then the authorless treatise, i.e. the Veda becomes invalid, like Hare's horn, which is not perceptible. According to him, there must be an author. To

make his argument competent, he takes the usages of common people. Hence, the system is called Lokāyata. On the contrary, however, a doubt arises as to how can he accept the divine Brahman. Since this system rejects God, soul etc. and secondly, how can he accept the usages (words) of people as valid as well as the words of the followers of Kaṇāda?

Next, Jayarāsi attacks on the validity of the cognition brought about by Vedic injunction. However, it seems that he does not differentiate the cognition which is derived from senses, from the cognition derived from Vedic injunctions. He uses almost all ordinary examples to make his argument sound. However, Vedic injunctions convey the meaning (object) with regard to past, present, future and also what is subtle, hidden, remote and the like and this cannot be done by any organ of sense.

As Bhāṇaviveka says in the so-called pūrvapakṣa it is true that the tradition of the Veda comes down to us by oral transmission and there is no any interruption in its study. Therefore, having seen this tradition, he admits Buddhism in this category and the teachings of Buddha are considered as Buddhism. However, in the case of the Veda, we cannot find any adviser. Veda itself is an adviser of *Dharma*. Hence a question arises that how Buddhism can be accepted as *āgama*. Of course, there is never any interruption in the teachings of Buddha or in the tradition of Buddhism. If the Buddhism is considered to be similar to the Veda, then the Buddha as the propounder of his doctrine should not have been remembered.

Bhāṇaviveka gives an example of a goldsmith. People generally trust the goldsmith as regards the purity of gold although he is a human being. If goldsmith is a trustworthy person, then his words cannot be false. However, in the case of the Veda, there is no scope for such doubt. The assertion of the Veda i.e. 'Having desire for the heaven, one should perform sacrifices' is not an uncertain one.

Further, Bhāṇaviveka goes on refuting the Veda on a number of points, like *bhūtaḥimsā*, *surāpāna*, *mithyokti* etc. However it seems that these are the common factors which can be found in

the refutation of Veda by opponents.

It seems that Dharmakīrti replies for the objection raised by Kumārila against Dinnāga. According to him, reason of truthfulness and merits of sentences pertain to human beings. This is to say that either truthfulness or merits depend upon the human beings. In the sense, Vedic sentences are dependent. Secondly, he says that the reason of making understand, the meaning depends upon the accurate convention of human beings.

Another reason he shows that a single sentence conveys many meanings, although there is a rule, i.e. one word conveys one meaning. As a matter of fact, in the case of Vedic sentence, this rule should be followed, otherwise, there is a split of sentence. However, we do not find the exact definition of the split of sentence in the Mīmāṃsā texts. On the basis of the JS II 2.47³, we can explain this concept as follows. 'When the parts of the sentences are equally independent of each other as well as one sentence does not expect words from other sentence to complete it, they should be treated as separate sentences⁴. Split of sentence is the most serious fault which disassociates the sentence and its meaning. Therefore it is to be avoided in sentences by means of various devices.

He raises another point that the beginninglessness would not lead to the status of being non-human origin of the Veda, because beginninglessness can be applied for the usages of Mlecchas as well as of the usages of heterodox systems. It seems that Dharmakīrti desires to put the Buddhism on the parallel line.

According to Dharmakīrti, an author of the Veda can be inferred, because, there is no single nature that can be found in the sequence of alphabets. This manifold nature of alphabets can be found only in products.

Next, he says that words themselves cannot assert the meaning as such and such people assume the meaning of words. It also leads to infer the author whose sentences should be non-contradictory and meaningful. However, as per the Mīmāṃsā view, an author of the Veda cannot be proved by any means of cognition. In the case of the inference, the reason is seen on the

mountain; relationship of *sādhya* and *hetu* is remembered after perceived the reason. This is not happening in the case of the Veda. There is no *hetu* and the relationship of the *sādhya* and *hetu* is also not remembered. Thus it is like *hetvābhāsa* only.

Regarding the Vedic injunction, 'One who desires heaven should perform *Agnihotra*'. Dharmakīrti cite a parallel injunction : 'one who desire heaven, should eat flesh of dog'. This statement has no reference to Veda and has been made just for the sake of argument.

So far as the non-human origin of the Veda is concerned, Śāntarakṣita states that, this is the product of false pride of the twice-born people. He argues invalidity on the ground that it stands in need of explanations by persons. It is dependent like a blind man. Therefore validity and realibility of the Veda cannot be right. It seems, that Śāntarakṣita's argument is similar to the arguments made by Dharmakīrti. But regarding to the statement, i.e. 'Veda is dependent', it needs further explanations, teachings of Buddha also need explanations. It is found that Buddhists too explain the teachings of Buddha in various ways. Hence, there is no need to say that the Veda is dependent.

According to him, the Veda is reduced to futility because there are the sentences, such as 'six cakes' etc. According to Śābara, these are useless sentences, since they are too ordinary and do not have expectancy⁵. Next, Śāntarakṣita criticizing Veda, on the ground of tradition, without which the Veda would have not been proved to be valid. Any beginningless line of pupils and teachers even though assumed, cannot make it faultless. Since a single person cannot be held to be capable of perceiving super-sensuous things, the traditional line of pupils and teachers can only be a line of blind persons.

Regarding the unbroken tradition of pupils and teachers, Jayatilleke rightly points out that, it was not exclusively used in reference to the teachers of Vedic tradition. According to Jayatilleke, it seems that despite the presence of other traditions, the Vedic tradition was the most influential one and all attention is focused on questioning its authority. This line of teachers and

pupils is called as '*paramparā*'. The word '*paramparā*' means a series of succession as well as an unbroken succession of teaching. This traditional line of pupils and teachers is continued still today and because of the the Veda is protected even though following the traditional line is considered as difficult task.

Next, Śāntarakṣita says that the Veda is a work of man, as it speaks about wrongful events, such as killing of animals and speaking lie etc. Bhāvaviveka also raises similar objections. However, prohibition of killing of living beings can be found in the Śābara Bhāṣya. Śābara states that the immoral act like, *Śyena* etc. involves inflicting injury and the inflicting injury has been forbidden, because *Śyena* and other such sacrifices are nowhere prescribed as benevolent rites that one should perform. They are optional Vedic rites. If at all one desires to inflict injury upon the enemy, one may perform the *Śyena* etc. They do not say that one should inflict injury²⁵.

The refutation of *surāpāna* may be considered as the refutation of *somāpāna*. Here, we can make a distinction between *surā* (liquor) and *soma* (soma-juice). Soma was used to be offered to Gods and it was to be consumed by the priests alone. However, the *surā* was not usually offered to Gods (except the *Sautrāmani* sacrifice) and it was being consumed by common people.

A number of *smṛtis*, digests, commentaries prohibit drinking of liquor. Bhāvaviveka too presents his views, regarding the prohibition of liquor. However, he emphasises that consuming liquor with reciting mantras yields the same effect such as consuming liquor without reciting mantras.

As regards the *mithyokti*, a number of passages can be found in the Vedas. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, they are to be considered as *arthavādas*. Śābara quotes the mantra '*Catvāri sṛṅgāḥ*' and says that the thing spoken of directly by the words here has no existence. However, words could be taken in an indirect sense and such expressions are accepted to be correct and justifiable. The mantra '*Oṣadhe trāyasva*' etc. addressed to the sacrificial substances are insensate and meant to indicate the accomplishment of sacrifice. They are as efficient as intelligent

beings. Similarly, the sentences like '*śṛṇota grāvāṇaḥ*' are meant to indicate that the recitation of Morning Hymns will follow. The statement is significant, because it implies that insensate stones will listen to it, how much more the learned Brāhmaṇas do? Therefore even if the stones are insensate, they are invoked⁷.

It is interesting to note that Jainism differs from the Buddhism on one point. Prabhācandra states that for want of all means of cognitions, the non-human origin of the Veda cannot be proved. Perception is not capable to prove it, since sense organs contact only such things as are present. It cannot be proved by the means of inference, because the reason, 'unremembrance of an author' becomes useless, just like Hare's horn. However, this does not seem to be sound argument since non-human origin of the Veda is not said as cognisable thing. Cognisable things need to be proved by means cognitions. Thus, non-human origin of the Veda does not require any means of proof. Regarding the unbroken tradition, there are many sentences which have an unbroken tradition. This ground shows, like exponents of Buddhism, the Jaina philosopher also tries to put the Jainism on the parallel line as against the unbroken tradition of the Veda.

As regards the authorship of the Veda, he quotes some Purāṇic sentences which are associated with the creatorship of Brahman. As he says, unremembrance of an author is accedental. Non-apprehension, presumption and inference are not the means to prove the 'unremembrance of an author'. *āgama* cannot be a proof to achieve the status of non-human origin of the Veda, due to the fault of mutual dependence. As such, validity of the Veda can be achieved, only if there is the status of non-human origin, and that can be achieved only there is validity of *āgama*. It cannot be achieved in the form of *prasajya pratiṣedha* (negative particle नञ् connected with a verbal activity) or in the form of *paryudāsa* (negative particle is compounded with a noun). Ratnaprabhasūri follows the same line.

It is significant to note that in post-Buddhistic times, there was a controversy between the orthodox and the non-orthodox

schools as to whether the Vedas derive their authority from a personal authorship, human or divine or from the absence of human authorship. Mīmāṃsakas assert the reliability of the Vedas on the grounds of their eternality. According to them, it had no human author or divine founder and therefore it was not affected by the defects of an instruments of knowledge, since it dealt with matters which were unverifiable, it could not be contradicted.

It can be found in Brāhmanic and Upaniṣadic tradition, that Vedic knowledge was deemed to be derived from divine origin i.e. Prajāpati or Brahmā. During that period, it seems that there was a strong belief that the original seers had a special intuitive knowledge of Vedic dharma. In this connection, we can quote the Yāska's statement that 'the seers had a direct personal knowledge of *Dharma*'⁸. There are a number of earliest accounts of the divine origin of the Vedas, possibly due to the influence of the *Puruṣa sūkta*⁹. Prajāpati is very often credited with the task of creating it¹⁰. It is also significant that Prajāpati is identified with Brahmā in Brāhmaṇas¹¹. It should also be noted that in the Brāhmaṇas Brahmā is identically associated with the three Vedas¹².

If we come to the earliest phase of the Upaniṣads we find Prajāpati continuing in his role as creator of the Vedas.¹³ It seems that this notion might be the main target of the criticism of the opponents.

As Jayatilleke says, there is criticism of the infallibility of the Vedas. From the time of Brāhmaṇas, it was generally assumed that the seers were not the authors or the composers of the Veda, which they saw by supernatural insight. The seers are constantly described as the makers and the utterers of the hymns. With the emergence of the conception of the eternality of the Vedas, it could not have possibly been held that the seers composed them.¹⁴ Mīmāṃsā argument emphasises that a word is the same even if it is uttered several times or by several persons.

As far as the validity of knowledge is concerned, a question arises as to what is validity and what is invalidity. The valid of knowledge is called as '*pramā*' and validity is called '*pramāṭva*'

in the Nyāya system. Kumārila and his commentators have used the terms '*pramāṇa*' for valid means of cognition, '*prāmāṇya*' for validity '*apramāṇa*' for invalid and '*aprāmāṇya*' for invalidity.

Pārthasārathi distinguishes the terms '*satyatva*' and '*prāmāṇya*'. There are two individuals, one asserting that there is Indra and the other asserting that 'there is no Indra'. These two statements are contradictory, one of them, however, must be true (*satya*). In this connection, Pārthasārathi says that as there is no criteria to decide which of them is true, there can be no validity¹⁵. Thus it seems that the validity implies the truth, the latter does not imply the validity.

According to Pārthasārathi, the definition of valid knowledge as an apprehension of a previously unapprehended object, which is devoid of defects, in its source and is not contradicted by subsequent experience¹⁶. Next, he mentions three distinctive features of valid knowledge¹⁷ viz., 1) its object is not remembered as having been previously known.

2) it confirms the real nature of its object.

3) there is a feeling of conviction regarding its confirmity or agreement with the real object. Thus novelty, freedom from doubt and truth are the essential marks of valid knowledge and among these, if any one is absent, it cannot be valid.

The Buddhist view of valid knowledge is the same as that of Kumārila. Dharmakīrti states that a source of right knowledge is uncontradicted experience¹⁸. Dharmottara defines valid knowledge as the knowledge of a previously unknown thing¹⁹. Because the function of knowledge is to prompt activity in relation to a thing that is presented by it and thus to help in securing it. Therefore memory is not valid means of cognition. In the same manner, doubt and error are also excluded from valid means of cognition. However, it should be noted that the view of non-contradiction is different from the view of Kumārila and his commentators. If knowledge shows an object and leads to it, then it is non-contradicted. Knowledge is sought for the sake of successful practical activity by people desirous of an effective dealing with objects. Hence valid knowledge is that which alone

presents objects capable of fulfilling our pragmatic needs²⁰. Thus it seems that Buddhistic conception of truth is pragmatic while Mīmāṃsā conception is realistic.

The Buddhist conception of truth has been criticised, because it is too wide as it applies to memory as well as practical efficiency. And again, it is too narrow, because it does not apply to inferential cognitions of past and future objects which lack practical efficiency²¹. If truth is equated with practical efficiency, the knowledge of such objects as perish after their birth (e.g. lighting) will always be false, because they cannot be attained²². Again, a cognition showing water to a man who is not thirsty, and inspiring no practical activity in him will be false and the cognition of water in a dream leading to the satisfaction of the dreamer's thirst will be true²³.

Valid means of cognition is true and definite. If any knowledge, however, lacks definiteness or certitude or does not convey any new information or does not represent things as they really are, it is invalid. According to Kumārila, there are three kinds of invalid knowledge viz. *mithyājñāna*, *ājñāna* and *saṁśaya*. In this statement, there is no mention of memory-which is definitely invalid according to him. It is strange that he does not mention it as a form of invalid knowledge along with other forms.

Sucaritamīśra classifies knowledge into five categories viz., cognition, illusion, doubt, memory and consistent knowledge²⁴. In this list, he does not mention ignorance as a form of invalid knowledge. It is true that validity and invalidity are the properties of knowledge and not presence or absence of knowledge. It is also true that ignorance or absence of knowledge does not help in the practical activities of life. But the practical disadvantage which is caused by ignorance does not justify calling it invalid. It is always some knowledge that is judged to be valid or invalid.

Śāntarakṣita refutes Mīmāṃsakas at length and argues validity of the cognitions is due to extraneous and invalidity is due to intrinsic factors.

The Buddhists theory maintains that falsehood is inherence in all means of cognitions while truth is extraneous. An appearance

of any cognition is not sufficient to prove its validity. The knowledge of silver arises when there is actually silver and sometimes when there is no silver, but some other object like silver such as a conch shell. Hence it can be said that silver is actually present simply on the ground that its knowledge has been produced. Therefore the validity of knowledge cannot be ascertained by the knowledge itself. It can be ascertained only when it is seen that knowledge leads to the expected practical efficiency. For instance, when a jar is cognised, the cognition by itself does not give an assurance that the jar is actually present. Afterwards we approach the object and find that we can fetch water in it, then it is ascertained that the cognition was true. Again, it can be ascertained even when there is no knowledge of practical efficiency, by the subsequent knowledge that the *guṇavatkāraṇajñāna* or by knowing that the *jñānātarasamvāda*. Thus the validity of knowledge is ascertained by some other knowledge and not by the same knowledge, since knowledge by itself is doubtful on account of falsehood which is inherent in it. Falsehood is nothing, but the absence of truth. It is non-entity, like a hare's horn, and thus cannot be produced by any thing²⁵.

Pārthasārathi criticizes Buddhist view. He says that falsehood is not merely an absence of truth. It is not definite prior-absence, as the Buddhist seem to hold. In the case of illusion, e.g. that of silver in a shell, which is a form of false knowledge, the perceiver is as confident of the presence of silver as in the case of real silver. False knowledge is positive in character. It represents something as a different thing due to certain vitiating factors and this can be known from positive and negative concomitance. The knowledge which is doubtful in its very origin is known to arise from certain defects. As regards the non-cognition, it is obviously due to the absence of causes which gives rise to cognition. However, what is true in the case of non-cognition, that may not be true in the case of illusion and doubt. Hence falsehood is uncaused and natural, it is caused by defects²⁶.

According to Buddhism, truth is caused by excellences and where there are no excellence there is no truth. If it is so,

there could not be truth in the cognition of a white conch as yellow or in that of shell as silver which is produced by visual sense devoid of excellences. In the cognition of a yellow conch, the element of conchness is true, though yellowness is false. In the illusion of silver in a shell too, the cognition is true in respect of such general features as brightness etc. These elements are evidently caused by merely the conditions of knowledge but not by excellences, since there are no excellences. Again, (as regards), the purity of organs etc. meant by the Buddhist, the Mīmāṃsaka's view is not contrary to it, because then excellences become equivalent to the absence of defects. And again, it does not interfere with the truth of the Veda. The Veda has no author and so the question of the presence of defects in its source does not arise. As a matter of fact, truth is not caused by the presence of merits, or by the presence of defects in the generating conditions of knowledge, but it is natural and intrinsic to knowledge. Wherever we found excellences in the cause of knowledge, they are not directly operative in producing truth. They serve just as removing defects. Thus merits are not directly the cause of truth²⁷.

The Buddhist's contention is that all knowledge is known to be false at the time of its origin, because falsehood depends upon the conditions which give rise to knowledge. If knowledge is inherently false, and immediately known to be false, illusion and disappointment cannot be explained. If a shell is perceived as silver and we immediately know that it is not silver, then the cognition 'it is not silver' becomes inexplicable. On the contrary, if a false knowledge is accepted to be true at the time of its origin, this fact shows that knowledge is known to be true intrinsically, while falsehood is a later discovery depending upon conditions extraneous to the condition of knowledge²⁸.

Pārthasārathi draws an attention in this regard to one possible misinterpretation of self-validity and invalidity due to others. *Svatastva* of truth does not imply that all knowledge is born true and '*paratastva*' of falsehood does not imply that knowledge born true is made false by such extraneous conditions as the subsequent appearance of a contradicting knowledge etc.

Truth and falsehood are produced in true and false respectively as well as simultaneously with the production of knowledge. They are properties of knowledge and are present from the very beginning. This is not correct to say that truth is born at the very beginning stage and falsehood is added later on, because falsehood is produced by same vitiating factors and they are present from the very beginning. The truth is intrinsic means that it is produced by the natural causes of knowledge and falsehood is extrinsic means that it is produced by some additional factor vitiating the natural causes²⁹.

The Mīmāṃsā view is that truth does not depend on any extraneous factor for its revelation and therefore it is self-evident. Pārthasārathi says that the theory of self-evidence does not mean that a cognition apprehends its truth in the form 'I am true'. On the contrary, it means that the knowledge of truth depends on the knowledge of cognition itself and the awareness of the object manifested by the cognition occurs. It is known that the object, as it is manifested, remains implicit until reflective consciousness appears. An explicit consciousness of the truth of a cognition appears subsequently and then it depends on the awareness of the cognition itself rather than on any extraneous factor³⁰.

It is true that the Mīmāṃsakas adopt the theory of self-validity to get a theoretical justification for the Veda and do not believe in the divine authorship. Veda is eternal and uncreated. The assertions like, 'one desirous of heaven should perform sacrifice', are not based on such extrinsic grounds as the divine authorship, ascribed to Brahman, or Prajāpati etc.

According to Prabhācandra, validity of valid means of cognitions is due to the other factors in their origination. It is by itself as well as by other extraneous factors at the stage of consciousness. He says that when validity is due to self-causes, then it does not arise on account of general rule of place and time and therefore there is no activity of validity. If validity is due to its own causes, then there occurs the fallacy of establishing the established object. If validity is due to its own functions, then it cannot be produced by its own originating factors.

Next, he argues that at the stage of not repeated course of observation of an object in consciousness, validity of cognitions would not arise on account of unreality, suspicion etc. Both validity and invalidity is determined by self, when there is a repeated course of observation.

According to him, determination of validity cannot be cognised by the means of perception nor by the inference nor by āgama. It can be determined only through the consistent knowledge. Practical efficiency is the subject of so-called determination of validity, since it pertains directly to the non-contradiction and there is no infinite regression of the practical efficiency, compare to other cognition in suspicion of perceiving non-objects and there is no doubt from the point of view of invisible, even that has no objects.

At length, as it is found in their treatises Śāntarakṣita and Prabhācandra refute mainly the views of Kumārila.

The Jaina philosopher, Ratnaprabhasūri criticises the definition of valid knowledge of the Mīmāṃsakas on the ground that it excludes recognition³¹. But Kumārila denies it. Kumārila says : "that part of perception which has been perceived before cannot be said to be perceived but the present existence is not got at by any previous perception. In recognition, 'this is the same person whom I met yesterday', there are two elements, viz. 1) an element of memory 2) an element of perception. It combines the memory element with the element of sense-perception. It is not a mere repetition of some past experience. It is valid because it reveals a new feature in the remembered object.

Regarding the validity of knowledge, it seems that Ratnaprabhasūri follows the line of Prabhācandra. He says that where the knowledge causing factors are good, then the knowledge is valid. On the other hand, where those factors are defective, then the knowledge is invalid. Thus validity and invalidity of the cognition depend upon others. His argument on the Mīmāṃsā theory is that the knowledge of validity of a cognition arises from the consistent knowledge. It includes the knowledge of good qualities inherent in knowledge causing factors as well as

excludes the contradictory knowledge. This consists in a knowledge of the form, the object of the present knowledge is apprehended to be similar to that of the previous knowledge. Such consistent knowledge gives the knowledge that the previous knowledge is valid.

It is established by the Mīmāṃsakas that the word as composed by letters, is eternal, so also what is denoted by the word and the relation between the word and its meaning is also eternal. Regarding this concept, almost all opponents severely criticise the Mīmāṃsakas.

According to Jayarāsi the relation between the word and its meaning cannot be cognised either by perception or by inference. If it be urged that it must be cognised by presumption, that the answer is that the presumption is based on perception. If perception would not exist then there is an absence of presumption. Inference does not exist, because there is no rise of *viññānagamaka*. Being this situation, the stateness of the words and the relation of word and its meaning may not be known, then there is no validity for Vedic sentences³².

According to S. Mukharji and H. Nagasaki, Dharmakīrti introduces a problem in Indian philosophy, whether the word is eternal or non-eternal. As they say, here the problem is concerned with the epistemological issue as to whether the audible word is possible if the latter (word) be neither permanent nor impermanent. Dinnāga's assertion is that the word is non-eternal, because it is an object of audible perception. An assertion of Kumārila is that this argument is an instance of fallacy. Dharmakīrti however, argues that word is non-eternal, because it is audible as a case of doubtful issue. If audibility being understood as the causal efficiency for generating audible perception, it is natural that what is audible must be impermanent. However, audibility stands for particular causal efficiency for audible perception, then it amounts to a case of the uncommon probans. Nothing but word is possible, so the awareness of audibility in other non-eternal facts is not possible. Hence the occurrence of audibility in other non-eternal facts is not possible.

Therefore it cannot be concluded that the word is non-eternal as the concomitance between audible and non-eternal is not ascertained. If it is contended that the concomitance is known in word by itself, then assertion is futile, since the word is known to be audible and non-eternal by the very act of knowledge of concomitance. Hence this is the reason for argument which is regarded as a case of doubt³³.

Regarding the eternality of word, Bhāvaviveka puts forth five more reasons in the *pūrvapakṣa* and they are rejected in his so-called *siddhānta*. It is interesting to note that the V S of Kaṇāda claim the eternality of word and some of them are similar to the P M S of Jaimini³⁴. All they are rejected by Kaṇāda showing their doubtfulness. Rejection made by Kaṇāda seems to be similar with the rejection made by Bhāvaviveka.

Again, the refutation made by Bhāvaviveka seems to be similar to the views of opponent found in the S B³⁵. The word is often found to be destroyed, therefore when it is produced, its relation to its denotation is artificial. It is always found to follow after an effort. Śābara's reply to this is that the word is found to appear after human effort, in the sense, that what is brought about by the effort is only the manifestation of the already existing word³⁶.

An example of a lamp given by Bhāvaviveka to disprove the eternality of the word cannot be found in the Śābara Bhāṣya. However, the refutation of the reasons, viz. recognition and repetition made by Bhāvaviveka indicates the direct refutation of Śābara Bhāṣya. Actually Mīmāṃsakas establish the eternality of the word on the grounds of these also. For these reasons, the word must be regarded as eternal. And the reason for this lies in the fact that the word heard today is actually recognised as the same that was heard yesterday. When there is utterance, it only serves to manifest the existing word, it does not create or produce it. Hence the word cannot be product or an effect. Not being an effect, it cannot be perishable and continuing to exist in its own form and not being perishable, it must be eternal.

Another objection raised by Bhāvaviveka is that if the

word is perceived by ears, how is it regarded to be manifested by sound? Regarding the wordness, Bhāṇaviveka says that wordness itself is not proved. However; according to the Mīmāṃsakas, wordness is the common nature found in all words. It may be noted as universal (class or generality). The term 'cow' is marked by certain characteristics such as dewlap etc. This universal is an accomplished entity and is actually perceived as such. This universal is eternal and also the relation of the word and what is denoted by it, is also eternal.

Śāntarākṣita held the view that there is no certainty regarding the eternality of word, there can be no manifest and manifested, there is no relationship between word and its meaning. Actually there are two kinds of relationship viz., the relationship of identity and the relationship of cause and effect. None of these is possible. There is no form which is found in recognition. Everything is momentary in reality such as the universal 'ga' is different from real 'ga', etc.

Thus, Śāntarākṣita refutes the views of the Mīmāṃsakas, particularly that of Kumārila. It seems that Kumārila was the main opponent compared to other Mīmāṃsakas. Hence he quotes many verses from SV to establish the pūrvapakṣa on the part of Mīmāṃsā and afterwords he rejects all of them. It seems that the refutation made by Śāntarākṣita is similar to that made by Bhāṇaviveka, however, in a broader extent.

As far as the Jaina epistemology is concerned, the Jainas do not accept the theory of eternality of word. Prabhācandra as well as Ratnaprabhasūri, reject the Mīmāṃsakas main thesis that the word is eternal, its denotation is eternal and the relation between the word and its denotation is also eternal.

Prabhācandra refutes the Mīmāṃsakas in the following way. It is not possible to ascertain the meaning of the word by the means of similarity because of its impermanence. The result of similarity of one reason can be found in another reason also, and that is appeared in the form of different and non-different. Generality (*jāti*) is completely a different object from this distinct and non-distinct forms, as it is accepted as eternal. The generality

should not be recognised by any reason or by the word.

According to him, palatal sounds etc. are the functions of cognition but not the functions of manifestation and there is no rule that wherever there is manifest there is manifestation. Next, he disapproves the all-pervadingness of the word. Regarding this, he uses an inference. The word is not all pervaded, because being the feature of specific and general, it is perceived by external organ, like a pot. Thus, there is no distinction between the pot and the word. He says, that the word cannot be cognised by the means of perception nor by the means of inference nor by the means of presumption.

Ratnaprabhasūri rejects the eternity of word on the following grounds viz. recognition, inference and presumption and mostly follow the way of Prabhācandra. Many common grounds in the arguments of both have also been found.

Perception is the primary source of valid knowledge and it gives a direct knowledge of reality, because in it we are face to face with reality, whereas the other means of cognition give only an indirect knowledge. Kumārila's theory based on the sūtra of perception is that the cognition by a person, appears, when there is a contact of the sense-organs. It is not a means of apprehending duty it apprehends only things existing at present. Jaimini proposes to examine the means of cognition from which duty can be known and in the very next sūtra he states that śabda or scriptural authority is such a means of cognition. He rejects perception since it apprehends only those objects which exist at present while *Dharma* as Śābara says, it yet to come into existence. In this connection, Jaimini has not examined the competence of other means of cognitions. viz., inference, analogy etc. It seems that Jaimini recognised only two means of cognitions. viz., perception and verbal authority for the purposes of secular and religious matters respectively. It seems that Jaimini is not conscious of inference as a means of knowledge or he does not recognise its independence status. Or it may be the reason that means of cognitions are not the topic of discussion during the period of Jaimini.

According to Pārthasārathi, an earlier commentator Bhavadāsa takes the first part of the definition of perception viz., 'Perception is that cognition which arises on the contact of a person's sense-organs with objects'. It seems that Dīnnāga too accepts this first part of perception. Hattori opines, it is true that the works of early commentators are not available except that Śābara Bhāṣya and their views are not known in detail, so there is little justification for a decisive identification of the views as criticized by Dīnnāga³⁸. Jinendrabuddhi comments on each term of the sūtra³⁹ 1) The compound 'sat-samprayoga' may be analysed into either 'sato samprayogaḥ' or 'satā samprayogaḥ' 2) The word 'samprayoga' means *samyak-prakṛṣṭa yoga* (correct contact and of sufficient strength) Kumārila analyses 'samprayoga' means '*samyak-prayogaḥ*' (proper function). 3) The term 'indriyāṇi' refers to 'manas' and therefore the cognition which takes ātman for its object. 4) The compound 'buddhi-janma' refers as to 'Karmadhāraya' or as a 'ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa' Kumārila develops detail discussion on the line of Śābara's interpretation of the sūtra and rejects Bhavadāsa's interpretation.

The second part of the sūtra as interpreted by Bhavadāsa. According to him, perception is not a means for the apprehension of *Dharma*. Kumārila rejects this interpretation by asserting that a definition would not be correct, because one would not be able to establish a connection with the preceding nimitta sūtra (MS 1.1.3), The purpose of the sūtra is to investigate *Dharma* (duty) and there is no need to undertake a definition of perception. Since it does not contribute to the apprehension of *Dharma* (duty),⁴⁰ Here, in this context, it may be said that if Jaimini wanted to define the means of valid cognition, he would have defined inference and the rest. If this would be considered as a definition, then it would be too wide, because it is not false cognition which arises when the senses are in contact with the object. If the word '*samprayoga*' be reinterpreted as, '*samyak*' 'correct' and '*prayoga*' means 'functioning', then the definition would be 'perception is a cognition of a person when the senses are functioning correctly.

It seems that Dīnnāga probably follows exactly the same method to criticize the Naiyāyikas who also maintain that perception is a cognition produced by the contact of sense and object.

Vṛttikāra (probably Upavarṣa) interprets the sūtra by changing the terms 'tat' and 'sat'. He reads, 'true perception is that which arises from the contact of a person's sense-organs with that object alone of which it is the perception'⁴¹. Eli Franco says that it is quite obvious that the Vṛttikāra construed the sūtra in a very ingenuous way which neither Hattori nor Frawallner seems to have realised⁴². In order to accomodate his theory, as Eli Franco says, he has probably construed '*satsamprayoge*' not only with '*indriyāṇām*' but also with '*puruṣasya*'. Here the word 'person' is interpreted as 'soul' and not as a person. Then the interpretation of the definition would be as Eli Franco observes, "perception is (the means of valid cognition whose result is) the arising of cognition when there is a contact of the senses (and) the soul (together with its properties) with an existing (object)"⁴³.

It should be noted that although Jayarāśi deals with the enumeration of causes and definition as independent alternatives, he certainly has in mind Kumārila's interpretation of the sūtra. Perception in which something other than *Dharma* appears refers to normal perceptions whereas the second, perception in which *Dharma* appears refers to the perception of yogin while the third, namely perception which does not arise looks strange but becomes understandable. According to the Mīmāṃsakas however, there is no such *yogi pratyakṣa*.

Kumārila says that mystic perception is impossible. It is held that '*yogin*' by virtue of his power of meditation can have a direct knowledge, not only a present things, but also of those that are past, future and distant. Perception is ordinarily seen to be of those objects alone that exist no more or in future. The mystic-perception cannot go beyond the limits of ordinary perception.

Kumārila concludes that the sutra is meant to state the reason why perception which is well known to be a means of

valid knowledge and it cannot give a knowledge of Dharma. Sense-perception (of mystics) is not the means of knowing dharma, because it apprehends accomplished entities. It apprehends accomplished entities, because it is brought about by a present sense-contact. It is brought about by a present sense-contact, because it is perception like the perception of ordinary objects⁴⁴.

Of all valid means of cognitions, Cārvākas accept only the sense-perception. However, we cannot find any explanation either in SDS or in TPS for the question as to, why perception has to be accepted? Here, it can be said that the perception is necessary for practice life and the perception of every person has to be accepted as true for them.

Perception is the primary source of valid knowledge, even it is criticised by various ways of thought. The Jainas and the Buddhists define perception as the direct cognition of an object. Māṇikyanandi defines⁴⁵ perception as distinct cognition, which is explained as the knowledge not mediated by another knowledge and as apprehending its object in all its details. The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti is known for his celebrated definition of perception. According to him, 'it is devoid of determination and non-erroneous'.⁴⁶ Determinations are the characteristics and their relations. Non-erroneous is a general condition of all forms of valid knowledge. This definition of perception is severely criticised by the rival schools. It is the same as the definition of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* given by Kumārila.

Buddhists use the word 'kalpanā' instead of 'vikalpa' but is similar in form (derived from the root 'kalp') and identical in meaning with the word 'vikalpa'. It seems, it was first used in philosophical literature by Dīṇnāga in his '*Pramāṇasamuccaya*' where he defines perception as knowledge free from imagination and unconnected with name, genus etc⁴⁷. Again even the word 'ālocana' occur in the PPB⁴⁸, detailed description is attempted for the first time by Kumārila. In contradiction to his opponents, he asserts that the denial of indeterminate perception is the denial of a well-established fact. As the experience, which proves that

on the contact of a sense organ with an object, the cognition that arises in the first moment is indeterminate. It is a cognition in the shape of mere observation which is not qualified and it is similar to the cognition of the infant or the dumb arising purely out of the object by itself. At that time neither any specialisation nor any generalisation is recognised, what is cognised is only the object, substratum of these specialisation and generalisation. In the absence of indeterminate perception, the determinate is too impossible. In the determinate stage, the object is conceived as belonging to a class and possessing a certain name, the class concept and the name given by memory. But memory cannot arise all of a sudden without some cause. As a matter of fact, what is perceived in the indeterminate stage arouses latent impressions and then alone can the object be determined as possessing class character and a name.

The Buddhist doctrine of perception is based upon the view that every object is the object itself and not another and has, therefore its own character⁴⁹. That the object is itself and not anything else (*svetarabhinnā*) is known perception. Buddhists do not accept the reality either of the category of particular or of the universal. The idea of the particular is only that which is not anything else and so of that which is different from everything other than itself. According to this system, the universal is only either a name (word) or a mental concept (*vikalpa*) and the established conclusion is that all perception is indeterminate. This is correct so far as the attribution to an object of something not possessed by it. But this does not exclude determinate cognition from perception because this latter does not make any false attribution. Universal is as real as particular. Hence determinate cognition is perceptual in character.

Bhāvaviveka does not enter into the discussion on the valid means of cognitions. Hence the question does not arise in this regard. He refutes the views probably of Śābara, who did not concentrate either on indeterminate perception or on determinate perception. It seems, that there are three rival theories in front of Kumārila viz. the Buddhists, the Advaitins and the Grammarians.

Śāntarakṣita rejects Kumārila's theory. He puts forth Kumārila's view on indeterminate and determinate perception as *pūrvapakṣa* then rejects it. He emphasises that the cognition appertains to the particular individuality of the thing, then even the apprehension of the universal and other properties should remain free from verbal expression, since particular individuality of things cannot be denoted by words. Again, he says that and the same cognition cannot apprehend both the specific and the universal. If that is conceptual cognition, then there would be no comprehension of the former, on the otherhand, there could be no apprehension of the latter too. If the universal and other properties have become already cognised by the initial cognition, then the latter cognition would be apprehending only what has been cognised. Thus it would be like memory.

According to the Jainas, sense-perception which is one of the forms of direct cognition is defined as clear cognition and they accept the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception in their own way⁵⁰. According to this system, completed perception is the perception of the object as determined by the universal. Such perception is determinate perception. But before the stage of determinate perception, the perceptual process goes through three stages and hence completed perception has four stages. They are - 1) *avagraha* 2) *vyāñjanāvagraha* 3) *arthāvagraha* 4) *īhā*. According to the Jainas, first three stages among these pertain to the indeterminate whereas the fourth to the determinate. However, as far as the present study is concerned, refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas has not been found either in the *aparokṣa* or in the *parokṣa* in the dialectism of Jainism.

Śabara's definition of inference is the basis for the later development of thought of inference. Śabara does not use the word '*samprayoga*', although Jaimini uses it instead of '*sannikarṣa*' in the definition of perception. Its use is rarely found in later philosophical literature and that of the word '*sannikarṣa*' is very common. Thus the word '*sannikṛṣṭa*' means an object in contact with the senses and the word '*asannikṛṣṭa*' means an object not in contact with senses. Accordingly, Śabara's definition of

inference be formulated like, "when the perception of one term of well-known relationship leads to the cognition of other term of that relationship, which latter is not in contact with the person's sense organs, this second cognition is called inference. Kumārila gives explanation of the compound form '*jñātasambandhasya*' as we have already seen.

According to Cārvāka system, inference cannot be accepted as a valid means of cognition, because its truth depends upon major premise. If inference is accepted as a valid means of cognition it must enable us to know only what is already known in the major premise through perception, then there is no need of inference. If it gives a new truth, then the major premise cannot be true. However, the conclusion can be true, only if the major premise is true. If it is said that the major premise can be based on causality, then the answer is that every causation assumes the truth of the principle of causality which is a universal proposition. Everything simple happens as it does. Every event is a chance. It is nature. All our inferences are guesses and their truth is accidental. God, heaven, ātman are not acceptable because they are not perceivable at all.

As Eli Franco observes, there is a certain discrepancy between the theory of inference in the SV and the one which is reflected in TPS. However a relation between the two texts can be found. Jayarāśi quotes a verse from SV and the problem of apprehension of an unapprehended object is one of the main topics of the theory of inference⁵¹. According to Eli Franco, Jayarāśi does not refer to SV but he quotes elsewhere from the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*. The half-verse quoted here, appears in SV does validate this assumption. *Bṛhaṭṭikā* is a later and more extensive treatise which incorporates material from the SV⁵². As Eli Franco says, Frauwallner has already pointed out that Kumārila in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* had changed his theory of *vyāpti* under Dharmakīrti's influence. The discussion in the TPS indicates that he has changed his theory of *anumeya* as well⁵³.

Jayarāśi's criticism of Kumārila is quite simple. Whatever the object of inference may be, either it was previously perceived

as related to the inferential indicative and thus its apprehension is that of an apprehended object or it was not previously perceived and hence it cannot be inferred from the inferential indicative.

The criticism made by Jayarāṣi is closely connected with a well-known Lokāyata verse, often used by orthodox systems to refute their opponents with slight variations⁵⁴. That Jayarāṣi puts forth the *vikalpa* which seems to be strange. Because universals are supposed to be eternal. Hence it would be useless to infer their existence at a certain time. Pārthasārathi holds that an object is produced or destroyed in the universal part, the one which it has in common with other individuals of the same class, is produced or destroyed with it, though it continues to exist, as part of other individuals of the same class. If it is urged that the universal is eternal and not subject to production and destruction whereas the individual has the opposite nature, how could there be unity of these two? This is not a fault, because this thing has many forms. It is a certain form to be eternal etc., and a certain being non-eternal etc., is not contradictory at all. Not only is the universal in the form of individual, not eternal but also the individual with the nature of the universal.

Dharmakīrti defines inference, such as, "inference is the cognition of the inferrable from the sign having three-fold character"⁵⁵. The three-fold characteristic of a sign are 1) its presence in the *pakṣa* 2) presence in *sapakṣa* 3) absence from the *vipakṣa*. However, this definition of Dharmakīrti is severely criticised, because it enumerates the conditions of validity rather than the state the essential nature of inference. The inclusion of the word 'inferrable' in the definition makes it open to the charge of circularity. There is no mention of invariable concomitance. Another defect has been found that instead of stating that inference is a cognition resulting from the cognition of a sign, it merely states that inference is a cognition from sign. From a mere sign, i.e. smoke, nothing can be cognised unless it is known to be the sign of something i.e. fire. Sucaritamīśra rightly points out that nothing can be cognised from the mere existence of something. Dharmakīrti is quite aware, as he makes the necessary amendment

in the next sūtra, but in the actual definition, he misses it⁵⁶.

There occurred frequent refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas with regard to their definition of the perception, but that is not the case with the inference. Śāntarakṣita the only Buddhist philosopher criticises the views of Śabara and Kumārila and establishes the theory of 'perpetual flux'. According to him, it proves that perpetual flux is all embracing, there can be no inference by itself.

The answer given by Pārthasārathi is that there is the permanent relationship between the probandum (fire) and probans (smoke) and it holds to view that inferential cognition like every valid cognition apprehends something that is not already known. He argues that even it is true that smoke is seen and also that said perception of smoke carries with the general idea of the fire as a permanent concomitant of the smoke, the final object apprehended by the resultant inferential cognition and this is not already apprehended by other valid means of cognitions. Because it is said that the perception of smoke implying the notion of fire as its relative, does not imply the notion of present fire in the mountain. This qualified fire forms the object of inferential cognition. Thus inferential cognition has to be regarded as apprehending something not already known by other means of cognitions. Hence there is no chance to the objection made by Śāntarakṣita that there is an assumed object etc.

As far as the verbal cognition is concerned, Jayarāṣi refutes the only Vedic authority, i.e. Vedic injunction but not the words of any reliable person. He criticises all valid means of cognitions accepted by Mīmāṃsakas and comes to the conclusion that there are no valid means of cognitions except perception. Even in this Cārvāka system, it can be found that the sense perception alone is the valid means of cognition. This system does not accept as valid means of cognition. Thus Cārvāka refutes testimony in general and scriptural testimony in particular, because Vedic knowledge in his opinion, is 'all fraud, a device of the cunning priests to earn their living by cheating the ignorant masses'.

The Buddhists do not accept verbal cognition as distinct

means of valid cognition. According to them, hearing the word as a sound is perception and knowing its meaning is inference. Thus, the verbal cognition is a combination of perception and inference⁵⁷. If we accept the authoritativeness of a book, because that is composed by a reliable person, then there is only a reliable person who is the Buddha. His teachings should be accepted as he is a reliable person. A reliable person is one who has knowledge of the ultimate truth, who knows, what is to be sought for and what is to be avoided and who is infinitely compassionate. He has gone in the right way (*sugata*) and who knows and teaches the Four Noble Truths. Such a person is the Buddha and his teachings alone are reliable. Further his teachings can be verified by experience and inference⁵⁸.

Regarding the verbal cognition, Bhāvaviveka claims in his so-called *pūrvapakṣa* that it is an independent source of knowledge like other cognitions. As he says, it cognises super-sensuous objects like, '*svarga*', '*apūrva*' etc. However, we cannot find this type of assertion either in the Jaimini sūtra or in the Śābara Bhāṣya. Śābara simply defines that the śāstra is the means of cognising the object not in the contact with the senses⁵⁹. It seems that Śābara does not bother about providing an assertion of verbal cognition, on the contrary, later commentators like, Kumāṛila, Prabhākara and others have asserted that the verbal cognition is an independent means of knowledge. Bhāvaviveka presents his views in a different way regarding the inclusion of verbal cognition in the inference. He held the view that one can cognise unseen matters (like *svarga* etc.) by *parārthānumāna*.

Next Śāntarakṣita includes verbal cognition under inference. He says that from all verbal statements there follows the inference of the 'desire to speak'. This is definitely known to be the cause of words through direct perception and non-apprehension. The Buddhist do not accept the status of an independent means of cognition to verbal testimony. He says that the intention of the speaker finds expression in his statement. The intention is the cause and the statement is its effect. When a speaker utters the word, the hearer infers the presence of fire from its effect viz.,

smokey. In this inferential process the speaker is the minor term, his intension is the major term, and the word is the middle term.

In this connection, Kumāṛila asserts that first learnt the meaning of a word, then hear that word, and then cognition of its meaning arises in our mind through memory and not through inference. Thus the understanding of the word has the nature of recollection. However, it (recollection) is not a means of cognition at all. The Buddhist attempt to reduce our cognition of meaning on hearing a word to inference is futile, because it constitutes a means of cognition called verbal testimony which is not a word but a sentence. If the meaning of a word be cognised through inference, the knowledge of a fact of hearing a sentence is not inferential and hence arguments made by the Buddhists are irrelevant⁶⁰.

Kumāṛila gives a long explanation of the points of difference between the inference and verbal cognition and concludes that the verbal cognition does not fulfil the three conditions that are essential in all inference and hence it is distinct from inference like sense-perception.

Kumāṛila's statement that the knowledge derived from individual words could be included under inference may be true, but it is true only in the case of ordinary people, because the cognition produced by them is purely inferential. The speech of men is an effect of his knowledge and therefore we can infer its cause from the effect. Thus all ordinary verbal cognition is inferential whereas that provided by the Veda alone is purely verbal.

Jainas do not accept the verbal cognition as a distinct means of cognition, but admit it in the last category of indirect cognition. They call it as *āgama*. It is infact verbal knowledge obtained from words. This verbal cognition is included in direct knowledge also. Jainas are not very clear on how verbal cognition can be classified under both headings. It seems that the verbal cognition comes under direct cognition whereas scriptural cognition is indirect cognition. A scripture is composed by a person, who is omniscient, dispassionate and beyond ignorance.

The words of such person are true and valid. The scriptures of Jainism alone are true and not those of others⁶¹.

It is interesting to point out that the Jainas, started as a sect of the bookless did not accept the authority of the extant Vedic scriptures but ended up with acknowledging their own scriptures means for the scriptural knowledge which was most reliable of all forms of indirect cognition. The Jainas say that the scripture must have been composed not by a God, but by the person who was the leader of their own religion. Their doctrine of verbal cognition is interesting. They treat a part of it as coming under direct cognition and author part under the indirect one, again the latter a part as fallible cognition and the scripture as infallible one. However, the refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas is absent throughout the whole discussion.

As far as the analogy is concerned, Jayarāśi says that the analogy is based upon perception. If the perception is not apprehended, then there cannot be analogy. He sets forth many alternatives in this context to deny the separate means of cognition.

Śāntarakṣita does not accept as a separate means of cognition. According to him, there is no object that could be cognised by this means of cognition and being the nature of remembrance, it cannot be a valid form of cognition.

The Jaina philosopher Prabhācandra admits this analogical cognition under *pratyabhijñā*. Another Jaina philosopher, Ratnaprabhasūri includes it under indirect cognition. According to him, the Mīmāṃsā theory of analogy, confines to an apprehension of similarity only. Hence another cognition should be found out for such cognition as that cow is dissimilar to that which consists in a cognition of dissimilarity. As he holds, according to Mīmāṃsā that dissimilarity is non-existence. Hence, cognition of dissimilarity come under indirect cognition. Next, from the another point of view, he includes the analogy under recognition where there are two elements viz., element of perception as well as recollection. The recognition is a second form of indirect cognition as accepted by the Jainas. Recognition is indeed, a combination of perception and memory. In this case,

'he is the same person I saw yesterday' both perception and memory are involved. Thus, extending the meaning of recognition, the Jainas reject the view of the Mīmāṃsakas regarding analogy is a distinct means of valid cognition.

According to Kumārila, in the analogical process, the observer already knows the object, i.e. a cow, then on going to the forest, he sees another animal which he perceives, and which is similar to an animal already known to him. There upon he recalled to his mind the formerly perceived cow which he cognises now as similar to the animal in front of his eyes. Hence there is the objective form of analogical cognition in which the remembered cow is qualified by similarity to the seen animal. There is truth in the opponents objection, that the similarity is perceived while the cow is remembered, yet the two together (i.e. cow alongwith similarity to the seen animal are not cognised either by perception or by remembrance). Therefore Mīmāṃsakas urged a need for the cognition of two together, a distinct means of valid cognition. For this reason, it cannot be included either in perception or in remembrance or in any other means of cognition. It cannot be regarded as the same as inference because the factors essential for inference are not present in the case of analogical cognition⁶².

One of the criticisms made by Śāntarakṣita is similar to that regarding the analogy made by Ratnaprabhasūri. It seems that Kumārila and his commentators have not anticipated it. Nārāyaṇa, the author of the *Mānameyodaya*, comparatively a recent author anticipates the objection that if the cognition of similarity requires an independent source of knowledge then the cognition of dissimilarity should require another means of cognition and the answer he gives is that dissimilarity, being the non-existence of similarity is cognised by non-apprehension, the sixth means of cognition⁶³. It seems that this has been anticipated and criticised by Śāntarakṣita and Ratnaprabhasūri who precedes Nārāyaṇa by several centuries. If dissimilarity is equated to the non-existence of similarity, then similarity can also be equated to the non-existence of identity. Thus, if dissimilarity is cognised

by non-apprehension for the reason that it involves non-existence, then similarity too should be cognised by non-apprehension for the same reason. Then analogy becomes super-fluous.

The fact that Nārāyaṇa repeats a reasoning which was refuted several centuries ago. G.P. Bhaṭṭa rightly says "To return opponents criticism, if we in the case of immediate inference in analogy it would not conflict with Kumārila's position, because we compare a physically absent but ideally present thing to another thing which is physically present."⁶⁴

As far as the presumption is concerned, Jayarāśi quotes six kinds of presumption asserted by Kumārila, but refutes only one among them. i.e. the perceived (seen) presumption. According to him, presumption based on perception is not proper, because the knowledge of positive and negative concomitance of organ eye, the cognition of reason would not arise by presumption. It seems, that, he uses reasoning to examine presumption. He argues that all presumption should be seen in the same way. If there is no perception then there is no presumption.

Next, he includes presumption under inference. In the case of 'fat Devadatta not eating during the day' Next, he shows the relation of cause and effect between fatness and eating through positive and negative concomitance.

Regarding the presumption based on analogy, he says that since the validity of analogical cognition is refuted, the validity of presumption arising out of it is also thereby refuted.

Next, he includes the presumption based on non-apprehension under inference.

Prabhācandra, the Jaina philosopher also includes presumption under inference. He sets forth many alternatives and checks every one through reasoning. He emphasises that being its 'otherwise inexplicability' presuming an unseen object would not occur or it may occur, then the reason makes the cognition arise which is to be inferred of indefinite concomitance and afterwards it may be differed from presumption. Further, he states that presumption means the whole structure of inference only.

Ratnaprabhasūri, another Jaina thinker follows the line of

Prabhācandra. He also includes presumption under inference.

In Śabara's statement⁶⁵, the words '*dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto va*' do not appear to refer to two different kinds of presumption, viz, presumption from seen and presumption from heard. Śabara has given only one example of presumption, but in case he intended two forms of presumption, he should have given two instead of one. Kumārila, however, interprets Śabara's statement as referring to the two main forms of presumption. He again classifies them into five. Thus there are six kinds of presumption in all.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, presumption is entirely different from inference. The given fact in the example is Caitra's absence in the house. That can be known from the fact which can be stated in the following forms, viz., 'Caitra is present in the outside space', and 'outside space is one in which Caitra is present'. Accordingly the minor term is either Caitra or the outside space. Now the question arises : What is the middle term? The middle term is always the property of the minor term. In the present case, the absence cannot be the middle term, since it is not a property either of Caitra or of the outside space. Absence is apprehended in the house. Therefore, it can reasonably be the property of the house, but not the property of Caitra or of the outside space. Next, imperceptibility is related to Caitra, because when a person goes to Caitra's house he does not perceive him there. This imperceptibility is not the middle term, because imperceptibility is not directly related to the major term, viz., the presence outside. From the imperceptibility it is directly ascertained that Caitra is absent in the house. It cannot have the double function of leading simultaneously to two inferences, viz., that Caitra is absent in the house and that he is outside. Here, the former is related to the minor term, Caitra, but is not related to the major term the presence outside the house, and the latter may be related to the major term but is not related to the minor term. There is another difficulty also. In inference the minor term is apprehended prior to the major term. In the present case, the minor term, has not been apprehended before which is the object of the inferential cognition. Neither outside nor Caitra has been perceived before⁶⁶. Hence it cannot be regarded as inference or

cannot be included in inference. It is a distinct means of valid cognition.

Another reason, why presumption cannot be included in inference is that it does not stand in need of the knowledge of invariable concomitance, whereas the latter cannot proceed without it. Invariable concomitance is a generalisation based on a frequent and uncontradicted experience of two things together and in inference invariable concomitance which constitutes the major premise is known prior to the conclusion. It is true that there is invariable concomitance between non-existence inside the house and existence outside the house, but it is not known prior to the presumption of Caitra's existence outside the house. Hence it cannot be the cause of the cognition that Caitra is outside. Even a person who never experienced the concomitance of non-existence and existence presumes that a person who is not inside, but outside.

Moreover, the proof of the said concomitance is no other than presumption. From the inexplicability of the fact that Caitra exists but does not exist in the house, it is presumed that he exists outside and then we become aware of the relation between the non-existence inside and the existence outside. The conclusion of reasoning is the result of applying a general rule to a particular case. This also establishes the distinctness of presumption from inference⁶⁷.

As far as the non-apprehension is concerned, Jayarāṣi refutes the views of Kumārila. According to him, cognition should be understood by the apprehension of existence and not by the non-existence.

Regarding the non-apprehension, Dharmakīrti denies separate cognitionhood to non-apprehension. He says in the case of the two co-perceptible facts, i.e. the ground and the jar, the ground is perceived and the jar is not perceived. If the jar is present on the ground it must be perceived, just like the ground is perceived. If the perception of another object (i.e. ground) is construed as non-perception (of the jar the object of negation), then it must be admitted that the negation of the jar is known by

perception. What is known by perception does not require to be proved by other means of cognition.

Śāntarakṣita rejects the non-apprehension after quoting the views of Kumārila. Such as, if it is meant by 'non-modification' is only the absense of modification, then, as the entity concerned is eternal, this should be understood to be there at all times as it never ceases. Or there may be non-modification of the soul, then the definition is wrong, because in the case of sleep, unconsciousness and the like, the object of cognition is there even though there is non-modification of soul. The non-modification of the soul be held in reference to the jar and other things on the ground, then there other cognitions; the ground concerned is seen to be devoid of those things.

Next, he argues that if non-apprehension of cognition is an object, then the non-apprehension of the cognised object also should be the same. Hence it should be included under perception. Again, he emphasises that the existent and non-existent cannot exist together in one and the same substratum. Since they are contradictory. The dual character can never subsist in any single object. The object that is featureless being devoid of the form of cognition cannot be a form of cognition. since this is always of the nature of cognition and entirely featureless object cannot serve as the cause of anything.

The Jaina philosopher Prabhācandra strongly refutes the non-apprehension as an independent means of cognition. he says that the non-objectivity of the non-apprehension does not produce any cognition and that where there is the non-existence of five means of cognitions, there would not arise the cognition of non-apprehension. And again, in the case of a person who has an apprehension of non-apprehension, but not the apprehension of the object which is to be negated, that apprehension of non-apprehension may arise only because of perception and not by any other means of cognition.

Next, he rejects all four kinds of non-apprehension in a long argument and lastly he declares that there are only two kinds of cognitions, viz, direct cognition and the indirect cognition.

Another Jaina thinker Ratnaprabhasūri also rejects the non-apprehension as an independent means of valid cognition. He includes this non-apprehension in the perception. Apart from the arguments of others, he uses another device for attacks. He says that memory which sometimes gives the cognition by non-existence of the form, 'that spot of land had no pot in it' and again 'this is that spot of land which had no pot in it'. And next, in a similar way he says that the cognition of non-apprehension can be cognised by recognition, inference and by verbal cognition. Hence the non-apprehension cannot be regarded as independent means of cognition.

According to Kumārila, the non-apprehension is a distinct means of cognition. The source of negative judgements is neither perception nor inference. Perception, inference etc. are the means of knowing the positive aspect of things. Hence, he clearly states that in the case of an object where the perception and the rest do not function towards the apprehension of the existence of that object, then there is a non-apprehension as the sole means of cognition. The ascertainment of the non-existence of non-object depends upon the validity of this (non-apprehension) as a means of cognition⁶⁸. Next, he says that by the word 'pramāṇābhāva' is meant the non-functioning of perception and the rest. This is either a particular modification of soul or the cognition of another object⁶⁹. Sense-perception and the rest apply to such cases where there is an apprehension of a positive form of an object. However, where the object of apprehension is in a negative form, the action of sense-organs is non-appearance. The notion, 'this is not' is never brought about by means of sense-organs, because they are capable of having contact with a positive form only⁷⁰. On the otherhand, the notion, 'this is not' is due to the absense of such contact. Hence absence of knowledge is thus the means of the knowledge of absence. In the example 'the absence of a jar on the ground', the knowledge of the absence of the jar cannot be perceptual. However, here in the case, the function of sense-organ pertains to the ground which is a positive entity. There can be no pure non-apprehension. Non-apprehension is always some

positive entity in some positive locus. Hence it can be said that 'so far as the positive form is concerned the cognition is perceptual and so far as the negative form is concerned, the object (i.e. jar) is remembered. Hence the notion is that 'this (the jar) is not', which is purely mental⁷¹. Therefore, it is an independent source of knowledge.

Regarding the means of cognitions it seems that almost all the systems of Indian philosophy except Cārvāka, accept all means of cognitions. They do not refute them but try to re-arrange the number of means of cognitions and include them under various heads. For instance, the Buddhists include verbal cognition in perception and inference, analogy also in the same, presumption in inference, non-apprehension in perception whereas the Jainas include verbal cognition in scripture, a kind of indirect cognition, i.e. inference, analogy in recognition, a kind of indirect cognition, i.e. inference, presumption also in indirect cognition and non-apprehension in perception. The Cārvāka is the only the system which refutes all the means of cognitions except perception.

Scope for further research - Within the scope of present study, it is not possible to pay attention to all arguments made by heterodox systems for the refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas. Main principles of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy have been discussed. Views of the Prābhākara school are not included for discussion due to limitation of the present study. If a study is undertaken on remaining principles of the Bhāṭṭa school as well as the Prābhākara school from the point of view of the refutation made by heterodox systems, it would be a good contribution to the study of the development of Indian philosophy.

There are not many serious studies on the controversy between orthodox and heterodox systems. It is possible to undertake a study of a few more topics in this regard, namely, the refutation of Vedāntins as well as Naiyāyikas by heterodox systems separately. Even within the orthodox systems there are a number of controvertial concepts and different attitudes. If a study at these concepts is undertaken, it will throw more light on the agreement and disagreement between different systems on a

number of issues for philosophical debate.

Foot Notes

- 1) Eli Franco, Perception..... p. 346.
- 2) Ibid, p. 106.
- 3) समेषु वाक्यभेदः स्यात् J.S. II. 2.47.
- 4) Kane P.V. Hist..... of Dharma, Part II, p. 1299.
- 5) दशदाडिमानि षड्रूपा इत्येवमादीनि च । SB on JS 1.1.5.
M D Anandashrama ed. p. 56 ff. 5-6
- 6) हिंसा हि सा । हिंसा च प्रतिषिद्धेति । नैव श्येनादयः कर्तव्या विज्ञायन्ते।
यो हिंसितुमिच्छेत् तस्यायमभ्युपपाय इति तेषामुपदेशः ।
श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेत इति हिंसामामनन्ति नाभिचरितव्यमिति ।
MD, Anandashrama ed. Vol. I, p. 33.
- 7) चत्वारिंशद्व्या इत्यसदभिधाने गौणः शब्दः ।
गौणी कल्पना प्रमाणत्वात् । उच्चारणाददृढप्रमाणम् ।
..... यज्ञसमृद्धये साधनानां चेतनसादृश्यमुपपादयितुकाम आमन्त्रणशब्देन लक्षयति,
ओषधे त्रायस्वैनमिति, शृणोत ग्रावाण इति ।
अतः प्रातरनुवाकवचनं भविष्यति; यत्राचेतनाः सन्तो ग्रावाणोऽपि शृणुयुः,
किं पुनर्विद्वांसोऽपि ब्राह्मणा इति । इत्थं चाचेतना अपि ग्रावाण आमन्त्र्यन्ते।
SB on JS 1.2.37, MD Anandashrama ed. Vol. II, pp. 64-65.
- 8) साक्षात्कृतधर्माणः ऋषयो बभूवुः । Nirukta I. 20.
- 9) RV 10.90.
- 10) i) प्रजापतिः सोमं राजानमसृजत । तं त्रयो वेदा अन्वसृज्यन्त । Tai. Br. 2-3.10.1
ii) प्राजापत्यो वेदः । Tai. Br. 3.32.1.
- 11) i) प्राजापत्यो ब्रह्मा । Tai. Br. 3.38.3
ii) प्राजापत्यो वै ब्रह्मा । Gopatha, uttarabhāga 3.18.
- 12) i) अथ केन ब्रह्मत्वं क्रियत इति त्रय्या विद्ययेति ब्रूयात् । Ait. Br. 5.33.
ii) अथ केन ब्रह्मत्वं (क्रियते) इत्यनया त्रय्या विद्ययेति ह ब्रूयात् । Śat.Br. 11.5.8.7.
- 13) Ch. Up. 4.17. 1-2.
- 14) Jayatilleke K.N., Early Buddhist..... p. 193

- 15) केनचिदतीन्द्रियविषयमेव वाक्यमिन्द्रोऽस्तीति
प्रयुक्तम्, अपरेण नास्तीति, तयोरन्यतरदवश्यमस्ति सत्यमिति ।
एतच्च सत्यत्वमात्राभिप्रायेणोक्तम्, न तु प्रामाण्याभिप्रायेण ।
द्वयोरपि तन्मूलाभावेनानिर्णायकत्वादप्रामाण्ये साध्ये नास्त्येनैकान्तिकत्वम् ।
NR on SV, 2.178.
- 16) कारणदोषबाधकज्ञानरहितमगृहीतग्राहिज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ।
SD of Pārthasārathi, Dharmadatta Jha ed. p. 45.
- 17) Ibid. pp. 45-50.
- 18) प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानमर्थक्रियास्थितिः ।। 1.3ab ।।
PV of Dharmakīrti, Ed. R. C. Pandeya p.2
- 19) अनधिगतविषयं प्रमाणम् । Vide. Bhatta G. P. Epistemology..... p. 79.
- 20) Ibid. p. 80
- 21) MM of Nārāyaṇa Ed. C;K. Raja and S.S. Suryanarayan Shastri, P. 7.
- 22) KSV 2.76, Vide Bhatta G.P. Epistemology..... p. 80.
- 23) TT of Umbeka, Ramanath Shastri ed. p.65.
- 24) प्रमाणं भ्रमः संशयः स्मरणं संवाद इति पञ्चधा ज्ञानं विभजामहे ।
KSV 2.20 Vide, Bhatta G.P. Epistemology..... p. 89.
- 25) Bhatta G P., Epistemology....., p. 122.
- 26) NRM of Pārthasārathi, Ed. Subrahmanya Shastri, pp 52-54.
- 27) NR on SV, 2.47 - 48, Vide, Bhāṭṭa G.P. Epistemology..... p. 125.
- 28) Ibid.
- 29) NRM of Pārthasārathi, Ed, Subrahmanya Shastri, p. 43.
- 30) Bhatta G.P. Epistemology..... p. 145.
- 31) Vide, Bhāṭṭa G.P. Epistemology p. 84.
- 32) TPS of Jayarāṣi, Sanghavi and Parikh ed. p. 114.
- 33) PV of Dharmakīrti, Eng. trans. by S. Mikhaji and H. Nagasaki, p. 73.
- 34) सर्वत्र यौगपद्यात् । JS 1.1.10, द्वयोस्तुप्रवृत्त्योरभावात् । VS 2.2.38.
संख्याभावात् JS 1.1.20, संख्याभावात् । VS 2.2.39. संप्रतिपत्तिभावाच्च ।
VS 2.2.41.
- 35) SB on JS 1.1.6., MD Anandasharma p. 87.
- 36) SB on JS 1.1.17, Ibid, p. 101.

- 37) NR of Pārthasārathi, SV, Ed. Dvarikadas Shastri, P. 97.
 38) Hattori, Diñnāga p.161.
 39) Hattori, Diñnāga p. 162.
 40) वर्ण्यते सूत्रभेदेन येन प्रत्यक्षलक्षणम् ।
 तेन सूत्रस्य सम्वन्धो वाच्यः पूर्वप्रतिज्ञया । । SV, 4.1.
 लक्षणस्याभिधानं तु केनांशेनोपयुज्यते ।
 किमर्थं चानुमानादेर्लक्षणं नात्र कथ्यते । । SV, 4.2.
 न तावदप्रमाणत्वं तेषां नाप्यक्षबुद्धिषु ।
 शक्यतेऽन्तर्गतित्वं न च लक्षणतुल्यता । । SV, 4.3.
 न चापि सिद्धिरेषां स्यादर्थान्तरप्रत्यक्षलक्षणात् ।
 न हि तत्पूर्वकं सर्वं प्रमाणमिति निश्चितम् । । SV, 4.4.
 प्रत्यक्षलक्षणोक्तिश्च नानुमानादिलक्षणात् ।
 विना न सिध्यतीत्येवमर्थक्षेपो न युज्यते । । SV, 4.5.
 तदेतत्पूर्वकत्वेधीर्न च तल्लक्षणाद् भवेत् ।
 तदुक्तेर्वानुमानादि किं न स्यात् तदपूर्वकम् । । SV, 4.6.
 न च लक्षणभेदस्य स्वरूपे यत् तयोरपि ।
 प्रत्यक्षलक्षणादेषां कथञ्चिदवधारणा । । SV, 4.7.
 प्रसिद्धत्वादवाच्यत्वं प्रत्यक्षेऽपि प्रसज्यते ।
 तेनान्यपरिसंख्यार्थं सूत्रं मूढेन वोच्यते । । SV, 4.8.
 न चाप्येतेन सूत्रेण प्रत्यक्षं लक्ष्यते स्फुटम् ।
 तदाभासेऽपि तुल्यत्वात् स्वप्नज्ञानैकवर्जनात् । । SV, 4.10.
 41) Bhaṭṭa G. P. Epistemology p. 150.
 42) Eli Franco, Perception Pp 522-23.
 43) Ibid.
 44) NR of Pārthasārathi, on SV 4.20-21.
 45) विशदं प्रत्यक्षम् । 2.3-4, PMS of Māṇikyanandī.
 46) कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तम् । NB of Dharmakīrti, 1.4.
 47) प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढं नामजात्यादिसंयुतम् । PS of Diñnāga.
 48) PPB.
 49) Bhaṭṭa G. P., Epistemology..... p. 190.
 50) Raju P.T., Structural pp 107-108,
 51) Eli Franco, Perception p. 395.
 52) Ibid.
 53) Ibid., p. 396.
 54) विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः सामान्ये सिद्धसाध्यता ।

- अनुमाभङ्गपङ्केऽस्मिन् निमग्ना वादिदन्तिनः ।
 SD of Pārthasārathi, Dharmadatta Jha ed. p. 63.
 55) त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गाद् यदनुमेये ज्ञानं तदनुमानम् । NB-2.3
 56) Bhaṭṭa G. P., Epistemology, p. 212.
 57) Vide, Bhaṭṭa G. P. Epistemology pp. 244-45.
 58) Raju P.T., Structural..... p. 168.
 59) शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानादसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे विज्ञानम् MD Anandashrama ed. p. 44.
 60) Bhaṭṭa G. P. Epistemology p. 284.
 61) Raju P. T. Structural pp 112-13.
 62) तस्माद्यत् स्मर्यते तत्स्यात् सादृश्येन विशेषितम् ।
 प्रमेयमुपमानस्य सादृश्यं वा तदन्वितम् । । SV, upamāna 37-43.
 प्रत्यक्षेणावबुद्धेऽपि सादृश्ये गवि च स्मृते ।
 विशिष्टस्यान्यतोऽसिद्धेरुपमानप्रमाणता । । SV, upamāna 38.
 प्रत्यक्षेऽपि यथा देशे स्मर्यमाणे च पावके ।
 विशिष्टविषयत्वेन नानुमानाप्रमाणता । । SV, upamāna 39.
 यत्र त्वसादृशादेव कल्पयित्वोपजायते ।
 सादृश्यप्रत्ययस्तत्र तदाभासत्वकल्पना । । SV, upamāna 40.
 समीपस्थोऽपि जानाति सादृश्यं नेति तत्र हि ।
 न बाध्यते समीपादौ यत् तु सादृश्यमेव तत् । । SV, upamāna 42.
 न नैतस्यानुमानत्वं पक्षधर्माद्यसम्भवात् ।
 प्राक् प्रमेयस्य सादृश्यं न धर्मत्वेन गृह्यते । । SV, upamāna 43,
 63) एतत्साधर्म्यवाक्यार्थादुपमानं समीरितम् ।
 एवमेव हि वैधर्म्याद्धर्ममात्राच्च संभवेत् ॥
 MM, Ed. C. K. Raja and S. S. Suryanarayan Shastri P. 113.
 64) Bhaṭṭa G. P., Epistemology p. 306.
 65) अर्थापत्तिरपि दृष्टः श्रुतोवार्थोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यत इत्यर्थकल्पना ।
 यथा जीवति देवदत्ते गृहाभावदर्शनेन वहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पना ।
 MD, Anandashrama ed. p. 46.
 66) अभावावगताच्चेन्नाद् वहिर्भावस्य सूचनम् ।
 पक्षधर्माद्यनङ्गत्वाद् भिन्नैवाप्यनुमानतः । । SV, Arthā. 10-16.
 वहिर्देशविशिष्टेऽर्थे देशे वा तद्विशेषिते ।
 प्रमेये यो गृहाभावः पक्षधर्मस्त्वसौ कथम् । । SV, Arthā, 11.
 तदभावविशिष्टं तु गृहं धर्मो न कस्यचित् ।

- गृहाभावविशिष्टस्तु तदासौ न प्रतीयते । । SV, Arthā, 12.
 गम्यते तु गृहं तत्र न च चैत्रः प्रतीयते ।
 न चात्रादर्शनं हेतुर्यथाभावेऽभिधास्यते । । SV, Arthā 13.
 तेन वेश्मन्यदृष्टावादिति हेतुर्न कल्प्यते ।
 अदर्शनादभावे च प्रमेयस्यावधारिते । । SV, Arthā 14.
 वहिर्भावमतिर्नासौ तेनादर्शनहेतुका ।
 चैत्राभावस्य हेतुत्वं गेहेऽभावश्च संस्थितः । । SV, Arthā 15.
 पूर्वं न चा गृहीतस्य धर्मिणः स्यात् प्रमेयता ।
 न चात्र बाह्यदेशो वा चैत्रो वा गृह्यते पुरा । । SV, Arthā 16.
 67) तेनार्थापत्तिपूर्वत्वमत्र यत्र च कारणे ।
 कार्यादर्शनतः शक्तेरस्तित्वं सम्प्रतीयते । । SV, Arthā 47.
 कार्यस्य ननु लिङ्गत्वं न सम्बन्धानपेक्षणात् ।
 दृष्ट्वा सम्बन्धितां चैषा शक्तिर्गम्येत नान्यथा । । SV, Arthā 48.
 तद्दर्शने तदानीं च प्रत्यक्षादेरसम्भवात् ।
 अर्थापत्तेः प्रमाणत्वं त्रैलक्षण्याद् विना भवेत् ॥ SV, Arthā 49, Ibid.
 68) प्रमाणपक्षकं यत्र वस्तुरूपे न जायते ।
 वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणता । । SV, Abhāva 1.
 69) प्रत्यक्षादेरनुत्पत्तिः प्रमाणाभाव उच्यते ।
 सात्मनः परिणामो वा विज्ञानं वान्यवस्तुनि । । SV, Abhāva 11.
 70) प्रत्यक्षाद्यवतारस्तु भावांशो गृह्यते यदा ।
 व्यापारस्तदनुत्पत्तेरभावांश जिघृक्षिते । । SV, Abhāva 17.
 न तावदिन्द्रियैरेषा नास्तीत्युत्पद्यते मतिः ।
 भावांशेनैव संयोगो योग्यत्वादिन्द्रियस्य हि । । SV Abhāva 18.
 71) गृहीत्वा वस्तुसद्भावं स्मृत्वा च प्रतियोगिनम् ।
 मानसं नास्तिताज्ञानं जायतेऽक्षानपेक्षणात् । । SV, Abhāva 27.

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Glossary

ativyāpti	- over applicability
atyantābhāva	- absolute absence
arthakriyājñāna	- knowledge of practical efficiency
arthaprakātya	- manifestation of object
arthavāda	- explanatary passages
arthānupapadyamānatva	- otherwise inexplicability
arthāpatti	- presumption
arthāvagraha	- contact with an object itself
adṛṣṭakalpanāgaṇava	- burden some imagination of an unseen object
advipravṛtti	- no other tendency
anabhyāsadaśā	- no repeated experience
anavsthā	- infinite regress
anāditā	- beginninglessness
anitya	- non-eternal
anupalabdhi	- non-apprehension
anupalabdhilakṣaṇa	- not the definition of perception, definition of non-apprehension
anumāna	- inference
anumeya	- object of inference
anuvāda	- oral transmission
anaikāntika	- inconclusive, unsteadiness
anyathānupapatti	- otherwise impossibility
anyonyābhāva	- mutual absence
anyonyāśrāya	- mutual dependence
aparokṣa	- direct cognition
apūrva	- resulting agency
apauruṣeya	- non-human origin

apauruṣeyatva	- being the status of non-human origin
abhāva	- non-apprehension
avagraha	- simple contact of sense and object
aviseṣaṇa	- non-qualifying element
asat	- non-existent
ahiṃsā	- no killing of living beings
ajñāna	- ignorance, non-cognition
ākāśa	- ether
ākṛti	- class
āgama	- authoritative sayings
ātmapratyakṣa	- self-perception
ātmānumāna	- inference of self
alocanajñāna	- precognition, simple apprehension
itaretarābhāva	- mutual absence
īhā	- expectation, curiosity to know what is object
upamāna	- analogy
upalabdhilakṣaṇa	- definition of perception
ūrdhvatāsāmānya	- highness of substantial identity
ūha	- probabilistic reason
ekārthanīyama	- rule as one meaning for one sentence
kartāraḥ	- makers, agents
karturasmaranāsiddha	- unapproved by unremembering of author
kṛtakatvaviśeṣaṇa	- being the status of artificial specialization
kṛtakatvānumāna	- inference of production, artificial inference
kārya	- effect, product
kāraṇaguṇajñāna	- knowledge of good qualities inherent in the knowledge causing factors

kharaviṣāṇa	- donkey's horn
guṇāḥ	- qualifying attributes
gamaka	- indicative
guṇavatkarāṇajñāna	- the cause of knowledge possesses excellence
cakraka	- circular reasoning
tadanyājñāna	- cognition of another object
tarka	- reasoning
doṣāḥ	- trustifying attributes
dvi-jāti	- twice-born
drṣṭānta	- example
dharma	- duty
nirālambanavāda	- no substratum theory
nirvikalpaka	- non-determinate, indeterminate cognition
nirviśeṣaṇa	- no character
paratastva	- extrinsicality
parasparāśraya	- mutual dependence
parārthānumāna	- inference for the sake of others
parokṣajñāna	- indirect knowledge
paryudāsa	- relative negation
pakṣa	- minor term
pakṣadharma	- minor premise
pakṣabādhānumāna	- inference of prohibition of minor premise
pauruṣeyatva	- being the status of human origin
pratyakṣa	- perception
pratyabhijñā	- recognition
pradhvarisābhāva	- absence after destruction
pramā	- right cognition
pramāṭṛ	- consider
pramāṇa	- means of cognition
prasajyapraṭiśedha	- absolute negation
pragabhāva	- previous absence
prāmānya	- validity, authoritativeness
bādhakajñāna	- contradictory knowledge sublation knowledge

bādhakābhāva	- absence of sublation
bādhakābhāvajñāna	- knowledge of absence of sublation
buddhijanma	- production of cognition
bhūtaḥimsā	- killing of living beings
bhūyodarśana	- repeated observation
malāpagama	- removing defects
mithyājñāna	- illusory knowledge
mithyokti	- speaking lie
mokṣa	- deliverance
yogipratyakṣa	- mystic perception
yogyatā	- compatibility
yajñīyahimsā	- killing of living beings in sacrifices
vākyabheda	- split of sentence
vācaka	- signifier, denotator
vācakatva	- denotativeness
vācya	- to be signified
vipakṣa	- contrary instance
vipakṣānupalambha	- no experience in contradictory instance
viruddha	- contrary
viśiṣṭa	- specified, particularised
viśāṇa	- horn
vijñānātmaka	- to make an apprehension known
vedāpauruṣeyatva	- being the status of non-human origin of the Veda
vyañjaka	- manifester
vyañjakatva	- manifestation
vyañjanāvagraha	- contact with indication
vyadhikaraṇāsiddha	- unproved with respect to location
vyāpti	- invariable concomitance
śabdatva	- wordness, generality of sounds
śabdanityatva	- eternality of words
śabdaprāmāṇya	- validity of verbal cognition
śākhā	- recension

śāstra	- scripture
śūnyavāda	- theory of emptiness
sat	- existent
satsamprayoga	- appropriate contact
sapakṣa	- similar instance
saṁprayoga	- contact
samyak	- appropriate
saṁvādaka	- consistent knowledge
saṁvādivedana	- experience of consistent knowledge
saṁśaya	- doubt
savikalpaka	- determinate
sarṣapa	- mustered seed
sādhana	- middle term
sādhya	- major term
sāmānya	- generality
sāmānyaviśeṣātmā	- generality as particularised in an individual
siddhasādhana	- establishing the established
surāpāna	- consumption of liquor
sūtra	- aphorism
somapāna	- drinking of soma
smaraṇa	- memory
svarga	- heaven
svatastva	- intrinsicity
svataḥprāmāṇya	- self-validity
svalakṣaṇa	- own character
svetarabhinna	- different from others
hetu	- reason, middle term
jñāpaka	- which makes known
jñāpya	- to be known
jñānāntarasamvāda	- a knowledge agrees with another knowledge of the same object

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(A)

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